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PREDICTABLE ELECTIONS, 
UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Be it for the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the intervention 
in Syria or the alleged interference in the US presidential 
election, Russia has been increasingly under the spotlight 
over the last years. In 2018, the world’s eyes will be upon 
two events: the presidential elections taking place on March 
18, and the World Cup, which will kick off in June. While the 
outcomes of the latter are still uncertain, President Vladimir 
Putin’s victory looks like a safe bet.
Even so, these elections bear important consequences for 
both Russia’s domestic and foreign policy, since they will 
affect Putin’s ability to both cement his power at home and 
pursue his objectives abroad. What are the main domestic 
and international challenges facing Russia? Will Putin 
continue to question the Western-championed liberal order 
or seek reconciliation with the West? The authors of this 
Report address these key issues, offering in-depth analyses 
of Russia’s political system, economy and society, as well as 
tracing their evolution and pointing at future scenarios for 
the EU-Russia relations.
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Introduction
For one reason or another, Russia has been under international 
scrutiny since at least 2013. Be it for the annexation of Crimea 
in 2014 and the subsequent international crisis, Russia’s role 
in Syria, or the alleged interference in the US presidential elec-
tion, the international community has been increasingly direct-
ing its attention towards Russia and its leader. In 2018, two 
Russia-related events are to further attract the world’s interest: 
the presidential elections taking place on March 18, and the 
World Cup, which will kick off in June. While the outcomes of 
the latter are still uncertain, nobody wonders who is going to 
win the elections, with President Vladimir Putin ready to serve 
another six-year-term. 
If the outcome seems so ineluctable, why should these 
elections be worthy of notice? In fact, they bear important 
consequences for Russia’s domestic and foreign policy alike. 
Domestically, the expected high rate of abstention might be a 
problem for Putin’s regime, which is often labelled an “electoral 
authoritarianism” or “illiberal democracy”, and to which for-
mal demonstrations of popular consent matter. Even if Putin’s 
approval rates have been remarkably high throughout the last 
years, a low electoral turnout would undermine the principle 
of legitimacy that even authoritarian regimes need or want to 
boast of. In fact, Putin worries about the prospect of repeating 
the scenario of 2016; back then, the ruling party, United Russia, 
won a comfortable majority in the parliamentary elections, but 
voter turnout hit an all-time low: less than 50% of Russians 
cast their vote, even less in major cities (only 28% in Moscow). 
While Putin is trying to mobilise the electorate through a 
campaign focusing on stability and social policies addressing 
growing inequality – highly sensitive topics for a population 
deeply hit by the international sanctions – the lack of a credible 
and attractive alternative to Putin and the perceived likelihood 
of electoral fraud may keep the participation rate low. 
When it comes to Russia’s foreign policy, the main puzzle 
here is what the post-election “new old Russia” will look like 
and what role it will play in the international arena. One funda-
mental question stands out among many: will Putin continue 
to challenge the Western-championed liberal order or will he 
seek reconciliation with the West? To answer this question, a 
closer look is required, not only in terms of the outcome of the 
elections but also in light of the dynamics at play before and 
after the electoral competition. It goes without saying that play-
ing the nationalist card to boost popular consent may not suf-
fice at a time when economic resources are shrinking. As high-
lighted in the recent ISPI Report Putin’s Russia: Really Back?, 
crucial variables such as the renewal of international sanctions 
or global oil prices will take their toll on the Russian economy 
and may further reduce Putin’s ability to both cement his power 
at home and pursue his objectives abroad.
The authors of this Report paint a clear picture of 2018 
Russia. A picture that is not a static one; on the opposite, not 
only does the Report give a snapshot of Russia’s political sys-
tem, its society, and its main domestic and international chal-
lenges, but it also traces their evolution while pointing at future 
scenarios.
For a start, Alessandro Vitale analyses Putin’s role and po-
sition within the current Russian political system. The author 
describes how the Russian president managed to ensure, Soviet-
style, the personification and indivisibility of power; at the same 
time, his regime sacrificed an independent and powerful civil 
society on the altar of order and institutional stability. What are 
the prospects for future institutional change? Even if combin-
ing economic regeneration and respect of constitutional rights 
with a strong state might prove increasingly problematic in the 
future, Russians keep considering the continuation of Putin’s 
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rule as the best option to keep order at home while regain-
ing great-power status abroad. Since Russian domestic politi-
cal structures largely depend on foreign policy priorities, Vitale 
claims that this situation is likely to endure in the short-to-me-
dium term.
In the second chapter, Aldo Ferrari looks at the increasingly 
conservative attitudes that Putin’s political discourse shares with 
Russian society. Is Russia the “Land of a Conservative Society”? 
The enactment of several conservative bills – just to mention 
a couple, the “anti-gay propaganda” laws or the decriminalisa-
tion of domestic violence – seems to suggest so. Conservatism 
reverberates through Russia’s international image: Moscow has 
indeed become a kind of conservative pole as opposed to the 
most recent Western social and legal developments. As a matter 
of fact, it seems that Russia has been increasingly waging a nor-
mative war against the West and its liberal values. Therefore, to 
fully understand the evolution in relations between Russia and 
the West, Ferrari analyses the emergence of their growing rift 
in terms of values. Nevertheless, Ferrari argues that this picture 
of a rapidly expanding conservatism in Russia’s society should 
not be overestimated; a quick look at key indicators, such as 
abortion or divorce rates, suggests that Russian society is not 
that different from those of secular Western Europe.
Richard Sakwa’s analysis of the nature and role of political 
opposition in Russia follows suit. The author offers an overview 
of both the systemic and non-systemic opponents to Putin’s re-
gime. The former play by the normative rules of regime politics, 
and in certain respects reinforce the administrative aspects of 
Russia’s “managed democracy”. The four parties that are cur-
rently represented in the Russian Duma are indeed the “usu-
al suspects”, as they have enjoyed unbroken representation at 
the national parliamentary level since their foundation. Non-
systemic opposition, on the other hand, includes those parties 
and groups not represented at the national level, such as the 
Yabloko social liberal party, but also “spoiler” parties – that is, 
parties with names similar to existing parties to draw away their 
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votes – and threats to stability such as the Radical Muslim mo-
bilisation and leftist nationalism. The author argues that the 
regime is claiming to introduce elements of competition into 
a fundamentally uncompetitive system to boost turnout, while 
only allowing mildly unconventional candidates not present-
ing a serious challenge to Putin, and barring, for example, can-
didates such as the lawyer and anti-corruption activist Alexey 
Navalny, the only independent and charismatic face of Russia’s 
opposition. 
In his chapter, Alexey Malashenko delves into Russia’s unique 
relationship with Islam. His analysis starts with the figures de-
fining the presence of Muslims in Russia: in 2017, there were 
some 17 million Muslims in the country, i.e. more than 11% 
of its population, although some politicians and state officials, 
including Putin, refer to much higher figures (up to 25 mil-
lion). Muslim migrants from abroad (especially Central Asia) 
have become a part of the Russian Islamic community, and they 
abide more and more by Islamic rules (for instance, in terms 
of alcohol consumption). Some regions, mainly in the North 
Caucasus, are undergoing a process of Islamisation or even 
Shariasation. These factors cannot but shape the Russian gov-
ernment’s policy toward Islam and Muslims, but also Russia’s 
foreign policy goals and concerns. Yet the author maintains that 
the situation in the Russian Muslim community is relatively 
peaceful. Russian Muslims are politically passive and loyal to 
the authorities, even with regard to Russia’s involvement in the 
Syrian conflict. Religious extremism and terrorism, while still 
present, decreased compared to previous years, as did the influ-
ence of and interest in ISIS.
Philip Hanson draws a parallel between Brexiteers and 
Russian advocates of economic sovereignty. Both share a sus-
picious view of foreigners and a readiness to sacrifice or deny 
the existence of benefits from existing patterns of international 
economic integration. The existence of international sanctions 
against Moscow makes the Russian case different, and in fact, 
Russian economic policy has a broader range of aspirations 
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(from import substitution to national control over IT systems). 
After a review of the chief policy document outlining the goal 
of economic sovereignty – the Strategy of Economic Security 
– Hanson spotlights the main challenges to future econom-
ic growth in Russia. He argues that, on the one hand, faster 
growth and protectionism are hardly reconcilable; on the other, 
the different growth proposals contained in the Strategy may 
pose high political costs for the elites, who could, therefore, 
hinder their implementation. For instance, the most important 
recommendation is to improve the business environment, in 
order to reduce the uncertainty experienced by private compa-
nies; this, however, would require upholding the rule of law and 
would drastically reduce the ability of officials to force targeted 
businesspeople to surrender their businesses or to collect bribes.
In the final chapter, Giancarlo Aragona investigates the main 
political dynamics at play both within the West and between 
the West and Russia and looks for the prospect of a possible 
thaw in the troubled relations with Moscow. It is true that the 
Trump presidency could have a dramatic impact on the very 
notion of “West” – given Trump’s peculiar interpretation of 
American interests and approach to power – and, therefore, on 
the West’s position vis-à-vis Russia. However, Aragona main-
tains that Trump lacks the political capital and authority to 
radically change the founding principles of US foreign poli-
cy and to achieve an easing of tensions with Moscow in the 
short-to-medium term, also in light of the investigation into 
Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election. At 
the same time, the author laments that, in shaping the Russian-
Western relationship, the weight of the EU appears relative-
ly marginal. While only some Member States play a signifi-
cant role and are recognised as legitimate interlocutors by the 
Kremlin, the EU needs to agree on a united and balanced poli-
cy platform, showing fewer emotions and more historical depth 
in recognising the perimeters and nature of Russian interests in 
its near abroad and beyond.
Introduction 11
As the old maxim from the Italian novel Il Gattopardo [The 
Leopard] goes: “For things to remain the same, everything must 
change”. It does not seem to be the case with Putin’s Russia. 
But as Putin grows older, and Russia shows increasing signs of 
strain, it remains to be seen whether the old maxim may finally 
come back to haunt him or not.
Paolo Magri
ISPI Executive Vice President and Director
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1. Does Putin’s Strong State Have a Future?
Alessandro Vitale
The long search for a successor who would be able to ensure state 
and institutional continuity ended when the entourage of the first 
Russia’s President found this guarantee in the person of Vladimir 
Putin, nominated Prime Minister on 9 August 1999 and formally 
elected for a first term on 14 March 2000, after Yeltsin’s resigna-
tion on 31 December 1999. Putin has served longer than anyone 
since Joseph Stalin. With 17 years in office, he surpassed the re-
cord of Leonid Brezhnev. Putin became president at age 47 and 
faces re-election to another six-year term this year. He was the 
unavoidable product of a particular institutional design: a strong 
“super-presidential” executive1 and the concentrated power of the 
presidency as an institution. In terms of regime type, Russia is 
formally a semi-presidential constitutional system, but this does 
not tell us much about how the Constitution works in practice.
Granted extensive authority by the 1993 Constitution (con-
servative and centralising, without adequate constraints and check 
and balances) was part of a precise institutional design to ensure 
strong powers for the executive in order to restore a strong state2 
and it has been accentuated by an high degree of institutional 
and personal continuity between the Soviet and the post-Soviet 
1 M.S. Fish, “When More is Less: Superexecutive Power and Political 
Underdevelopment in Russia”, in V. Bonnell and G.W. Breslauer (Eds.), Russia in 
the New Century: Stability or Disorder?, Westview Press, Boulder Co. 2001. See also 
M.S. Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of  Open Politics, Cambridge-New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
2 A.I. Tsygankov, The Strong State in Russia. Development and Crisis, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2014. As declared by Vladimir Putin: “Russia needs strong state 
power ad must have it”. V. Putin, “Rossija na rubezhe tysjachiletii” (Russia in 
between millenia), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 December 1999.
Russian political systems3. The presidency possesses an high de-
gree of freedom of manoeuvre4. As a result, the emergence of a 
presidential state in the 1990s fostered the creation of a system 
that maintained some of the characteristics of the “Soviet order”. 
In fact, based on these premises, Putin’s approach, character-
ised by the pursuit of a policy of “normal politics”, “managed 
normalisation”5, and stability6, permitted considerable changes 
in policy orientations and leadership style that effectively marked 
the beginning of a “new era” in Russia’s politics. Thus, it is not 
surprising that he reasserted the constitutional prerogatives of 
the state that he called “the dictatorship of law”. He managed to 
ensure, following Soviet style, that the regime did not fall under 
3 G.M. Hahn, Russia’s Revolution from Above, 1985-2000: Reform, Transition, and 
Revolution in the Fall of  Soviet Communist Regime, New Brunswick NJ, Transaction 
Publishers, 2002. See also O. Krishtanovskaya and S. White, “Putin’s Militocracy”, 
Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 19, no. 4, October-December 2003, pp. 289-306.
4 However, it is worth remembering that Yeltsin’s political and physical weakness 
allowed the parliament – even after the 1993 crisis – to play a significant role. 
Although the presidency still possessed the upper hand over the parliament, it 
still managed to check the President’s power and influence public policy in a 
number of  significant issue areas because the presidential administration and 
government were often divided. Putin disciplined policy making within the ex-
ecutive branch, and reengineered the internal procedures of  legislative chambers 
in order to ensure consistent and reliable majorities in favor of  presidential rule 
and to direct the whole decision-making process.
5 G. Pavlovsky in “Vremya Novostej”, 30 March 2004. Pavlovsky was a political 
analyst close to the Presidential Administration. “Managed normalisation” was 
supposed to provide the means to revive the state and enable it to incorporate 
different social demands through the creation of  greater state autonomy from 
special interests (oligarchic economic interests and regional political elites). S. 
Prozorov, “Russian Conservatism in the Putin Presidency: The dispersion of  
a hegemonic discourse”, Journal of  Political Ideologies, vol. 10, no. 2, p. 125. See 
also R. Sakwa, “Regime Change from Yeltsin to Putin: Normality, normalcy 
or normalization”, in R. Caeron (Ed.), Russian Politics under Putin, Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 2004, pp. 17-36.
6 Undoubtedly, at the heart of  Putin’s politics of  stability was the influence of  
various phases of  Russian history. In the foreign policy sphere Putin insisted that 
Russia should be treated as a “normal great power”. He also stated that Russia’s 
foreign policy should serve the country’s economic interest, a policy that was 
particularly evident in debates over the Union of  Russia and Belarus.
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the influence of the really independent civil society. Hence, the 
political regime very quickly became insulated from all inter-
nal political actors, such as political parties and the parliament. 
Administrative measures tended to predominate (a system of 
“managed democracy”, in Putin’s words or “sovereign democra-
cy”7 in the notion advanced by Vladislav Surkov8, deputy head 
of the presidential administration between 1999 and 2011, and 
others) as it happened during the Soviet period – in deep con-
trast with an ordered society which mainly operates according 
to spontaneous processes. The idea of a “sovereign democracy”, 
grounded in the integrity of the state, has been paired with the 
concepts of “managed democracy” and “directed economy”, 
both of them presupposing the existence of a strong state. The 
Russian political class has perpetuated two key elements of the 
traditional way of exercising power: the personalisation of it and 
the principle of indivisibility of power which remains monolith-
ic9: that is what has been called “vertical of power”.
7 For an overview of  the issues in defining “sovereign democracy” see A. 
Kasantse, “Suverennaja demokratiya: struktura i sotzial’no-politicheskie funktsii 
konceptsii” (Sovereign democracy: the structure and social-political function of  
the concept), Forum Novejshej Vostochnoevropejskoj Kul’tury (Forum of  the Newest 
East European Culture), vol. 4, no. 1, 2007, pp. 1-16.
8 According to Vladislav Surkov, Russia had its own democratic traditions and 
standards that were different from liberal and pluralist Western notion of  de-
mocracy. “Sovereign democracy” depends on these traditions and standards, 
created and supported by Russian state sovereignty and meant a different “dem-
ocratic” understanding of  rights and political competition. Moreover, State and 
civilisation are mutually supportive, the president is the “unifier of  differences” 
and guarantees against factional politics and “dangerous pluralism”. Obviously, 
“sovereign democracy” was supposed to immunize Russia from the “colour rev-
olution virus” and to guarantee to recover the status of  a “great power”, because 
first and foremost “sovereignty” means competitiveness on international scale. 
So, ensuring sovereignty for Russian democracy would preserve Russia’s status 
of  a great power. See V. Surkov, Russkaya politicheskaya kul’tura. Vzglyad iz utopii 
(Russian political culture. A glimpse from the utopia). V. Surkov, Suverenitet – 
eto politicheskij snonim konkurentosposobnosti. (Sovereignty is a political synonym of  
the ability to be competitive) Moscow, Lenand, 2006; V. Surkov, “General’naya 
Linija” (The main line), Moskovskie Novosti, 3-9 March 2006.
9 L. Shevtsova, “Post-communist Russia: a historic opportunity missed”, 
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The uncertain trajectory 
of post-Soviet Russia’s political system
Despite the continuity in the constitutional and political sys-
tem, undoubtedly Putin represented a shift towards a new style 
of leadership. He inherited the personalised system of rule devel-
oped under Yeltsin (who encouraged the development of teams 
based on loyalty and “protection-obedience”), at the same time 
developing new leadership skills. Not surprisingly, mobilisation 
of the country against internal and external enemies significant-
ly increased. The renewed reliance on the concept of internal 
and foreign enemy, indeed, is often strongly related to a charis-
matic leader. Moreover, a dominant party that resembled that 
of Soviet period, groups of political supporters (like the Nashi - 
youth group), and new party rules that minimised the potential 
for the emergence of new opposition political parties appeared 
on the political scene. An evident innovation, compared to 
Yeltsin’s traumatic “departyisation”, has been also the creation 
of a “new state apparatus” that absorbed many former Party and 
bureaucratic employees, reproducing the hierarchical internal 
structure of the old bureaucracy. While Yeltsin proclaimed de-
mocracy as the main goal to achieve, Putin established a new set 
of rules in the relations between state and society, regions and 
the centre, and officially proclaimed security as the main goal 
of the country’s domestic politics. Furthermore, Putin included 
military figures and siloviki into politics, involving them at high 
levels in Russia’s governing structures. As a result, “stability” hin-
dered the development of a “natural” order, which is something 
that arises when the social, economic, and political systems find 
their own balance. On the contrary, this process undermined 
the spontaneous interaction of pluralistic political and social 
forces. Moreover, the result of a coherent but strong process of 
centralisation was the suppression of every form of (though al-
ready formal) territorial division of sovereignty and power, even 
International Affairs, vol. 83, no. 5, 2007, pp. 891-892.
Russia 2018. Predictable Elections, Uncertain Future16
at the administrative level of decentralisation. Nevertheless, a 
coherent and durable new political order, strong, centralised, 
and controlled from the centre, began to emerge. Be that as 
it may, the Constitution allowed the preeminent power to re-
assert its own predominance while very often violating some 
basic rights and hindering many socio-economic transforma-
tion in the country and slowing down the modernisation of the 
economy. Putin’s technocratic approach has been one of system 
management oriented by the concept of “normality” inside the 
country and “normal great power” in foreign policy. 
Once he rose to power, Putin emphasised the importance of 
the state as a guarantor of order and made the defence of the 
state his first priority. On the opposite, at first he emphasised 
the importance of the rule of law, sponsored legislation facili-
tating the purchase and sale of land, and encouraged proper-
ty-ownership. After his election, he spoke of his “pride in the fa-
therland” and told the public straightforwardly that “for Russia 
a strong state is the guarantee of order, the initiator and main 
driving force for change”10. The measures he took to this end 
were certainly authoritarian11. 
A range of reforms to the state system, announced by Putin 
in 2004 (he was formally elected for a second term on 14 
March 2004), after the tragic and brutal Beslan school mas-
sacre (of 1-3 September), was seen as reflecting a strategy of 
“authoritarian modernisation”. In fact, it was a de facto “mani-
festo” of an authoritarian regime based on the notion of “order” 
(poryadok) that – as it is well known – can be used by the ruling 
political class and the institutions of the administrative system 
to obstacle and subvert political freedom, even formally main-
taining full respect to constitutional rule. As a result, the idea 
of “sovereign democracy” resulted into a regime that tended 
10 See V. Putin, Russia at the Turn of  the Millennium, Appendix to: N. Timakova and 
A. Kolesnikov, First Person, London, 2000, pp. 209-219. See also L. Shevtsova, 
Putin’s Russia, New York, 2003. 
11 P. Longworth, Russia’s Empires. Their Rise and Fall: from Prehistory to Putin, 
London, John Murray Publishers, 2005, p. 315. 
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to substitute for the people, or in a de facto split between the 
regime and society. The concept of “sovereign democracy” per-
petuated the thinking behind the “managed democracy” that 
was characteristic of Putin’s first presidential term. “Sovereign 
democracy” became little more than a synonym for “adminis-
tered democracy” or “managed democracy”. 
Some key aspects and problems of Putin’s 
political system
The key aspects of the debate on the political system in Russia 
can be mainly identified in the problems of domestic territorial 
integrity and the country’s status in the world. Everything, as in 
the past, must be submitted to these key aspects at the core of 
post-Soviet Russia. 
The 1993 Constitution declared that the President only de-
fines the basic directions of the domestic and foreign policy. 
However, during Putin’s rule many different changes strength-
ened the President’s power to manage centre-periphery relations, 
de facto abolishing the federal structure of the state described 
in the Constitution. Already in 2000, Putin established seven 
supra-regional districts headed primarily by loyal individuals, 
emasculating regional leaders and institutions and undermining 
their authority and autonomy. This reform, among other reforms 
aiming at re-centralising powers, had decisive consequences for 
national elections too12. Indeed, the Kremlin succeeded in elim-
12 As Michael Rochlitz wrote: “The governors mostly have no previous ties 
to the region to which they are appointed and they have a higher degree of  
political loyalty to the presidential administration in the centre than governors 
with a strong regional power base”. M. Rochlitz, “At the Crossroads: Putin’s 
Third Presidential Term and Russia’s Institutions”, Political Studies Review, vol. 
13, 2015, p. 62. Moreover, they are rewarded for providing electoral support 
and not for economic performance. On “electoral authoritarianism” and re-
gions see G. Golosov, “The Regional Roots of  Electoral Authoritarianism in 
Russia”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 63, no. 4, 2011, pp. 623-639. Nowadays, in 
order to keep his job a regional governor in Russia has to deliver sufficiently 
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inating divisions among regional elites: as a consequence, by late 
2003, almost all regional leaders were supporting Putin and the 
majority party United Russia13. Putin’s post-Beslan decision to 
eliminate gubernatorial elections de facto transformed the feder-
ation into a unitary state that pays only lip service to the guid-
ing principles of federalism (self-rule of constituent units, shared 
rule, non-centralisation, plural sources of authority, limited gov-
ernment, fragmented sovereignty, and so on). But centralisation 
has reverse effects. It risks the breakdown of government struc-
tures in remote regions. Indeed, it depends on an evident centre’s 
inability (or will) to decentralise decision making14. 
What becomes more evident is that political institutions in 
Russia have been formally created (through a sort of “apparent” 
and “procedural democracy”15) using a Constitution but certain-
ly they do not reflect a kind of “polyarchy”16 characterised by 
both true participation and opposition. The restoration of order 
has been achieved at the expense of political participation too. 
In fact, the people remain very distant from decision-making 
high election results for the President and the ruling party. W. Reisinger and B. 
Moraski, “Defence or Governance? A Survival Analysis of  Russia’s Governors 
under Presidential Control”, in W. Reisinger (Ed.), Russia’s Regions and Comparative 
Subnational Politics, London, Routledge, 2013, pp. 40-62. See also M. Rochlitz, 
Bureaucratic Appointments under Limited Political Competition: Evidence from Russian 
Regions, Working Paper, quoted in M. Rochlitz (2015), p. 62.
13 By 2007, there was no effective opposition to the majority party in the prov-
inces and governors were openly encouraged to deliver votes for it. This party is 
likely to win he elections thanks to monopolistic control over national television 
and solid backing from most regional fractions of  political class. After the mur-
der of  Boris Nemtsov, one of  the most prominent opposition leaders, and the 
inescapable fear it provoked, the regime consolidated power and eliminated all 
the sources of  opposition, real and potential.
14 In fact, the issues not at the top of  the presidential agenda remain ignored. B. 
Judah, Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell in and out of  Love with Vladimir Putin, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, CT, 2013.
15 J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London, Allen & Unwin, 
1976. As it is well known, Schumpeter defined “procedural democracy” as the 
structural competition for votes in exchanges for policies.
16 R.A. Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition, New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press, 1971.
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and the authorities are only weakly and formally accountable to 
society. At the same time, the parliament has been pushed to the 
side-lines of the political system. As a result, nowadays parlia-
mentary and other fractions of political class represent not mass 
movements but their own interests17. Moreover, after the elec-
tions of 2003 and 2007, a powerful hegemonic party (United 
Russia) emerged, which inherited forms of political activity and 
even some traditions of the former Soviet ruling Party, and came 
to dominate the parliament18. The political system, marked by 
formally free and fair elections19, is far from a “model democra-
cy” that preserves the rule of law, separation of powers, shared 
and limited sovereignty, efficient check and balances, protection 
of liberties of speech, assembly, and property rights. The political 
17 Already after January 2000 the Duma became a tool for legislative endorsement 
of  nearly any initiative of  the president. This trend became more marked follow-
ing the 2003 presidential election, when the President’s allies gained the majority 
in the Duma. Nowadays, the Duma is a central arena for wheeling and dealing 
among powerful organised interests. The Russian upper house, the Federation 
Council, lost its political independence it once had enjoyed. See T. Remington, 
“The Russian Federal Assembly, 1994-2004”, The Journal of  Legislative Studies, vol. 
13, 2007, pp. 121-141.
18 As in other authoritarian regimes where the model of  a dominant party regime 
has been used (in Mexico, Malaysia and so on), the rulers and the executive use 
the dominant party to control the political process. The party operates as a giant 
national patronage machine: not only, as it happens everywhere, it gives ambitious 
politicians the opportunity to build political careers, but thanks to their privileged 
access to the government, they can reward the wealthy and powerful interests that 
back them, steering lucrative contracts or jobs their way. In this context, the rulers 
benefit by ensuring that politicians will be loyal to the authorities rather than com-
peting against them. Mobilising support for the regime at the elections, the party 
get from the authorities the assurance against the possibility that opposition parties 
would made serious inroads into the ruling party’s dominant status. Obviously, the 
authorities can do it using all their powers of  control over different media and in-
stitutions. Subsequently, the politicians in the dominant party give up their political 
voice in return for the access to the benefits of  office.
19 In Russia the problems of  voter manipulation and electoral fraud have only 
increased. Already “in the 2011-12 electoral cycle the fraud and abuse were con-
sidered so widespread that popular demonstrations broke out”. K. Dawisha, 
“The Putin Principle: how it came to rule Russia”, World Affairs, May/June 2015. 
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system mimics (and undermines) some aspects of western dem-
ocratic systems, actually serving the main purpose of creating a 
unified, centralised, and strong authoritarian state. 
As it happens in many authoritarian regimes worldwide, dem-
ocratically elected presidency and regimes are routinely ignoring 
constitutional limits (when they are present)20 on their power. 
Indeed, relatively free elections are not in contradiction with 
strong executives, concentration of power, centralisation, fights 
against other groups and fractions of potential political “coun-
ter-political class” (oligarchs or opposition), weak legislatures 
and judiciaries, and few civil and economic liberties. Similarly, 
these countries have a “delegative” rather than “representative” 
character although consensus is high21. Basically, consensus 
doesn’t matter because a government can, without obstacles, rely 
on the decision-making process and depoliticise the population. 
Only when it needs its plebiscitary support it tries to temporarily 
re-politicise citizens22.
20 As Thomas Remington noted: “Although the constitution did not give the 
Federal Assembly a formal power of  oversight over the executive, parliament has 
other formal powers which it can use to monitor or check executive power”. T. 
Remington, “The Russian Federal Assembly, 1994-2004”, The Journal of  Legislative 
Studies, vol. 13, 2007, pp. 121-141. As a matter of  fact, however, these powers 
can only be exercised to the extent that the parliament chooses to wield and the 
executive branch consents to their being used. Consequently, “in the current 
period, when political power is highly concentrated in the presidential adminis-
tration, parliament’s oversight power has been reduced to virtually nil”, Ibidem, p. 
129. The critical aspect of  that political environment is the degree to which the 
president dominates political processes. 
21 G. O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy”, Journal of  Democracy, vol. 5, no. 1, 
1994, pp. 55-69. In this context the electorate delegates to the executive every 
process of  decision-making to the executive. The only existing constrain is the 
constitutionally-limited term of  office which can be often bypassed using in-
formal expedients. Nevertheless, Putin’s government is undoubtedly considered 
legitimate by the great majority of  Russians, as evidenced by the outcomes of  the 
various electoral cycles along with his consistently high personal ratings through-
out different terms. Moreover, Putin’s approval rates skyrocketed after the an-
nexation of  Crimea and the so-called “Putin generation” largely supports the 
President and shares his worldview, despite the poor performance of  institutions. 
22 G. O’Donnell, “On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual 
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Instead of being accountable to the representative institutions 
and constrained by the Constitution, in Russia the government 
became de facto independent from all forms of sub-state consti-
tutional, political, and social organisations. In fact, the political 
system lacks effective mechanisms of accountability. It is quite 
evident that formal, procedural democracy does not lead to an 
effectively working constitutional system which first and fore-
most means protection of constitutional rights. In this context, 
this sort of regime is mainly under-institutionalised. 
Not surprisingly, in this context, a leader can become strong 
and even ignore those whom he is meant to represent. Moreover, 
the role of non-formalised but strongly operative practices is 
very relevant in post-Soviet Russia. It depends on widespread 
forms of neo-patrimonialism23, the absence of independence of 
the administration, the de facto widespread private appropri-
ation of public offices with their arbitrariness, the use of tax 
system as an authentic weapon against enemies or powerless 
and coercible people, patronage, personalistic rule, legal arbi-
trariness, and corruption.
Problems”, World Development, vol. 21, no. 8, p. 1367. The notion of  a “delegative” 
political system is very relevant in the Russian case and has a clear application to 
this country. It is not surprising that it has been fruitfully used in analysing this 
case-study. However, the use of  “full delegation” of  authority analysing Russian 
politics remains controversial because of  the nature of  institutions.
23 N. Robinson, “Russian Neo-patrimonialism and Putin’s ‘Cultural Turn’”, 
Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 69, no. 2, 2017, pp. 348-366. According to Lilia 
Shevtsova, concentrated power in Yeltsin’s and Putin’s regimes proves that both 
have evolved in a “neo-patrimonialist” direction. L. Shevtsova (2007), p. 898. 
Stephen E. Hanson used term “plebiscitarian patrimonialism” which refers to 
the right to rule “as if  the state were its ‘personal property’” claimed by the 
Russian leadership. The results of  this rule are then electorally ratified by the peo-
ple, intended as a true reflection of  the “(general) national will”. “Plebiscitarian 
patrimonialism differs from other forms of  patrimonial rule, in its very real priv-
ileging of  the electoral mechanism for building state legitimacy”. S.E. Hanson, 
“Plebiscitarian Patrimonialism in Putin’s Russia: Legitimating Authoritarianism 
in a Postideological Era”, The Annals of  the American Academy, 636, July 2011, pp. 
32-48.
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The entwining of institutional and personal factors in a weak 
(or sham) constitutional order24 (Scheinkonstitutionalismus) and a 
still under-developed civil society encouraged the dominance of 
a power system centred on the presidency. In Russia, particular-
istic informal practices have been in tension with the proclaimed 
principles of the universal and impartial prerogatives of the con-
stitutional state. A set of informal behavioural norms predom-
inate even though it does not formally violate the letter of the 
Constitution. Moreover, this kind of informal behaviour (due 
to the fact that historically Russia has failed to acquire the basis 
of constitutionalism and still embodies the “coherent” version 
– that is, without the constitutional exception – of the mod-
ern State) is governing every political practice25, but ultimately 
proves counter-productive because it relies on the personal 
24 It is clear that (as it happened with the various Soviet “pseudo-constitutions”) 
Russia’s 1993. Constitution failed to define and limit the powers of  the leadership. 
It even did not even attempt to fulfill the classic functions of  a Constitution, let 
alone foster the practices of  constitutionalism such as the impartial exercise of  the 
rule of  law, limited government a true separation and balance of  powers. This is 
embedded in the 1993 document, although this separation is unbalanced in various 
aspects. In fact, the Russia’s post-Soviet constitution actually establishes the basic 
principles of  the polity but it lacks tools to limit the exercise of  power.
25 As Michael Rochlitz wrote: “These informal practices, permeating every level 
of  government, often replace formal institutions and determine the way political 
decision are taken, policies are implemented, and jobs and positions are distrib-
uted. They permit the ruling elites and the Russian president to mobilize resourc-
es, balance between competing clans […]”. M. Rochlitz (2015), p. 59. However, 
according to the “institutional” view of  Russian policy-making, one should not 
underestimate the participation of  institutionalised policy participants such as 
the government, ministries, bureaucratic agencies, policy experts, some business 
associations and social actors in the decision-making process. This approach 
takes into account the influence of  the Russian institutional structure on the pol-
icy strategies of  agencies and individual actors and possesses an high degree of  
complexity. It takes into account also grass-roots initiatives carried out by local 
communities interacting with local administrators. See M. Khmelnitskaya, The 
Policy-Making and Social Leaning in Russia: the Case of  Housing Policy, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave McMillan, 2015; L.J. Cook, Postcommunist Welfare States: Reform Politics in 
Russia and Eastern Europe, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2007; S. 
Wengler, Post-Soviet Power, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
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intervention of leadership politics and administration rather 
than on the self-sustaining practices of a genuinely constitutional 
system. 
Since Yeltsin’s time, personalised leadership and its oligarchic 
allies operated largely independently from the formal rules of 
the political and constitutional systems. This is the reason why 
the pyramidal political class that inherited the Soviet system 
considered itself free from accountability and popular supervi-
sion and surveillance. 
Does Putin’s strong state have a future?
Each presidential term has entailed unforeseen developments 
and policy choices. In the past fifteen years, Russia experienced 
radical shifts in the balance of internal power across the institu-
tions. It may suggest that Russia’s political balance of power is 
likely to evolve still further. For example, after the wave of pro-
tests in 2011-2012 there was an evident and growing institu-
tional disequilibrium. However, it is clear that Russians today, 
as in the past, desire a “stability of power”. The federal executive 
continues to be the pre-eminent force in the Russian polity and 
by all indications political class and people, despite street pro-
tests26, support this and will ensure its long-term continuation. 
It is too easy to say that cultural and historical preconditions 
made this development (the authoritarian drift) inevitable27. In 
fact, this state of affairs is not necessarily permanent. Obviously 
a shift to a more balanced relationship between the constitu-
tional branches and a true balance of power will require signif-
icant and deep regime changes28. The role of interests and the 
26 S. White, “Taking it to the Streets: Raising the Costs of  Electoral 
Authoritarianism in Russia”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 14, no. 
4, 2013, pp. 582-598.
27 V. Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes, Pittsburgh, 
PA, University of  Pittsburgh Press, 2015.
28 T. Remington (2007), pp. 121-141.
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strategies of domestic stakeholders are crucial29. 
In fact, the Kremlin’s monopoly on policy-making is absolute 
and concentrated. An élite faction that concentrate power in the 
hands of a leader who relies on bureaucracy, security forces, and 
big business for support, perpetuates its rule by making its con-
trol over access to power unchallengeable30. The government is 
barely accountable to society and its representatives. The sys-
tem presents some illiberal aspects and an evident “delegative” 
character31. Centralisation and authoritarian policymaking are 
quite evident. Success in restoring order is achieved through 
coercion, corruption, and repression32, making the outlook for 
the future uncertain at best33. In such a regime, the potential for 
reform is fairly limited.
The current one-party dominance is so entrenched that is 
far from giving way to a more truly competitive party system. 
Political parties in Russia don’t offer alternative visions of pol-
icy direction and the parliament is not an authentic arena for 
deliberation. The media are not as free as they were at the be-
ginning of the 1990s. The members of the parliament are not 
encouraged to stake out policy positions independent of the 
President. They are not counterweights to the executive branch 
and its decisions. The absence of independence and the use of 
29 “For instance, the president would need give up much of  the informal power 
he possesses, and other institutions (such as parliament) would need at least to 
win an independent political mandate from the electorate”. Ibidem, pp. 121-141.
30 This involves co-opting, weakening, or destroying rival factions, creating sanc-
tions to prevent defection from the winning group, and reducing the possibility of  
threats emerging from the electoral system. N. Robinson and S. Milne, “Populism 
and political development in hybrid regimes: Russia and the development of  offi-
cial populism”, International Political Science Review, vol. 38, no. 4, 2017, p. 415.
31 Achieving security over control of  power constricts the space for free political 
competition by strengthening authoritarian political practices. Ibidem, p. 415.
32 As Taylor puts it: “The authoritarian state-building project is likely to fail”. 
B.D. Taylor, State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion After Communism, 
Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 321.
33 G.B. Robertson, “Book Review: State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and 
Coercion after Communism”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 45, no. 3, 2012, pp. 
394-405.
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administrative methods to marginalize political opposition, re-
duced the freedom of manoeuvre for opposition political par-
ties and candidates in elections. A balance in the distribution 
of power inside the institutional structure became almost a uto-
pia. Furthermore, there are still complicated issues at stake. The 
strong centralisation creates problems and makes it difficult to 
find local solutions. National interest groups and judicial bodies 
are still dependent on the executive. The relationships between 
government and big business, the state and the economic forces 
(of free enterprise, when they are still active) is quite contro-
versial and difficult to solve. The fusion of power and property 
is quite evident. Legislation and arbitrary power often prevail 
without control. The economic sphere continues to experience 
heavy political pressure, also for foreign policy reasons34. 
As it is well known, Russia’s economy in Putin’s third term 
is still dangerously dependent on energy exports and hydro-
carbons. This dependence became increasingly prominent and 
poses several questions to economic stability. After sanctions, 
Russia still needs investment capital from the world markets. 
Russia needs cooperation and assistance in developing Siberia 
and the Far East. A sort of “closed commercial state” (in Fichtean 
sense) is destructive to Siberian and Far East’s potentialities. 
Russia has problems with strengthening international econom-
ic relations. Furthermore, Russia has been suffering from a long 
and deep “brain drain”. Russia has lost young scientists, entre-
preneurs, economists, and engineers. They now live and work 
outside the country.  The country’s problems, arising from an 
aging and declining population, can only be reversed by years of 
sustained economic growth. In fact, the gradual “restatisation” 
34 Celeste A. Wallander even argues that Russia’s “patrimonial authoritarianism” 
is also at the root of  its foreign policy strategy: indeed, geopolitical goals are 
pursued primarily not through military means, but rather “Through commercial 
relationships and transnational patron-client relationships. The interests at stake 
are not national security interests arising from geopolitics or national wealth”. 
C.A. Wallander, “Russia’s Transimperialism and its Implications”, Washington 
Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 2, 2007, p. 119. 
Russia 2018. Predictable Elections, Uncertain Future26
of the Russian economy, along with Putin’s elimination of both 
regional and national political opposition, can exacerbate the 
difficulties connected with the new presidential term.
In a strong state with strong personal rule, both the pow-
er system and the constitutional order succumb to “clientelist” 
pressures and intense fight for power, exerted by powerful in-
terests in society. The government assumes an independent po-
litical existence, but at the same time, it also becomes a regime 
dependent on informal political practices35. The way in which 
the Russian political class have begun to deploy state resources 
to stay in power represents an interesting example in authori-
tarian political regimes36. The state’s role in determining elec-
toral outcomes is quite evident and crucial because the political 
class needs elections to legitimize its rule. However, as it is well 
known among political scientists, elections can unexpectedly 
change. They can suddenly acquire a more significant, promi-
nent procedure, especially during a time of crisis, in which they 
might acquire meaning again37. 
The future development of the Russian regime is facing dif-
ferent scenarios: repressive authoritarianism, political decay, 
regime collapse, creeping democratisation38, a systemic crisis, 
35 See, for example, the classic book of  D. North, Institutions, Institutional Changes 
and Economic Performance, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 
1990. According to Hanson, these overly-personalised and informal institutions 
are the biggest obstacle to systemic modernisation and economic development 
of  the country. P. Hanson, “The Economic Dimension of  Russia’s moderniza-
tion”, in S. Gusti, Modernizing Russia: Internal and External Implications and Challenge, 
ISPI Studies, 2011, pp. 25-44. 
36 The state controls economic resources: those controlled by society (or “eco-
nomic sphere”) are incomparable. Consequently, who is in power has a tremen-
dous and unfair advantage. Moreover, the tight-knit circle, the group of  security 
officials (the so-called siloviki), the restricted “power équipe” (with a high level 
of  small group cohesion) around the President sought to use public positions 
for personal gain, being protected by the same political system. But according to 
Taylor, although they “Represent a highly unified corporate identity, there are in 
fact also divisions among the siloviki”. B.D. Taylor (2011).
37 As dictators in Kenya, Serbia, and so on recently learned at their expenses.
38 As wrote Lilia Shevtsova: “To understand Russia today one needs to be aware 
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continued stagnation, or some transformation towards liberal 
democratic and true constitutional political order. Admittedly, 
it is difficult to imagine why should the political class change 
habits, mentality, and interests, supporting transformations that 
might undermine its position introducing reforms39. The peri-
od of stagnation that began in 2013 gave the political class an 
additional push in the direction of political restoration40 and if 
it will continue, it is more likely that it will end with new forms 
of authoritarianism aimed at hindering a continuous decay.
Post-Soviet state building is complex and controversial be-
cause the Soviet legacy generated particularly inauspicious 
conditions for the rebuilding of institutions. The policies of 
post-Soviet Russia have failed even to generate coherent author-
itarianism. Indeed, the country still lacks any consensus about 
its basic principles of state legitimacy and it is very complicated 
to study and describe what is happening under the surface of 
Russian society. No one knows for sure for how long people 
will be satisfied with the status quo, the economy, the politi-
cal system, and the political class in power. It remains an open 
question if Putin has strengthened the state or merely a specific 
regime. In fact, Russia is still dysfunctional. 
The main problem is how to combine economic regenera-
tion, respect of constitutional rights, political stability, and 
the elimination of social distress with a strong state. But this 
process is a complex one: in Russia, the political regime has 
led to a combination of weak institutional structures and the 
of  a complicated interplay of  continuity and change, in which continuity often 
imitates change discrediting the very ideas of  innovation and modernization”, L. 
Shevtsova (2007), p. 891.
39 Undoubtedly, there was a kind of  historical regularity, a sort of  gravitational 
force that constantly pulled Russia in the direction of  autocracy and repeatedly 
overcame forces that might have caused her to abandon it. That force was the 
self-interest of  the Russian ruling class. Moreover, as pointed out Marshall T. 
Poe: “Autocracy enabled the elite to successfully defend its interests both against 
external and internal threats”. M.T. Poe, The Russian Moment in World History, 
Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2003, p. 103.
40 M. Rochlitz (2015), p. 65.
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over-management of the political system41. Official populism 
(the protection and unification of the people) justifies a dim-
inution in political pluralism while giving no guidance on 
how to reconstruct state and public administration and solve 
the material problems that Russia faces.42 In sum, this kind of 
leadership, whose authoritarian form is characterised by an ac-
tive and dynamic “Caesarist strategy”43, is clearly fraught with 
contradictions44 and becomes increasingly hard to manage. The 
policies of post-Soviet Russia have failed to generate coherent 
authoritarianism. In Russia, Caesarism cannot assure the “nor-
malisation” of the political and civil society. Nevertheless, par-
adoxically society sees the ruler as the guarantor of order and 
certainty. Indeed, the majority of Russians is ready to support 
a constitutional change allowing Putin to be elected forever 
and without any term limits. Feeling increasingly powerless in 
influencing the political process, people became cynical about 
the importance of the elections. Thus, Putin’s rule is considered 
the best chance, compared with the unpredictability of fair and 
free elections. But in fact, the country still lacks any consensus 
about basic principles of state legitimacy45. Where power is ex-
41 N. Robinson and S. Milne (2017), p. 413.
42 Ibid., p. 422.
43 A “Cesarist strategy” (in Gramscian terms) “Is one in which a leader or gov-
ernment opts for a series of  authoritarian measures to cover up potential insta-
bilities that might occur at the level of  civil society”. O. Worth, “Unravelling the 
Putin Myth: Strong or Weak Caesar?”, Politics, vol. 29, no. 1, 2009, p. 54.
44 State capacity to control the country politically – through massive investment 
in the security apparatus and legislative measures aimed at controlling election 
outcomes better – do not correspond to positive effects in terms of  state effi-
ciency and coherence. See M. Mendras, Russian Politics: The Paradox of  a Weak 
State, London, C. Hurst & Co., 2012. As stated Richard Sakwa: “Putin’s model of  
‘democratic statism’ became high contradictory”. R. Sakwa, “Putin’s Leadership: 
Character and Consequences, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 60, no. 6, 2008, pp. 879-
897. Furthermore, it is not difficult to find some incompatibility between the 
informal institutions put into place to guarantee the political control of  the 
country and the kind of  institutions needed to foster economic growth. See M. 
Rochlitz (2015), p. 62.
45 S.E. Hanson, “The Uncertain Future of  Russia’s Weak State Authoritarianism”, 
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cessively centralised, discontent may emerge, especially when 
State interests are still involved and deemed more important 
than individual or societal interests and priorities, as it was un-
der the totalitarian rules of the Nineteenth century. Due to this 
fact, many conflicts may appear in Russia. As Lilia Shevtsova 
pointed out in 2007, new conflicts may explode: “Between the 
regime’s attempts to manage business and the needs of the mar-
ket; between the state’s expansion and it attempts to control 
society and the population’s aspirations to run its own affairs; 
between the growing Russia’s integration into the globalised 
world and the Kremlin’s attempts to close off society from ex-
ternal influences”46. Formally Russia remains a strong state but 
in practice it could reverse into a weak state because of its char-
acteristics and the fact that is frequently unable to deliver on its 
promises. Consequently, even situational factors which today 
appear to ensure stability may tomorrow have an opposite ef-
fect. At times, elite attempts of building plebiscitary support 
for authoritarian rule have opened up the potential for genuine 
revolution from below47. 
Russia has been ruled for most of its history by autocratic 
governments, but to infer from this historic recurrences that 
Russian people are somehow predisposed to authoritarian gov-
ernments48 is to ignore that popular and constitutional gov-
ernments are exceptionally rare in world history, particularly 
before the Twentieth century49. Copying ideas, policies, and 
institutions from abroad is difficult in Russia since they are de-
rived from the experience of other cultures. 
Admittedly, Putin’s address to the country on 26 May 2004 
East European Politics & Societies, vol. 21, no. 1, February 2007.
46 L. Shevtsova (2007), p. 906.
47 It must be remembered that social and political protests are not new to Russia 
and have played an important role in the history of  the strong state system. 
A.I. Tsygankov, The Strong State in Russia. Development and Crisis, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2014, p. 155. 
48 This is also the Putin’s opinion. See V. Putin, “Address to the Federation 
Council” delivered on 12 December 2012.
49 M.T. Poe (2003), p. 2.
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stating his priorities such as “A stable democracy and devel-
oped civil society” was in deep contrast with the concrete re-
alisation of a strong state. It must be noted, on the contrary, 
that the idea that the collapse of the Soviet Union would im-
ply the end of Russia’s great-power status (maintaining of der-
zhavnost’: Russian national greatness) is flawed. In fact, a strong 
state is the main tool to achieve, both at home and abroad, the 
true aim of the government: the status of great-power. Despite 
every academic discussion about “electoral authoritarianism”50, 
“hybrid regime”51, or “competitive authoritarianism”, we must 
consider first and foremost that the post-Soviet Russian state 
is based on the permanent search for new spheres of influence, 
possibly through the territorial enlargement of the post-imperi-
al country. The Russian political class subordinates every other 
problem to this dilemma – and always did. 
Russia’s domestic political structure largely depends on its 
foreign policy priorities. Thus, on regional scale, this tenden-
cy is particularly dangerous, considering that nearly every state 
border in the former Soviet Union remains uncertain, fuzzy, 
and hotly questioned. At any rate, in Russia the problem of the 
strong state is still open and the future of the country remains 
uncertain. 
50 A. Schedler, “Electoral Authoritarianism”, in R. Scott and S. Kosslyn (Eds.), 
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences, New Jersey, John Wiley & Sons, 
2015.
51 S. Levitsky and L.A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After Cold 
War, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
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2.  Russia. A Conservative Society?
Aldo Ferrari
Over the last few years, Russia has been increasingly in conflict 
with the West. It is a primarily geopolitical contrast that reflects 
a different and conflicting view of international relations, par-
ticularly on the post-Soviet areas placed between Russia and 
the European Union (South Caucasus and Eastern Europe, es-
pecially with reference to Ukraine and Georgia). In addition to 
such a geopolitical contrast, the cleavage between Russia and 
the West tends to assume a cultural dimension, too. From the 
ideological point of view, in recent years, Russia has in fact be-
come a kind of conservative pole as opposed to the most re-
cent Western social and legal developments. Therefore, to fully 
understand the evolution of the relations between Russia and 
the West, we should also consider the emergence of a grow-
ing distance in terms of values. Besides, the nature and aims of 
contemporary Russian conservatism are quite controversial and 
have often been subjected to biases1.
1 See, for example, A. Makaryschev and A. Yatsik, A New Russian Conservatism: 
Domestic Roots and Repercussions for Europe, Notes Internationals, Barcelona Centre 
for International Affairs (CIDOB), no. 23, June 2014; D. Ernst, “Putin’s Right 
Hook: The Strategic Implications of  Russia’s New Conservatism”, The Federalist, 
24 February 2014; P. Grenier, “The Varieties for Russian Conservatism”, The 
American Conservative, 19 June 2015; L. Polyakov, “Conservatism” in Russia; Political 
tool or historical choice?, Russie.Nei.Visions no. 90, Institut français des relations in-
ternationals (IFRI), Russia/NIS Center, 2014; Y. Netesova, What does it mean to 
be Conservative in Russia?, Institut français des relations internationals (IFRI), 
December 2015; K. Bluhm, Modenization, Geopolitics and the New Russian 
Conservatives, Frei Universität Berlin, 2016; Konservatizm vo vnešnej politike: 
XXI vek (Conservatism in Foreign Policy of  the XXI Century), 2017.
A conservative shift?
As a matter of fact, at first, Putin’s ideology was not conserva-
tive. His leadership style tended to incorporate a large spectrum 
of ideological positions from both liberal and nationalist sides, 
mainly stressing on the importance of managerial figures. This 
non-ideological stance was first challenged by the colour revo-
lutions in Georgia (2003) and particularly in Ukraine (2004). 
After those traumatic political events, suspected by the Kremlin 
of being promoted by the West, the regime began to move to-
ward a more coherent ideological posture in order to avoid any 
revolution in Russia itself2. But it was a rather slow process. 
Still, in 2006, even the leading party of the country, United 
Russia, could not be considered a conservative one. As the jour-
nalist Yulia Netesova observed, “There were many things that I 
could say about United Russia in 2006, but I never thought of 
it as a conservative party […]. Looking back from 2016 I un-
derstand that I was wrong. The conservative wave was coming 
and Putin knew it all the way […] So when did this all happen? 
How can a Russian be a conservative? Does this mean some-
thing different in Russia?”3.
According to most analysts, Putin’s true conservative shift 
occurred only in his third presidential term, after some years of 
active incubation. 
The role of the Orthodox Church
The growing role of the Orthodox Church in the Russian so-
ciety was certainly key in this process. Orthodoxy is Russia’s 
most important religious tradition since the Baptism of the 
country (988).  In the cultural vacuum that followed the eclipse 
2 M. Laruelle, Putin’s regime and the ideological Market: A difficult balancing 
Game, 16 March 2017.
3 Y. Netesova, “What does it mean to be Conservative in Russia?”, The National 
Interest, 10 August 2016.
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of communist ideology after the fall of URSS in 1991, the 
Orthodox Church rapidly gained a remarkable place in Russian 
society thanks to its moral and spiritual prestige4. 
The death of Patriarch Alexy II and the election of 
Metropolitan Kirill to the Patriarch’s throne in 2009 inaugu-
rated an era of closest cooperation between the Church and 
the State. The idea, already stated in 2000, that the Church 
could implant Christian values in social decisions at the na-
tional and international levels, started to be concretely put in 
practice. Unlike Patriarch Alexy II, who used to hold a largely 
neutral, detached position with respect to the state, political 
parties, and conflicts, from the very beginning Patriarch Kirill 
promoted the active participation of the Church in the political 
life of the country5. Although Orthodoxy is not the official re-
ligion of Russian Federation, which recognis es four traditional 
religions (including Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism), in the last 
years, this process led to a growing collaboration between the 
State and the Church. Today, Putin and the Patriarch show a 
large convergence of interests on many issues, starting from the 
defence of the so-called “traditional values” (family, ethical is-
sues, demographics, to name just a few).
The emergence of an official conservatism
The defence of these traditional values is obviously at the cen-
tre of the new Russian conservatism, which emerged through a 
quite complex evolution. The neo-Eurasian ideas of Aleksandr 
Panarin (1930-2003), Vadim Tsymbursky (1957-2009), and 
Aleksandr Dugin (1962) have made a contribution to this 
4 D. Shmonin, Religion and Education in Contemporary Russia: the Dynamics of  Recent 
Years, ISPI Studies, February 2014.
5 S. Firsov, “Tserkov’i gosudarstvo pri Sviateyshem Patriarkhe Kirille 
(Gundiaeve): osnovniye tendentsii razvitiya” (Church and State under Patriarch 
Kirill (Gundyaev): main trends of  development), Vestnik Russkoj christianskoj gu-
manitarnoj akademii (Herald of  the Russian Christian Humanitarian Academy), 
vol. 14, no. 3, 2013, pp. 351-360. 
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intellectual elaboration, but their ideological radicalism only 
partially fits this aim. Indeed, the diffused overestimation of 
Dugin’s role does not help in understanding contemporary 
Russia6. As Marlene Laruelle argues, “Dugin’s networks are 
those of the European New Right, rooted in barely concealed 
fascist traditions, and with some assumed intellectual and indi-
vidual affiliations with the Nazi ideology and post-Nazi elusive 
transformations. On the contrary, the Kremlin has progressive-
ly created a consensual ideology without doctrine, founded on 
Russian patriotism and classical conservative values: social or-
der, authoritarian political regime, the traditional family etc”7.
As a matter of fact, these conservative values emerged from 
other and less radical Russian intellectual circles. One of the 
most relevant initiatives of the growing conservatism in Russia 
is the founding of the so called “Conservative Press Club” in 
2003 by the journalist Egor Kholmogorov and the political sci-
entist Mikhail Remizov. In 2004, the internet platform pravaya.
ru became a very active centre of conservative ideas hosting, 
in 2006, the important manifesto “Imperatives of National 
Rebirth” (Imperativy Natsional’nogo Vozrozhdenia). This text, 
written with the contribution of Sergey Baburin, who played an 
important political role in the beginning of the Nineties against 
Yeltsin’s Western-oriented reforms, appealed for the formation 
of a “National Conservative Union”. In the same year, a sim-
ilar text, The Russian Political Conservatism, written mainly by 
Mikhail Remizov and Boris Mezhuev, was published, while the 
huge (800 pages) document called Russian Doctrine – which 
can be considered the most comprehensive project of the new 
conservative trend – appeared in 2007. Many representatives of 
the contemporary Russian conservatism worked on this text: 
6 See for example A. Barabashin and H. Thoburn, “Putin’s Brain: Alexander 
Dugin and the Philosophy Behind Putin’s Invasion of  Crimea”, Foreign Affairs, 
31 March 2014. 
7 M. Laruelle, “Dangerous Liasons: Eurasianism, the European Far Right, and 
Putin’s Russia”, in M. Laruelle (Ed.), Eurasianism and the European Far Right: 
Reshaping the Euro – Russian Relationship, London, Lexington Book, 2015, p. 23.
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Michail Leont’ev, Vitalij Aver’janov, Egor Kholmogorov, and 
Mikhail Remizov. The later Patriarch Kirill joined the discus-
sion around this document too8.
In 2012, Alexandr Prokhanov, a well-known writer and 
publicist who, since 1991, appealed for the national rebirth of 
the country upon conservative political and moral principles, 
founded the Izborsk Club, a true centre of the new ideology 
in Russia, which among its member includes the First Deputy 
Prime Minister Dmitrii Rogozin, Alexander Dugin, and some 
of the authors of the Russian Doctrine, such as Vitaly Aver’ianov. 
This group produced another important document, the so-
called Mobilitation Project, which gives a particularly intense 
version of the new Russian conservatism9.
As a matter of fact, a large group of Russian intellectuals 
worked on the elaboration of a cultural conservative platform, 
which aimed at becoming the official ideology of the country. 
They usually shared the idea of Russia as an independent civili-
sation mainly based on the view of the Orthodox Church and 
proposed a kind of modernisation that was different from the 
liberal and individualistic type chosen by the West. These ideas 
were already largely embraced by the government during the 
Medvedev-Putin tandem, but they gained a somehow official 
status only at the beginning of Putin’s third presidential term, 
in 2012.  
After the huge wave of demonstrations that swept Russia 
from December 2011 to March 2012, instead of making con-
cessions to this emerging political opposition, Putin choose a 
completely different direction. His re-election was followed 
not only by a series of legislative measures designed to restrict 
the activities of the opposition by further limiting the activities 
of NGOs and by reducing Internet freedom, but also by the 
8 K. Bluhm, Modernization, Geopolitics and the New Russian Conservatives, 
Frei Universität Berlin, 2016.
9 M. Laruelle, “The Izborsky Club, or the New Conservative Avant-Garde in 
Russia”, Russian Review, vol. 75, no. 4, 2016, pp.  626-644.
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launching of a conservative ideological campaign10. Putin de-
cided to give this conservative posture a more official stance by 
commissioning works from several think-tanks. The Institute 
of Socio-Economic and Political Research (ISEPR) became the 
main group engaged in elaborating ideas of conservatism11.
In an interview released on 4 September 2013 Vladimir 
Putin, who previously accurately avoided any identification 
with a specific ideology, even accepted the label of “conserva-
tive pragmatist”:
I think it is perfectly possible to say that I am a pragmatist with 
a conservative orientation [...]. Conservatism does not mean 
stagnation, anyway. Conservatism means reliance on traditional 
values but at the same time it aims at development […].  And 
usually, in almost every country of the world the conservatives 
gather the resources and promote the  economic growth, but 
then the revolutionaries come and destroy everything in a way 
or another12.
As a matter of fact, these words give a good explanation of 
Putin’s personal approach to conservatism, which for him is not 
a definite ideology, but a kind of political, economic, and mor-
al platform for Russia. Even before the crisis in Ukraine and 
the dramatic rise in political confrontation, Putin had clear-
ly indicated the gap with the West in terms of values. Some 
observers have even referred to a “cultural war” launched by 
Putin13, which had its climax in the speech made by the Russian 
President on 19 September 2013 at the final plenary meeting 
of the Valdai Club, the international forum organised by the 
Ria Novosti agency that brings together politicians, Russian 
analysts, and civil society from Russia and abroad. On this oc-
casion, as well as tackling a series of political issues, Putin also 
10 A. Ferrari, A new struggle between power and culture in Russia, ISPI Analysis n. 231, 
4 February 2014. 
11 M. Laruelle (2017). 
12 Interv’ju Pervomu kanalu i agenstvu Associated Press.
13 See D. Clark, Vladimir Putin’s culture war, 8 September 2013.
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spoke about issues with a social and even a moral dimension: 
Another serious challenge to Russia’s identity is linked to events 
taking place in the world. Here there are both foreign policy and 
moral aspects. We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic coun-
tries are actually rejecting their roots, including the Christian 
values that constitute the basis of Western civilisation. They are 
denying moral principles and all traditional identities: national, 
cultural, religious and even sexual. They are implementing poli-
cies that equate large families with same-sex partnerships, belief 
in God with the belief in Satan14.
Putin reiterated many similar arguments in the speech to the 
Federal Assembly on 12 December 2013, stating: 
We know that there are more and more people in the world 
who support our position on defending traditional values that 
have made up the spiritual and moral foundation of civilisation 
in every nation for thousands of years: the values of traditional 
families, real human life, including religious life, not just mate-
rial existence but also spirituality, the values of humanism and 
global diversity. Of course, this is a conservative position. But 
speaking in the words of Nikolay Berdyaev, the point of con-
servatism is not that it prevents movement forward and upward, 
but that it prevents movement backward and downward, into 
chaotic darkness and a return to a primitive state15. 
In Putin’s political discourse, traditional values are now exalt-
ed according to an openly conservative approach. The Russian 
President is rapidly becoming a kind of icon of global conserva-
tism16 and his popularity grows even among the US representa-
tives of this current17. Not by chance, a star of the US conserv-
atism as Pat Buchanan wondered whether “Is Vladimir Putin a 
paleoconservative? In the culture war for mankind’s future, is 
14 Vladimir Putin Meets with Members the Valdai International Discussion Club. 
Transcript of  the Speech and Beginning of  the Meeting.
15 hiip://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/19825  
16 B. Whitmore, Vladimir Ilyich Putin, Conservative Icon, 19 December 2013. 
17 D. Ernst (2014); P. Grenier (2015). 
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he one of us?”18.
One of the most striking points of this ideological course is 
the Federal Law “for the Purpose of Protecting Children from 
Information Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family 
Values”, also known in English-language media as the  “an-
ti-gay propaganda law”. This law, drafted by Yelena Mizulina, 
the chairperson of the Russian Duma’s Committee on Family, 
Women, and Children, was almost unanimously approved 
by the State Duma on 11 June 2013 (with just one absten-
tion) and signed into law by President Putin on 30 June. It is 
remarkable to observe that according to a survey conducted in 
June 2013 by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public 
Opinion (VTsIOM), almost 90% of Russians surveyed were in 
favour of the law19.
This ideological line puts Russia in growing contrast with 
Europe and the United States, as demonstrated already by the 
decision of many Western leaders to boycott the Sochi Winter 
Olympic Games in early February 2014 in order to protest 
against Russia’s “anti-gay propaganda” law. Anyway, Moscow 
did not change its stance and on the basis of such conservative 
ideas, the minister of culture Vladimir Medinsky drafted, in the 
beginning of 2014, a document titled Materials and proposals 
for a project of the bases of a cultural policy of the state, which can 
be considered a kind of official document of the new Russian 
ideological orientation. This document rejects, for example, the 
Western principles of multiculturalism and tolerance:
Without denying the right of any nation to preserve its eth-
nographic identity, we consider unacceptable the imposition 
of values alien to the Russian society. No reference to “creative 
freedom” and “national identity” cannot justify a behaviour un-
acceptable from the point of view of Russian traditional values. 
[...] At the same time, the term “tolerance” in its modern sense 
18 P.J. Buchanan, “Unlike Nixon, Trump Will Not Go Quietly Thursday”, Official 
Website, 14 December 2017.
19 Law Banning Gay Propaganda: Pro et Contra, Russian Public Opinion 
Research Center (VCIOM), Press Release no. 1553, 11 June 2013.
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does not allow a clear separation between the racial, ethnic and 
religious intolerance and intolerance to social phenomena that 
are alien and dangerous from the point of view of Russian soci-
ety and its inherent values, which leads to inappropriate use of 
the term “tolerance” for the purposes of state cultural policy20. 
The law for the partial decriminalisation of domestic violence 
signed by President Putin on 7 February 2017 is usually con-
sidered another important step in the conservative process. This 
law was also drafted by Yelena Mizulina. The Russian Orthodox 
Church and the traditional “family values” organisations sup-
ported Mizulina’s efforts. For instance, the All-Russian Parents’ 
Resistance has warned that criminalisation of  familial battery 
will lead to prosecution of parents who were acting in their chil-
dren’s best interests21.
Nevertheless, this picture of a rapidly expanding conserva-
tism in Russia’s society, mainly within the family, should not 
be overestimated. For instance, a recent survey of the already 
quoted All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion 
states that the relationships within the family are being quickly 
modernised. The position of men is still strong:  29% recognize 
that the husband is the head of their families (34% among male 
respondents; 61% of those think that the eldest man should be 
head of the family); only 7% mention the wife (12% among 
women). At the same time, according to this survey, the au-
thoritarian approach in Russian family is quickly displaced by a 
much more democratic attitude and the family life of Russians 
keeps improving: married or cohabiting persons are comforta-
ble with its various aspects much more than it was five or ten 
years ago22.
20 hiip://stdrf.ru/media/cms_page_media/127/kultpolitika.pdf . 
21 See D. Litvinova, “If  He Beats You, It Means He Loves You”, The Moscow 
Times, 5 August 2016. 
22 Russian Public Opinion Research Center, “Modern family: who is the head?”, 
Press release no. 1970, 7 July 2017. 
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A thousand-year glorious history
Besides the insistence on traditional moral values, in recent 
years the Russian government has devoted a huge attention 
also to the country’s history aiming to consolidate the nation 
around a single official version of the past. This state-led ap-
proach tends to glorify both the Tsarist and Soviet legacy, ex-
alting the historical continuity and greatness of Russia’s histo-
ry. President Putin has introduced the idea of what he terms a 
“thousand-year history” that incorporates many glorious pages 
from the country’s past, including the victories over the Poles 
in 1612 and the French Grande Armée in 1812, the heroic 
though useless defence of Sevastopol during the Crimean war, 
and mainly the Soviet Union’s 1945 victory over Germany in 
the Great Patriotic War23. This list includes also Russia’s takeo-
ver of Crimea in 2014, but not the 1917 Revolution. Indeed, 
although almost all members of the Russian elite – President in-
cluded – have been members of the Communist party, the 1917 
Revolution represents a delicate political and cultural problem. 
It was in fact a moment of violent rupture of the Russian state 
system, which before “stabilising” in the Soviet regime caused a 
bloody civil war and the emigration of millions of people. From 
this point of view, the Revolution was an event that has nothing 
positive in the eyes of those who hold power in contemporary 
Russia: “[…] but then the revolutionaries come and destroy 
everything in a way or another”. As a matter of fact, Putin has 
consolidated a neo-conservative regime that refuses every po-
litical bottom-up upheaval, from the “colourful revolutions” of 
Georgia and Ukraine to the “Arab Springs”. In this perspective, 
the 1917 Revolution is too important an event to be completely 
ignored, while appearing intrinsically negative. The same holds 
true for its leader, Lenin, who upended the Russian political 
system and whose figure, although still positively evaluated by 
public opinion, is not well-regarded by the elite. Unlike his 
23 See A. Kolesnikov, A past which divides. Russia’s new official history, Carnegie, 
5 October 2017.
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successor, Stalin, who is instead seen as the rebuilder of the state 
– obviously in Soviet form – and the winner of World War II, 
which the Russians call the Great Patriotic War.
As a recent survey conducted by Levada Center shows, 
Russian public opinion is very divided on its assessment of the 
revolutionary event:
Tab. 1 - Do you think that the October revolution played 
a positive or negative role in Russia’s history?24
  November 1996
October 
1999
October 
2000
March 
2014
March 
2017
Very positive 19 18 17 8 10
Mostly positive 28 28 32 40 38
Mostly negative 21 25 22 22 25
Very negative 12 10 13 6 6
It is difficult to say 21 20 17 24 21
In this situation, Russian authorities are understandably reluc-
tant to assume a too definite position on the 1917 Revolution. 
The October anniversary is in fact largely perceived as an ob-
stacle to the construction of a national identity with no room 
for contrast between the Red and White epigones. Kremlin’s 
current authorities wish for a shared national self-conscious-
ness, proud of the past as well as the present and the future of 
the country. Instead, the instances of internal fracture, destabi-
lisation and risk for the existence of the Russian state are starkly 
condemned. In this sense, the 1917 Revolution fits in a series of 
negative times, ranging from the Epoch of the Torbids (Smuta) 
– which at the beginning of the Seventeenth century almost 
led to the collapse of the young Russian empire – to the first 
post-Soviet decade, when Yeltsin’s uncertain guidance seemed 
24 hiips://www.levada.ru/en/2017/04/21/the-october-revolution 
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to push the country in the same direction. Putin, the strong 
leader who according to the great majority of the Russians has 
brought the country on the right track, cannot therefore be 
excited about the centenary of the Revolution. In the run-up to 
the March 2018 presidential elections, which should sanction 
its easy re-election, Putin chose to devote to the Red Star’s cen-
tenary limited attention, if not hostility.
Putin’s role is central also in deciding which historical figures 
should be considered particularly important for contemporary 
Russia. This is the case, for example, of the Prime Minister of 
the Russian Empire Pyotr Stolypin (1862-1911) and the phi-
losopher Ivan Ilyin (1883-1954). Putin decided that Ilyin’s re-
mains were to be reinterred in Russia in 2005, and a statue of 
Stolypin was erected outside the Russian White House in 2012. 
The importance of history as a major criterion of self-identi-
fication for ordinary Russian citizens is confirmed by surveys 
conducted by the independent Levada Center showing that, in 
recent years, the number of respondents who list history among 
the key factors that instil a sense of pride in Russia has been 
consistently high (around 40%)25. 
The other Russia against the conservative shift
Therefore, religion, traditional values – particularly in family 
life – and shared national history seem to be the main pillars of 
the official conservatism launched by the political elite of con-
temporary Russia. But, as observed from a liberal point of view 
by Masha Lipman, the picture is not so simple:
 Russia’s social conservatism is a complicated, controversial issue. 
The country may appear to be fairly conservative, if one looks at 
its widespread homophobia or public condemnation of irrever-
ence toward Russian Orthodox Church. Yet, when it comes to 
other social habits, such as divorce, abortion, or birth rate, the 
picture is very different. Russia has one of the world’s highest 
25 A. Kolesnikov (2017). 
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rates of both divorce and abortion, and some of the most liberal 
laws on the latter. Russia’s birth rate is not dissimilar from that 
of secular cultures of western Europe. Premarital sex and single 
motherhood are fairly common; in one survey, a mere fourteen 
per cent of respondents said they believed a single parent can’t 
raise a child properly. And while a large majority of Russians 
identify themselves as Orthodox Christians, the proportion of 
those attending services or observing religious rituals in Russia is 
not dissimilar from many European countries26. 
Besides, the conservative shift is not shared by a large part of the 
most educated component of Russian society27. During the first 
years of his rule, Putin has been able to count on extensive pop-
ular support, thanks both to a generally positive economic trend 
and to the widely inclusive nature of his ideology. As a matter of 
fact, he succeeded in cutting any real political opposition almost 
to zero. After being largely excluded by the voters themselves, the 
parties making up the liberal opposition failed to get into parlia-
ment. In recent years, rather than expressing themselves in the 
political arena, these parties have limited themselves to a number 
of key sites of cultural action. Anyway, since 2011, Putin and his 
party lost consensus in the larger cities, above all in Moscow and 
St Petersburg. A new kind of opposition emerged, mainly among 
Western-friendly people. This opposition has different channels 
of expression. Probably the most remarkable among them are the 
newspaper “Novaja Gazeta” owned by Mikhail Gorbachev and 
State deputy Alexander Lebedev28, the human rights association 
“Memorial”, dedicated to the victims of Soviet repression29, the 
Levada Center, a non-governmental sociological research or-
ganisation founded towards the end of the Soviet period30, the 
26 M. Lipman, “The Battle Over Russia’s Anti-Gay Law”, The New Yorker, 10 
August 2013. 
27 L. Shevtsova, Valdajskaja doktrina Putina (La dottrina di Putin a Valdai), cit. in A. 
Ferrari and S. Giusti, A new struggle between power and culture in Russia, ISPI 
Studies no. 231, 4 February 2014.
28 An English version is available on-line: hiip://en.novayagazeta.ru/
29 hiip://www.memo.ru
30 hiips://www.levada.ru
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Carnegie Moscow Center, established in 1994 as a subdivision of 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington31, 
and the radio station “Ekho Moskvy” (The Echo of Moscow)32. 
Furthermore, a growing number of personalities in Russian 
culture openly oppose the establishment and its conservative 
orientation. The clash between power, personified by Putin, and 
much of the world of Russian culture actually began several years 
ago33. Obviously, it is often hard to pin down this multifacet-
ed cultural opposition to a specific political identity. This is the 
case, for example, of Eduard Limonov, a sometimes disconcert-
ing writer and political activist who was a supporter of the Serbs 
in the Bosnian civil war in the Nineties, founder of the National 
Bolshevik Party (banned in 2007) as well as ally of ex-world chess 
champion Garry Kasparov in the political coalition “The Other 
Russia”. Limonov was arrested on numerous occasions and con-
demned for his political activities, and his paradoxical positions 
and solipsist extremism make him an isolated though fascinating 
figure within the scene of intellectual opposition to Putin.
A more consistent civic and political stance distinguishes 
writer-journalists like Arkady Babchenko and Yulia Latynina, 
who also work for Novaya Gazeta. Both, like Anna Politkovskaya 
before them, paid great attention to the war in Chechnya which 
Babchenko experienced first-hand as a soldier. This trend has 
grown rapidly in recent years, sweeping up numerous Russian 
writers in its wake. The well-known Boris Akunin (pseudo-
nym of Grigory Chkhartishvili, born in Tiblisi in 1956 to a 
Georgian father and Jewish mother), has begun to play an in-
creasingly active role in Russian political life, starting a blog 
called Love of History, a platform for comments on numerous 
historical and political events that are extremely critical of the 
Russian regime34. 
In the last few years, many leading Russian authors openly 
31 www.carnegie.ru 
32 hiip://www.echo.msk.ru  
33 See A. Ferrari and S. Giusti (2014).
34 hiip://borisakunin.livejournal.com
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aligned themselves with this opposition and their activities con-
tinue to defy Putin and his regime. Russian literature therefore 
seems to have at least partially regained the role it had in the 
Tsarist and Soviet periods when it acted as a catalyst for political 
protest. This trend is also confirmed by interviews given by a 
number of intellectuals discussing the conservative ideas up-
held by Putin. For example, when asked how to interpret recent 
laws on foreign funding of NGOs and against blasphemy and 
homosexuality, film director Andrei Nekrasov stated: 
The regime is at a certain stage – it’s getting old. It needs an 
emergency injection of support at any cost, even at the cost of 
these scandalous laws. These laws are popular in Russia because 
there’s a deep culture of conservatism in the country and Putin 
needs the support that comes from this ideological element35. 
Russian contemporary art, like literature, is becoming increas-
ingly hostile to the establishment, on occasions clashing with it. 
As well as the all-too famous case of Pussy Riot, we just have to 
think of artist Konstantin Altunin, whose provocative paintings 
of Putin and Medvedev in women’s underwear led to him hav-
ing to flee the country36. There is no shortage of similar exam-
ples. In fact, the rise in “protest culture”37 in recent years seems 
destined to continue growing in the near future, lending sup-
port to the theory that culture will represent one of the main 
thorny issues that Putin has to tackle. The picture that emerges 
is basically one of a growing conflict between the broadening 
conservative establishment and a large segment of Russian so-
ciety, in particular, of its more educated and modern classes. 
This conflict reflects and partly determines the gradual rise of a 
strong opposition to Putin within the educated middle classes 
35  PEN interviews Russian writers ahead of  G-20 Summit in St. Petersburg, 
ICORN, 25 August 2013.     
36 R. Oliphant, “Putin in negligee painting forces artist to flee Russia”, The Sidney 
Morning Herald, 29 August 2013.
37 See in this regard the in-depth study by M. Gabowitsch, Putin Kaputt!? Russlands 
neue Protestskultur, Berlin, Suhrkamp Verlag, 2013.
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in the big cities, an opposition that will certainly increase in the 
near future, also in response to the increasingly conservative 
bent of his ideology. The risk, which is clearly apparent to those 
aware of Russia’s historic dynamics, is that the country is head-
ing towards a duel between culture and power like the one that 
took place during the last decades of Tsarist Russia and ended 
with no winners. 
The growth of conservatism within Russian society 
Anyway, at the moment the conservative line is apparently 
prevailing. As a matter of fact, Russian society is getting even 
more conservative. In 2003, in response to the question “Do 
you personally sympathize with the ideas of conservatism or 
not?”, 37% replied “definitively yes” or “probably yes”, while 
33% answered “probably not” or “definitely not”; 30% were 
undecided. In 2014, 48% answered “yes”, definitively or prob-
ably, 35% replied “definitively or probably not”, while 17% 
remained undecided38. 
But apart from the rise of conservative attitudes among 
Russian citizens, the main question concerns the true meaning 
of this ideological evolution for those in power. Is this conserv-
ative shift only a kind of short period ideological tool to divert 
the attention of the Russian population from the growing eco-
nomic difficulties? Or should we look at this process in a dif-
ferent way, taking into serious account its relation with Russia’s 
earlier cultural and political tradition?
Most part of Western scholars tend to prefer the first answer. 
According to Marlene Laruelle, 
The Kremlin does not have many options at its disposal to main-
tain control of the public sphere. The very inspiring theme of 
nationalism poses inherent problems in terms of its contents 
(impossible to get unanimous definitions) and endangering 
both the survival of the regime (the mobilising potential of 
38 L. Polyakov (2015). 
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nationalism is largely anti-Kremlin) and the country (risk of 
increased ethnic tensions, and the issue of the integration of 
migrants). Only moral conservatism can become more explicit, 
with benign effect. It enjoys a silent majority, respects social hi-
erarchies, does not call the legitimacy of the Kremlin into ques-
tion, stigmatizes sexual minorities that are less threatening than 
ethnic minorities, and lacks destabilising potential39. 
The Polish scholars W. Rodkiewicz and J. Rogoża recognize 
only an instrumental meaning to Russian conservatism:  
At the outset of his third presidential term, Vladimir Putin open-
ly declared that henceforth he would be guided in his policies by 
“conservative values”. However, in reality the Kremlin has been 
treating its own conservative ideology in a purely instrumental 
manner. Its resort to conservatism has been aimed solely at en-
hancing the legitimacy of the regime by claiming that it reflects 
Russian tradition. While it is the Kremlin’s genuine intention to 
maintain a strong, centralised state authority, the conservative 
social and moral rhetoric is in fact being used as just another “po-
litical technology”, i.e., a tool for manipulating public opinion, 
both at home and abroad. The invocation of this ideology means 
neither that the current rulers of Russia really adhere to conserv-
ative values, nor that that they have a long-term programme to 
implement them. We are in fact dealing with another kind of 
“Potemkin village”, the aim of which is to divert public attention 
from Russia’s real socio-political and economic problems, and to 
provide the authorities with arguments to implement repressive 
internal policies and an anti-Western foreign policy40.
Anyway, the question of Russian contemporary conservatism 
probably deserves a less biased approach. In such a perspec-
tive, some useful indications can come from both the West and 
Russia. So, Canadian scholar Paul Robinson, at the end of an 
article linking Putin to the long tradition of the Russian liber-
al-conservatism (Frank, Struve, Berdjaev, Ilin), concludes: “But 
39 M. Laruelle, “Conservatism as the Kremlin’s New Toolkit: an Ideology at the 
Lowest Cost”, Russian Analytical Digest, no. 138, 8 November 2013.
40 W. Rodkiewicz and J. Rogoża, Potemkin Conservatism: an Ideological Tool of  
the Kremlin, Russian Analytical Digest, no. 171, 14 July 2015.
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the point here is not whether liberal-conservatism is the right 
choice for Russia. Rather, the issue is that we in the West fail to 
recognize this ideology for what it is. Putin has a clear vision of 
a strong, centralised, law-based government with defined and 
limited competences, consistent with native Russian schools of 
thought. Our relations with Russia would be greatly improved 
if we were to acknowledge and engage with this reality instead 
of tilting at irrelevant caricatures of a police state”41.
Another interesting suggestion comes from the Russian 
scholar Leonid Polyakov, who stresses the fact that the new 
Russian conservatism has something to say not only to the 
Western right-wing political leaders and ideologists: “However 
the pivot towards Asia promises very different prospects for the 
Russian conservative discourse. Putin’s conservative formula 
(development on the back of national traditions) is an almost 
perfect match both for Asian modernisations that has already 
taken place (in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) and 
the hopes and intentions of the next modernisation projects 
in the East and the South-East. Most importantly, this formu-
la perfectly reflects the experience of the People’s Republic of 
China, the main strategic partner of today’s Russia”42.
A particularly interesting result of the Russian contemporary 
reflection about conservatism can be considered the special is-
sue of the journal “Russia in Global Affairs” that appeared in 
May 2017 with the title Conservatism in Foreign Policy of the 
XXI Century. In the introduction to this volume, that includes 
articles written by many leading Russian historians and politi-
cal scientists, Fydor Lukyanov starts from the fact that President 
Putin called conservatism his political credo, at the same time 
reflecting and inspiring the emergence of such an ideologi-
cal perspective in the Russian society. But in his perspective, 
conservatism is not only a reserve of national moral values. 
According to Lukyanov, indeed, conservatism must be regarded 
41 P. Robinson, “Putin’s Philosophy. The Russian leader’s paradoxical, strong-
state ‘liberal-conservatism’”, The National Conservative, 28 March 2012. 
42 L. Polyakov (2015). 
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as the most appropriate approach to the present international 
scenario, where a new political situation is rapidly replacing the 
liberal order that followed – or seemed to follow – the fall of 
Soviet Union in 1991. Not only Russia, but also China and 
USA after the election of Donald Trump, are actually building 
the future of their countries on the basis of the primacy of the 
national cultural tradition. Therefore, Russia should definitive-
ly dismiss the liberal Western-oriented attitude, that in any case 
is no longer so impelling because of the dramatic rise of the 
East in global politics. From this point of view, conservatism is 
not an old-minded ideology but an extremely effective political 
instrument to manage the new post-liberal and post-Western 
international order43.
Conclusion
The conservative stance elaborated in the last years will proba-
bly remain at the centre of the Russian political discourse in the 
future. It was a real success, indeed. In foreign policy, it has al-
lowed Russia to find a common language with many non-West-
ern countries and even with representatives of conservatism in 
Europe and the United States, thus gaining for the first time 
since the collapse of Soviet Union a kind of soft power beyond 
its borders. Within the country, the stress on conservatism pro-
duced a largely shared platform of cultural and moral values 
that only a minority of Russian citizens seem to refuse from 
a liberal and Western-oriented point of view. In a multi-eth-
nic country such as the Russian Federation, the emergence of 
a radical ethno-nationalist movement is probably more danger-
ous for the elite than this kind of opposition. Therefore, Putin’s 
regime is presently giving some concessions to the liberal wing, 
mainly in economics, recalling such figures as Aleksei Kudrin 
43 F. Lukyanov, “Konservatism dlja épochi nestabil’nosti”, in Konservatizm vo vnešnej 
politike: XXI vek (Conservatism in Foreign Policy of  the XXI Century), 2017.
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and Sergei Kirienko44. But this happens within a largely es-
tablished conservative orientation that is presently the leading 
force of the Russian political discourse.  
44 M. Laruelle (2017).
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3.  Moscow: In Search for an Opposition
Richard Sakwa
Institutionalised political contestation and opposition is an es-
sential component of a democratic society, but in keeping with 
the profoundly hybrid character of Russian politics, the coun-
try both has and has not an opposition. In formal constitution-
al terms, it is clear that elections are held regularly, public space 
is populated by political parties that regularly compete in elec-
tions, and there is a vigorous clash of ideas and programmes. At 
the same time, it is clear that something is missing: the essential 
ingredient that makes elections genuinely competitive accom-
panied by the alternation of power. Although the precise out-
come of each electoral cycle is unknown, and every election in 
Russia throws up its own surprises, the broad result is entirely 
predictable. It has now become almost proverbial to state that 
Russian practice inverts the usual formula of stability of rules 
and uncertainty of outcomes into a permanent instability of 
rules and certainty of outcome.
There are many ways to conceptualise the contrast between 
an apparently competitive party and political system and the 
managed character of the process. Andreas Schedler outlined 
the concept of “electoral authoritarianism”, in which he de-
scribes how formally free elections lack the freedom, fairness, 
and integrity appropriate for a genuine liberal democracy, and 
instead become instruments of an authoritarian rule rather than 
of democracy1. Levitsky and Way have identified “competitive 
authoritarianism” as the defining feature of many post-com-
munist systems, a regime type that, they argue, should be 
1 A. Schedler (Ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of  Unfree Competition, 
Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006.
distinguished from democracy on the one side, and full-blown 
authoritarianism on the other2. Both these models have been 
widely and creatively applied, and they accurately diagnose the 
problem. However, such models tend to lack a sense of the dy-
namic elements in such systems, a feature which is certainly 
apparent in Russia. 
For this reason, the dual state model probably has more to of-
fer. In contemporary state theory, the constitutional state exists 
separate from the government and the ruler of the time, and en-
dures beyond the lifespan of a particular administration, and is 
rooted in law and statute and a certain idea of the general public 
good. The constitutional state is regulated by impartial norms 
of law and managed by a disinterested bureaucracy. In Russia, 
this Weberian ideal has been subverted by the emergence of 
an enduring administrative regime, which draws its legitimacy 
from claiming to apply the principles of the constitutional state 
and derives its authority from its representation of the com-
mon good, but in practice exercises power in ways that subvert 
the impartial and universal application of the rules established 
by the constitutional state. Already under Boris Yeltsin in the 
Nineties there was a divergence between the practices and the 
culture of power of the administrative regime and the consti-
tutional state. Instead of consolidating the rule of law, the au-
thority of constitutional institutions such as parliament and the 
formal procedures of modern governance, “regime” practices 
predominated, characterised by arbitrary interventions and the 
management of elections. Under Vladimir Putin, from 2000 
onwards, the administrative regime became rather more sophis-
ticated. The regime did not repudiate the formal framework of 
the Constitution, but the sphere of discretion (which exists in 
all political systems), became extraordinarily wide3.
2 S. Levitsky and L. Way, “The Rise of  Competitive Authoritarianism”, Journal of  
Democracy, vol. 13, no. 2, 2002, pp. 51-65; S. Levitsky and L.A. Way, Competitive 
Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010.
3 R. Sakwa, “The Dual State in Russia”, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 26, no. 3, 
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Dynamics of systemic opposition
It is in this framework that the opposition in Russia operates. 
The conventional distinction is between the systemic and the 
non-systemic opposition. The systemic opposition accepts not 
only the normative framework of regime politics, but in certain 
respects reinforces the administrative aspects of what in Russia 
is called “managed democracy”. Four parties are currently rep-
resented in the State Duma (the lower house of the bicameral 
parliament): United Russia (UR), the Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of 
Russia (LDPR), and Just Russia (Spravedlivaya Rossiya, SR). 
These parties have enjoyed unbroken representation at the na-
tional parliamentary level since the first significant election af-
ter their foundation.
United Russia was established in 2001 through the merger of 
Unity with the remnants of what, at one time, appeared to be a 
winning opposition combination. Unity was created in autumn 
1999 to represent the regime after the failure of the previous 
body occupying the niche of what is called “the party of pow-
er”, Our Home is Russia. On the other side, the combination 
of Fatherland and All Russia (OVR), headed by the mayor of 
Moscow Yuri Luzhkov and the veteran politician and former 
Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, represented the emergence 
of a genuine opposition party. The December 1999 parlia-
mentary election saw Unity do remarkably well after just a few 
months of existence, but only after a ferocious official media 
campaign against Primakov, who had been nominated by OVR 
to be its presidential candidate in the March 2000 elections. 
The December 1999 election was as much a contest between 
regime types as between parties. The election represented a fate-
ful turning point. Although there is still plenty of pluralism in 
the Russian political system, late 1999 was the moment when 
July-September 2010, pp. 185-206; R. Sakwa, The Crisis of  Russian Democracy: 
The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2011.
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the possibility of a change of administration by an organised 
opposition force was possible. Putin’s election to the presidency 
in spring 2000 ushered in a new era during which the advantag-
es of regime incumbency would be institutionalised and care-
fully managed. The system had already emerged under Yeltsin, 
notably in the 1996 presidential election when Gennady 
Zyuganov, the CPRF leader, had been defeated through the 
application of massive administrative and financial resources 
(aided by American advisors). However, it was only in the early 
Noughties that what had been ad hoc and reactive became sys-
temic and organised.
In the new Putin system, order and stability became the 
watchwords. United Russia dominated the party, electoral and 
legislative spheres, and although other parties survived, the 
“systemic opposition” was effectively forced to align with UR. 
Like Mexico’s Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in an 
earlier age, UR united the various elite factions and aggregated 
their interests. The party also became the vehicle for bureau-
crats and the channel for their advancement. Even Putin was 
aware of the party’s limitations, and this is why in 2011 he cre-
ated the All-Russia People’s Front (ONF) to act as a check on 
the bureaucratic degeneration of the pedestal party and as an al-
ternative vehicle for monitoring and political mobility. United 
Russia is not the ruling party but the dominant party, a very 
different political model. It is the party of power, not the party 
in power. It does not rule, since this is achieved by the profes-
sional administrative class in the Presidential Administration 
and the government, but it acts as the dominant force in the 
party and electoral spheres, and provides the majority in parlia-
ment to pass the regime’s legislation.
Russia’s democratic institutions are smothered by the regime. 
Critique of the regime is stifled or channelled into the impo-
tent fulminations of the CPRF and LDPR, while SR became 
increasingly supine under the leadership of Sergei Mironov. 
Just Russia had been established by Vladislav Surkov in the 
mid-Noughties to provide a left-centre balance to United Russia 
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but failed to develop as an autonomous social democratic par-
ty.  In 2011-2012, some of the SR deputies emerged as genu-
ine oppositional figures, notably father and son Gennady and 
Dmitry Gudkov and Ilya Ponomarev, but in the next few years, 
they were expelled from parliament and the party. Just Russia 
lost all dynamism and momentum. Although it had achieved 
membership of the Social Democratic International, the very 
survival of the party is increasingly questioned. 
The CPRF, under its aging leadership, remains loyal to an 
imprecise version of Orthodox Sovietism – a combination of 
Russian Orthodox religiosity and Soviet-era nationalism, com-
bined now with an assertive Russian patriotism. Earlier, there 
had been an expectation that the party would evolve and adopt 
some sort of social democratic programme, but instead it de-
vised a peculiar niche of its own4. Although ferocious in its cri-
tique of the government in parliament, the CPRF was careful 
not to offend Putin and tended to vote with the regime on most 
important bills. Its social conservatism only amplified the tradi-
tionalist character of the regime, especially marked after Putin’s 
return for a third presidential term in 2012.  
As for the LDPR under Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s flamboyant 
leadership, it represents Russia’s small-town and obscurantist 
nationalism. Its characterisation as a populist party is accurate 
to the degree that it reflects a certain anti-elitist and anti-met-
ropolitan animus, as well being critical of the West and glo-
balisation. Like populism elsewhere, its programme remains 
amorphous in classic ideological terms and leader-centred. In 
parliament, it tends to vote with the regime. It is unlikely that 
the party will survive once Zhirinovsky retires.
A crisis of all the major systemic parties can be identified. 
Even though UR remains dominant, its ambivalent position 
as a top-down party of power and bottom-up representative 
4 L. March, “For Victory? The Crises and Dilemmas of  the Communist party of  
the Russian Federation”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 53, 2001, pp. 263-90; L. March, 
The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russia, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
2002.
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institution means that its identity is unstable and derivative. 
The CPSU remains the largest opposition party but is voter 
base is eroding, while the long-term future of the LDPR and 
Just Russia is in doubt. 
The non-systemic opposition
The idea of a “non-systemic” opposition is becoming increas-
ingly redundant. The term covers those parties and groups 
not represented in the national parliament, although some 
may retain a presence in regional and municipal legislatures. 
Pre-eminent among these is the Yabloko social liberal party, 
led by the veteran oppositionist Grigory Yavlinsky. Yabloko 
is one of the few genuine grassroots parties in Russia, with a 
loyal membership, regular congresses, and a coherent political 
programme. It enjoyed representation in the Duma from the 
first Russian post-communist election in December 1993 until 
it failed to pass the five per cent representation threshold in 
December 2003. Putin’s restrictive party legislation, adopted 
in July 2001 and subsequently amended many times, reduced 
the number of officially registered parties to reach the nadir of 
only seven participating in the December 2011 election. In that 
election Right Cause, the (much degraded) inheritor of the old 
neo-liberal Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), finally crashed 
out of the system, winning only 0.6% of the vote, compared to 
Yabloko’s 3.43%.
In the aftermath of the loosening of party registration laws in 
2012 (see below), the country enjoyed a boom in party forma-
tion, with 77 parties registered with the Ministry of Justice in 
late 2017. Many of these were “spoiler” parties, often choosing 
names similar to existing parties to draw away their vote. This 
was notably the case with the Communist Party Communists 
of Russia, which won 2.27% of the vote in the September 2016 
State Duma election, helping to push down the CPRF vote to 
only 13.34%, its worst performance since 2007. Some activ-
ist MPs from Just Russia had been involved in the 2011-2012 
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protests, including Ponomarev and the Gudkovs, but they were 
soon purged. The loyalist Mironov reasserted his authority, and 
the party soon declined into irrelevance. 
In this period, even the non-systemic opposition man-
aged to achieve a degree of organisational unity. The People’s 
Freedom Party (Partiya narodnoi svobody – Parnas), Democratic 
Choice, and the Party of Progress coordinated their work in 
the Democratic Coalition (Demokraticheskaya koalitsiya) to 
fight the various elections of September 2015, and to provide a 
joint platform in the Duma elections of September 2016. The 
new movement incorporated Vladimir Ryzhkov’s newly-re-reg-
istered and respected Republican Party of Russia. In the event, 
following bitter internecine leadership conflicts – the endemic 
problem of the Russian opposition – Ryzhkov left the party, 
along with some other leading figures including the former Just 
Russia deputy Gennady Gudkov, who fought the election with 
Yabloko. This left the former Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, 
to take the party into the September 2016 parliamentary elec-
tion. Primaries exposed Parnas’s relatively weak voter base as 
well as the severe divisions in its leadership. The top three posi-
tions on its party list were chosen without primaries. Kasyanov 
was designated to head the list, but following a personal scandal 
(exposed on NTV) his position was challenged by activists such 
as Ilya Yashin, who called for his removal. 
On the other flank, the regime has long recognised that the 
greatest threat to its much-vaunted stability comes not from the 
disorganised and largely ineffective democratic opposition, but 
from ethno-nationalist mobilisation of various stripes. Post-
communist Russia fought two wars to pacify Chechnya and, in 
the end, came to an untidy arrangement allowing the rebellious 
republic a high degree of autonomy without independence5. 
Radical Muslim mobilisation represents an enduring challenge 
to stability, in the Volga republics but above all in the North 
Caucasus. By the time of Putin’s third term, the number of 
5 R.B. Ware (Ed.), The Fire Below: How the Caucasus Shaped Russia, London and New 
York, Bloomsbury, 2013.
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terrorist incidents in the region had declined, but the potential 
for violence remained6. 
The greatest danger, however, comes from Russia national-
ism, especially when combined with a leftist agenda. The great 
majority of Russia’s 120-odd political prisoners, if such a cat-
egory still applies, are not “democrats” but Russian national-
ists. Sergei Udaltsov, the head of the Vanguard of Red Youth 
movement, was one of the activists in the “For Fair Elections” 
movement in 2011-2012, and as a result of the disorders on the 
eve of Putin’s inauguration in May 2012, in July 2014 was sen-
tenced to 4½ years in jail. Udaltsov considers himself more of a 
Soviet patriot than a Russia nationalist and supports the trans-
fer of Crimea to Russian jurisdiction and the people’s republics 
in the Donbass. On his release in August 2017, he called for a 
single opposition candidate to stand against Putin the March 
2018 presidential election. The CPRF even toyed with the idea 
of making him their presidential candidate. Udaltsov ruled out 
working with Alexei Navalny, one of the other main leaders of 
the 2011-2012 protests, as being too pro-Western.
The rebirth of politics?
The 24 September 2011 rokirovka (castling move) between Putin 
and Medvedev delivered a shock to elites and political society as 
a whole. Although President Dmitry Medvedev since 2008 may 
not have achieved much, he defined an intra-systemic alterna-
tive and indicated an evolutionary path away from managed 
democracy and towards a more open and competitive system. 
His supporters in the Institute for Contemporary Development 
(INSOR) issued a range of papers and ideas about how to make 
the system more competitive and transparent. Medvedev and 
Putin openly clashed over the West’s intervention in Libya, but 
6 G.M. Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Challenge, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2007; 
G.M. Hahn, The Caucasus Emirate Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia’s North 
Caucasus and Beyond, Jefferson, NC, McFarland, 2014.
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even then, some in the elite believed that Medvedev would be 
allowed a second term. In the event, Putin came under severe 
pressure from the guardianship-security bloc to foreclose what 
this group feared was Medvedev’s excessive liberalism at home 
and neo-Gorbachevite capitulationism to the West abroad. On 
24 September, it was announced that Putin planned to return 
to the presidency and that Medvedev would be nominated for 
the post of Prime Minister. Medvedev even stated that this is 
what had already been decided when he had assumed the pres-
idency in 2008. The managed character of the system was laid 
bare, as well as the manipulative character of the regime. 
This was the period of the “Arab Spring”, with regime change 
in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and the disturbances in Syria 
that burgeoned into outright civil war. There was also a spirit of 
protest in the air that betokened what some called a “Russian 
spring”. The white ribbon became the symbol of aspirations 
for a more open and law-bound system, in which corruption 
could be exposed, the arbitrariness of the regime constrained, 
and the pressure on businesses from administrative bodies (as 
well as corrupt law enforcement agencies) would finally ease. 
Even some officials took to wearing the ribbon as the first signs 
of an intra-elite split emerged between those aligned with the 
aspirations vested in the Medvedev programme of moderate 
reform (if not in the man himself ) and the partisans of the 
restoration of Putinite order and stability. There were also signs 
that the population was restive, with Putin openly booed at a 
sporting event, and some leading cultural figures speaking out 
in favour of change. 
Thus, even before the Duma election on 4 December the 
country was stirring. In the event, the widespread fraud and 
ballot stuffing provoked the widest political protest movement 
of the Putin years7. The “democratic opposition” in Russia ex-
hibited a persistent inability to unite, but the protests from 
December 2011 brought together disparate movements united 
7 S.A. Greene, Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin’s Russia, Stanford, 
CA, Stanford University Press, 2014.
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in their condemnation of electoral fraud, coming together in a 
movement called “For Free Elections” (“Za chestnye vybory”). 
Tens of thousands came onto the streets, notably in the mass 
demonstrations in Bolotnaya Square on 10 December and 
Sakharov Avenue on 24 December. However, when it came to 
advancing a positive programme of substantial political change, 
other than the basic slogan of “Russia without Putin”, the op-
position divided between liberal, statist populist, and nation-
alist positions. When a regime falls, the external opposition 
usually plays a facilitating role, but the most important factor is 
intra-systemic elite splits. In this case, Alexei Kudrin, the liberal 
Minister of finance from 2000, had already, earlier in 2011, 
called for free and fair elections, and following the vote spoke at 
the opposition rallies. He later went on to create an independ-
ent think tank, the Centre for Strategic Research (CSR), which 
offered Putin advice on economic and political reform.
In his final state-of-the-nation speech on 22 December 2011, 
Medvedev outlined a programme of political reform, including 
the restoration of gubernatorial elections, and changes to the 
party and electoral systems. These reforms were implemented 
by the head of the domestic politics section of the Presidential 
Administration, Vyacheslav Volodin, in 2012, with various 
modifications since then. In other words, pressure from the 
non-systemic political opposition forced the regime to push 
the pendulum within the dual state towards more open politics 
within the parameters of the constitutional state. At the same 
time, the reforms were constrained by the incumbent regime’s 
unwillingness to cede political control. The opposition itself 
failed to institutionalise its potential and lost popular support. 
The demobilisation phase was accompanied by disunity, polari-
sation, and disappointment, with a division between those who 
sought to enter systemic politics and others who became more 
radicalised8.
 
8 V. Lasnier, “Demobilisation and its Consequences: After the Russian Movement 
Za chestnye vybory”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 69, no. 5, July 2017, pp. 771-93.
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Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 proved a watershed 
moment in Russian political development. On the one side, 
contentious politics returned with a vengeance, although that 
particular wave of mobilisation soon ebbed. On the other side, 
the regime sought new forms of legitimacy. A number of strat-
agems were adopted. First, politics underwent a “cultural turn”, 
with a greater emphasis on identity politics and conservative 
social motifs. It was in this period that the Duma adopted a 
range of repressive and socially-conservative legislation, in-
cluding the ban on “homosexual propaganda” among minors. 
Although same-sex relationships remained legal and the “gay 
scene” continued, intolerant attitudes were encouraged. More 
than this, the social liberalism of the West was condemned. A 
law protecting the dignity of religious feeling was also adopted, 
apparently at the prompting of the Russian Orthodox Church. 
This was the period when parliament acted as a “crazy printing 
press”, rushing out ill-considered and intolerant laws, not all 
sponsored by the Kremlin but reflecting the empowered con-
servative sentiments of the assembly.
Second, the political reforms outlined by Medvedev were 
largely implemented, including the restoration of gubernatorial 
elections, the return of a dual election system to select the 450 
members of the State Duma (half by first-past-the post con-
stituency elections, and half by the proportional party list sys-
tem). The changes were hedged in with restrictions that blunted 
their democratising character. In the 87 gubernatorial elections 
staged since their reinstatement in 2012, only one required a 
run-off vote. In such conditions, it is hardly surprising that 
turnout is low and declining.
At the same time, the new overseer of political matters in 
the Kremlin, the pragmatic Volodin, introduced elements of 
a greater competition into the managed political system, goals 
that were obviously incompatible yet reflected the regime’s un-
derstanding that the old methods of political management – as 
demonstrated in 2011-2012 – had counter-productive effects. 
The regime still tried to win, but by less of an overwhelming 
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– and thus delegitimising – margin. Putin’s great fear is to be 
swept from office through some sort of popular movement, and 
thus concessions were accompanied by new forms of control.
Regime reset and new patterns of opposition
In other words, in Putin’s third term the regime tried to find 
ways out of the political and developmental impasse by intro-
ducing elements of competition into a fundamentally uncom-
petitive system. The various attempts to create an enduring 
framework for the oppositional mobilisation against electoral 
fraud in 2011-2012 soon dissolved. Organised opposition was 
in disarray, and instead the focus shifted to individuals. Chief 
among them is Alexei Navalny, the firebrand anti-corruption 
campaigner at the head of the Foundation for the Struggle 
against Corruption (FBK). Navalny became one of the few 
nationally-recognised independent politicians. In December 
2016, he announced his intention of standing in the March 
2018 presidential election, although his criminal record gained 
in what were almost certainly politically-motivated trials pre-
cluded him from running. The Kirovles scandal dates back 
to the time when he served on a voluntary basis as an advisor 
to the liberal governor of the Kirov region, Nikita Belykh, in 
2009. In July 2013, Navalny was sentenced to five years in jail, 
but it was subsequently suspended, allowing him to participate 
in the September 2013 Moscow mayoral election. Navalny won 
an impressive 27%, and thereby became the unofficial leader 
of the democratic opposition. In a second case, in December 
2014, Navalny and his brother Oleg were convicted of embez-
zling over $500,000 from the cosmetic company Yves Rocher.
Navalny’s criticism of Putin was harsh, yet he remains, 
against all the odds, a major political player. His case reflects 
the limits and achievements of the Putin system, trapped in 
some no-man’s land between democracy and authoritarianism, 
with elements of both, but in which the logic of neither is given 
free rein. This is why Navalny was allowed to run in the 2013 
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Moscow mayoral election, and why some other opposition fig-
ures won posts in regional mayoral elections. Between 2012 
and 2014, oppositionists won mayoral elections in a number 
of cities: Evgeny Urlashov in Yaroslavl (Civic Platform, 2012), 
Galina Shirshina in Petrozavodsk (Yabloko, 2013), Evgeny 
Roizman in Ekaterinburg (Civic Platform, 2013), and Anatoly 
Lokot’ in Novosibirsk (CPRF, 2014). The rebirth of politics 
after 2012 was limited but serious. The moderate programme 
of deconcentration – not genuine liberalisation – was derailed 
by the intensification of conflict with the West over Ukraine 
from late 2013. 
An amendment to the law on local government was passed 
in May 2014, allowing regional legislatures to choose their local 
executive model. Elected mayors were replaced by city manag-
ers, chosen by UR-dominated city legislatures, with the process 
overseen by regional governors9. By late 2017 only eight of 79 
regional capitals continued to hold mayoral elections. In prac-
tice, concessions and exceptions were allowed, with Roizman 
remaining mayor of Ekaterinburg, although his nomination by 
Yabloko to run for governor in September 2017 was disquali-
fied. He failed to collect the required number of endorsements 
from local municipal deputies – the ‘municipal filter’, requiring 
typically the support of between 5 and 10% of local council-
lors. The incumbent governor, Evgeny Kuivashev, won re-elec-
tion. This was a typical case in which strong candidates are not 
allowed to register. 
Even incumbent oppositions are forced out of office, as 
happened to Shirshina in December 2015 in Petrozavodsk. 
Shirshina had stepped in only after the experienced Yabloko 
politician Emilia Slabunova (who is now the national chair of 
Yabloko) had been disqualified from running a fortnight before 
the election, on the grounds of fault in her paperwork – she 
appears not to have mentioned her PhD on her nomination 
papers. Shirshina continued to fight against the heavy-handed 
9 J. Moses, “Political Rivalry and Conflict in Putin’s Russia”, Europe-Asia Studies, 
vol. 69, no. 6, August 2017, pp. 961-988.
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actions of the governor of Karelia, Alexander Khudilainen10. 
Khudilainen’s efforts were not enough to save him, and he was 
one of five governors forced to resign in February 2017 as the 
Kremlin purged the gubernatorial corps in the run-up to the 
2018 presidential election. His successor, Artur Parfenchikov, 
has to ensure support for regime candidates in regional and na-
tional elections, but in ways that do not provoke instability. 
The push for more competition saw the incumbent CPRF 
governor of Orël, Vadim Potomsky, elected by a large margin in 
September 2014. The CPRF challenger, Sergei Levchenko, won 
the gubernatorial election in Irkutsk in September 2015, the 
first competitive opposition victory since gubernatorial elec-
tions were restored in 2012. The toehold of democratic oppo-
sitionists in local legislatures allowed them to stand in elections 
without gathering signatures. The regime reset was not entirely 
dead, and once the worst of the crisis over Ukraine was over, 
there were attempts to make the September 2016 Duma elec-
tion rather more competitive. The aim was to avoid a repetition 
of the protests provoked by the flawed election of December 
2011. The electoral system had now changed, with the dual sys-
tem of half the 450 deputies elected in single-mandate constit-
uencies and the other half on party lists through proportional 
representation, with the five (down from seven) per cent thresh-
old restored. The goal remained to win a majority for UR, but 
one that would involve less fraud and ballot-rigging. The task 
set for regional leaderships was to ensure the victory of regime 
representatives but by legal means. 
For the first time in post-communist Russia (apart from 
the first election in December 1993), the parliamentary vote 
was decoupled from the presidential election, which because 
of the extension of the presidential term to six years was now 
scheduled for March 2018. The Duma election was also unu-
sual because of the prominent role of the ONF. Established in 
10 For a powerful study of  local politics in Petrozavodsk and the strategies of  
the opposition, see A. Fouks, “Karelia: A Story of  Autocracy and Resistance”, 
16 November 2017.
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May 2011 as a popular vehicle for Putin’s re-election bid, the 
ONF was registered as a public movement in June 2013. In 
May 2016, the ONF took a prominent part in the UR prima-
ries to select candidates for the forthcoming national election, 
with about 200 selected. In the event, approximately 60 ONF 
candidates were elected to the State Duma, mostly affiliated 
with the overwhelming UR majority. 
The return to the dual electoral system paid handsome divi-
dends to the ruling party. United Russia won an overwhelming 
constitutional majority with 76% of the seats, a total of 343 
UR deputies. Joel Moses shows how the various regional elec-
tions in 2015 and beyond “exposed a Russia politically divided 
by rivalry and conflict”11. Putin and the Kremlin were chal-
lenged to balance the interests of the various levels of regional 
government, the interests of establishment and governmental 
stakeholders, and political parties and the ONF. The vertical 
dimension of Russian politics is able to impose its preferences, 
but it operates in an environment where horizontal interests 
constrain and shape politics. This is not an environment where 
diktat and decrees can work, and instead responsive policies, 
co-optation strategies, and flexible strategies disarm, incorpo-
rate, and disorient the opposition. 
The emergence of real opposition?
After nearly two decades in power, there is growing dissatisfac-
tion with the suffocating character of regime politics, although 
this does not mostly translate into political opposition. Navalny 
became a leader capable of forging some sort of alternative con-
sensus. He exploited the liminal character of Putinism by ex-
ploring the tension between its regime and constitutional char-
acter. By definition, the exceptional character of a regime system 
presupposes a base normality. In post-communist Russia, this is 
precisely the constitutional state, and this is what provides the 
11 J. Moses (2017), p. 982.
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dual state with its dynamism. This is generated by the inherent 
tension between the normality incarnated by the legalism of 
the normative state, and the exceptionalism represented by the 
administrative regime.
This ambivalence was exploited by Dmitry Gudkov’s crea-
tion of the United Democrats project in Moscow for the mu-
nicipal elections in September 2017. Yabloko participated de-
spite its long-term refusal to join democratic coalitions. The 
United Democrats won 176 seats, a further 108 were gained 
by independents, and over 70 by the systemic opposition. Even 
though UR candidates won 1,152 out of the 1,502 seats, the 
authorities lost control of 28 out of Moscow’s 125 municipal 
councils. However, even in districts where the opposition won a 
plurality of seats, such as in Filëvsky Park, they were prevented 
from taking the chair because of the rule that the incumbent 
remains in post after an election unless two-thirds of the coun-
cillors vote for a change. The law does not explain what should 
be done where no group can muster such a majority12. A simi-
lar situation held in the Konkovo Municipal District Council. 
Elsewhere, democratic activists such as Ilya Yashin, now the 
head of Krasnoselsky Municipal District, tried to demonstrate 
that they could govern in a new manner13. Elsewhere, Yabloko 
won 8.5% of the seats in the Pskov City Duma election. 
Overall, it was notable how little ethnic Russian nationalist mo-
bilisation took place. The regime had been able to put the genie 
of Russian nationalism back into the bottle after letting it out 
at the time of the reunification of Crimea. 
The general dissatisfaction was brilliantly exploited by 
Navalny. His FBK organisation chronicled the abuses and ex-
cesses of the ruling elites. In a series of powerful videos, Navalny 
exposed the corruption within the Putin system. In one nota-
ble film about Dmitry Medvedev posted in early 2017 (with 
12 “In Western Moscow, Putin Allies Lose an Election but Cling to Power”, 
Reuters, 24 November 2017.
13 M. Eismont, “New Politicians are Searching for a New Agenda”, Vedomosti, 23 
November 2017 [in Russian].
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English subtitles), Navalny traced the various properties and as-
sets, including a Tuscan vineyard and villa, whose alleged own-
ership was hidden behind a number of front companies14. In 
less than a month, the video was viewed over ten million times 
on YouTube, and today some 27 million have seen the video. 
Another notable exposé a year earlier had discovered the alleged 
links in the chain hiding the assets of the Prosecutor General, 
Yuri Chaika. Navalny’s slick and professional videos gained mil-
lions of viewers. His exposure of venal corruption, the acqui-
sition of properties and assets in Russia and abroad, provided 
a damning indictment of the meta-corruption associated with 
the rule of the Putin elite. On the back of this, Navalny built 
up a nationwide network of regional headquarters staffed by 
thousands of volunteers15. Navalny became one of only two in-
dividuals in Russia with substantive political autonomy – the 
other one being Putin.
As Navalny prepared for his run for the presidency, there 
was a steady rise in the number of social and political pro-
tests. Social protests covered such issues as the violation of 
social rights, falling living standards, job losses, defrauded in-
vestors, increases in utility charges, and the non-payment of 
wages16. One of the largest protest movements encompassed 
truckers incensed by the introduction of the Platon system of 
road tolls introduced in November 2015, managed by Rostec 
and the Rotenberg brothers. There were also protests against 
Sergei Sobyanin’s plans in Moscow to demolish thousands of 
Khrushchev-era five-storey housing blocks. Most of these social 
protests complained of specific policies and were not opposed 
to the government as a whole.
14 “On vam ne Dimon” (“Don’t Call me Dimon”), YouTube.
15 J.M. Dollbaum, “When Life Gives You Lemons: Alexei Navalny’s Electoral 
Campaign”, Russian Analytical Digest, no. 210, 14 November 2017, pp. 6-12.
16 Y. Kuznetsova, in a report of  the Centre for Economic and Political Reform, 
“Eksperty zayavili o rezkom roste chisla protestov v Rossii” (Experts said a 
sharp increase the number of  protests in Russia), RBK, 10 July 2017.
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As for political protests, the most notable were organised by 
Navalny and his supporters. In 2017, Navalny initiated nation-
wide protest rallies on 26 March and 12 June, reflecting an up-
surge in dissatisfaction with falling living standards, economic 
inequality, corruption, and political stagnation. Most alarming 
for the authorities was the youthfulness of the protesters. The 
initiative had clearly shifted from the old generation of mid-
dle-aged “angry urbanites” to a new generation of disaffected 
youth17. Navalny’s call for a monthly minimum wage of 25,000 
roubles (about $440) was accused of being populist and, in a 
time of budget deficits, meant that the middle class would be 
squeezed to provide the funds. 
Navalny became the charismatic face of the opposition. He 
advanced classic liberal postulates on the rule of law, transpar-
ent government, and constitutionalism, but he also embraced 
certain ideas drawn from the more conservative repertoire of 
nationalist ideas. In a well-publicised debate on 20 July 2017 
with Igor Strelkov (Girkin), the militant nationalist and viru-
lent monarchist who took his forces from Crimea to foment 
rebellion in the Donbass in March 2014, both came out as los-
ers. Strelkov appeared to lose interest in the discussion, while 
Navalny was unable to advance any sort of coherent worldview. 
Perhaps more important was that the debate took place at all, 
providing a discussion free of official interference. It indicated 
the return of elements of public political debate. More disturb-
ing, the debate showed that Strelkov had strong and coherent 
nationalist views, combining a distinctive view of the global 
economy and various conspiracy theories; while Navalny was 
unable to advance a coherent response18. For Navalny, the main 
enemy was domestic crony capitalism, and he vowed to clean 
17 K. Shamiev and T. Shentseva, “The Deep Roots of  Russia’s Young Protestors”, 
Intersection, 4 September 2017.
18 K. Gaaze, “Zdravyi smysl protiv trekhlineiki: Kak v Rossii uchatsya govorit’ o 
politike” (Common sense against the trilinear: How in Russia learn to talk about 
politics), RBK, 21 July 2017. The debate was aired on Ekho Moskvy, TV Rain 
(Dozhd) and the Reuters websites.
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up the vast public procurement system, which accounts for 
37% of the economy. By contrast, the enemy for Girkin was 
the West, which in his view carved up the USSR according to 
borders drawn by the Bolsheviks and destroyed Russia’s indus-
trial base19. Strelkov noted that, in 2014, he believed that Putin 
was ready to stage a “revolution from above” in Ukraine but, 
by 2015, when the “revolution” did not come, he lost faith in 
Putin. He also criticised the official line on Chechnya. The de-
bate once again demonstrated that the greatest threat to Putinite 
stability comes not from the liberals but from nationalists. 
This perhaps explains why Navalny is subject to sharp attacks 
from Western-oriented liberals. They condemn him for his re-
fusal to accept that Crimea should be returned to Ukraine, for 
his attacks on migration from Central Asia, and for his erstwhile 
nationalist slogan of “stop feeding the Caucasus” (i.e., subsidis-
ing the region). While Navalny’s anti-corruption policies are 
popular, his stance on migration is less so, with polls suggesting 
that xenophobic sentiments are at an all-time low. Nevertheless, 
Navalny articulated popular concerns and, in addition to his 
nationalist themes, he was moving towards class politics. He 
condemned Putin for creating a system of predatory capitalism 
that profits only the top 0.1%. Although Navalny is accused 
of Trump-like irresponsibility and populism, he certainly does 
not intend to further skew the tax system in favour of the rich.
Putin’s fourth term and beyond
Although Putin long delayed announcing his candidature for 
the 18 March 2018 presidential election, the country prepared 
for Putin’s fourth – and final – six-year term. The problem for 
the Kremlin was how to stimulate interest in an election whose 
outcome was predetermined. The fundamental questions were 
who Putin would run against, the turnout, and by what margin 
19 L. Bershidsky, “Putin’s no Good, but Where’s the Alternative?”, Bloomberg, 
21 July 2017.
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Putin would win. A number of strategies were devised, includ-
ing trying to devise a programme with some fresh ideas, and 
allowing mildly unconventional candidates to boost turnout 
while not presenting a serious challenge to Putin’s incumbency. 
Perhaps an even bigger problem was how to ensure that the 
coalition could be maintained as the regime itself changed. In 
the longer perspective, the regime began to prepare for a Russia 
without Putin. The time horizon for the regime was 2024, 
when Putin’s putative fourth term would end. There have al-
ready been changes in the style of government and personnel 
policy in preparation for the big change. Notably, despite the 
reintroduction of gubernatorial elections, over two dozen re-
gional governors were replaced in the year before the election. 
Putin ran as an independent candidate, requiring him to 
gather 300,000 signatures in support of his nomination. This 
accentuated Putin’s position above the existing institutions and 
party system, and further marginalised UR’s place in Russian 
political life. Although UR had won a constitutional major-
ity in the 2016 elections, its “brand” was tainted and it was 
never able to shake off Navalny’s 2011 epithet as “the party of 
crooks and thieves”. Putin’s independent status emphasised his 
distance from the ruling elites and his historical role as the pu-
tative saviour of Russia. As the presidential election approach, 
plans have resurfaced once again to create a two-party system. 
Mironov would be replaced by a more authoritative leader, 
and the party boosted to provide credible balance to UR. This 
would be difficult, since the CPRF already absorbed the protest 
vote, while the LDPR filled the more populist segment of the 
party spectrum, even though it had in effect become a branch 
of UR20. The new head of the internal affairs department of the 
Presidential Administration, Sergei Kirienko, gained unprece-
dented authority, managing not only political affairs but also 
masterminding a social strategy. He advanced an even more 
ambitious plan to restructure the party system, floating the idea 
20 A. Gorbachev, “‘Kreml’ reanimiruet ideyu dvukhpartiinoi sistemy” (The Kremlin 
reanimates the idea of  a two-party system), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 October 2017.
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of merging SR, CPRF, and LDPR to create a centre-left oppo-
sition to UR as part of a classic two-party system. The speaker 
of the Duma, Volodin, opposed the plan21. 
It is clear that the existing systemic parties are hardly in a 
position to challenge the regime, and thus a strategy of survival 
predominates. However, the dual character of the system means 
that elections provide an opportunity to advance the legal ra-
tional “constitutionality” of the system22. The initial goal for the 
2018 presidential election had been based on the 70/70 formu-
la – 70% turnout and 70% for Putin. In 2012, Putin won with 
63.6% of the vote. The interesting question was who would 
run against Putin. The old guard represented by Zhirinovsky, 
Zyuganov, and Mironov was hardly likely to set the electoral 
pulse racing.
Hence, there was talk of a possible run by the patriotic film 
director Nikita Mikhalkov, and the declared candidacy of 
Ksenia Sobchak. She was the daughter of Putin’s former men-
tor and sponsor, Anatoly Sobschak, the mayor of St Petersburg 
in the first half of the Nineties, and she was even rumoured 
to be Putin’s goddaughter. She became involved in contentious 
politics during the protest wave of 2011-2012, and she became 
one of the most recognised opposition leaders. She then hosted 
a talk show, Sobchak Live, on TV Rain, one of the few remain-
ing independent networks in Russia. Following months of ru-
mours, she declared herself as a candidate in October 2017. She 
positioned herself as the “protest candidate” and argued that 
a vote for her represented a vote “against all”. She was helped 
by the political consultant Vitaly Shklyarov, who had worked 
for Bernie Sanders in the 2016 US presidential campaign. She 
denied accusations that she had been put up by the Kremlin 
to stimulate interest in the election and thus boosting turnout. 
21 Interviews with various party officials (who prefer to remain anonymous) in 
Moscow in November 2017.
22 This is explored by Andrei Semënov, “How Far Can They Go: Russia’s Systemic 
Opposition Seeks its Place”, Russian Analytical Digest, no. 210, 14 November 
2017, pp. 2-5. 
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She declared that she would give up her candidacy if Navalny 
somehow managed to get on the ballot paper. This was unlikely, 
since the head of the Electoral Commission, Ella Pamfilova, on 
17 October 2017 declared that Navalny was not eligible to run 
until 2028 because of his two criminal convictions. It was at 
this time that Navalny organised nationwide protest rallies on 
7 October, Putin’s 65th birthday. 
In historical terms, the Russian political situation today re-
mains open, with fundamental questions of political identity 
and competition still in play. This historical openness is in part 
derived from the closed nature of the political system, where 
fundamental policy questions are suppressed rather than re-
solved. The dual system still operates, with contention between 
constitutional and administrative rationales. This means that 
there is scope for a political opposition to exploit openings and 
opportunities; but it also means that the regime works to en-
sure that these opportunities do not threaten its own power or 
the stability of the system. A political opposition can be found, 
but it survives in the interstices of the administrative and con-
stitutional systems rather than as a formal part of the political 
system itself.
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4.  Islam in Today’s Russia 
Alexey Malashenko
In 2017 there were some 17 million Muslims in the Russian 
Federation (a census carried out in 2002 showed a smaller figure 
– 14.5 million), i.e. more than 11.4% of its population. Still, 
politicians, including President Vladimir Putin, and the media 
usually give another figure, – 20 million – because “Russian 
Muslims,” or, to put it more correctly, Muslims living in Russia, 
include migrants from Central Asia and South Caucasus (some 
2.5 – 3 million people). In 2017, Ravil Gaynutdin, Head of 
the Russia Mufties Council, mentioned a figure of 25 million1.
It should be noted that, first, there is no official confes-
sional statistics in Russia, second, the information on the size 
of ethno-confessional minorities is inaccurate, and, finally, 
third, there is no clarity when it comes to counting migrants. 
Therefore, all data mentioned here and below should be regard-
ed as estimates.
The percentage of Muslims in Russia can be compared to 
their share of the population in France (from 9 to 13%), the 
Netherlands (7%), or Germany (about 7%). European statis-
tics, however, is also far from accurate. 
The Tatars constitute the most numerous Muslim ethnic 
group in Russia – 5.3 million; Bashkirs are the second-biggest 
group – 1.6 million, and the Chechens are the third. Muslims 
are a majority in seven Russian regions – 99% (nearly a hundred 
percent) in Ingushetia, 96% in Chechnya, 94% in Dagestan, 
70% in Kabardino-Balkaria, 63% in Karachay-Cherkessia, 
54.5% in Bashkortostan and 54% in Tatarstan. In nine regions 
1 hiip://islamio.ru/news/policys/pravedlivaya_kritika_ili_banalnyy_shantazh 
their number exceeds 10% of the population2. These figures are 
approximate. In some regions migrants are taken into account 
when the percentage of Muslims is calculated, in others it is 
not. (The counting process is further complicated by the fact 
that some Muslims, especially those from the Caucasus, regis-
ter one region as a place of their residence, but in fact live in 
another one). 
Islam is actively spreading in the Urals, Siberia and pene-
trates into the Far East. This is a result of growing Muslim mi-
gration from abroad, and internal migration from the North 
Caucasus as well.
According to some estimates, by 2025 the number of Muslim 
citizens of Russia – if the current dynamics persists – will reach 
20.9 million, and by 2050 will exceed 31 million3.
As we already mentioned, Muslim migrants from abroad 
have become a part of the Russian Ummah (Islamic communi-
ty). According to the Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS), 
in the beginning of 2015 4.3 million of migrants from Central 
Asia were staying in Russia (in 2005 there were only 1.5 mil-
lion of them) including 2.2 million Uzbeks, 983,000 Tajiks and 
540,000 Kyrgyz people (unofficial sources give a much bigger 
number of Kyrgyz migrants – more than a million in 2017).  In 
addition, more than 1.5 million of Azerbaijanis live in Russia. 
In recent years the number of migrants from Central Asia di-
minished due to the deterioration of the economic situation in 
Russia and newly introduced entry restrictions. 
Migrants are visibly present in big cities, especially Moscow 
and St. Petersburg, in the southern regions and those bordering 
Central Asia, as well as in raw-material producing areas, the 
Tula and Novosibirsk regions, in Yekaterinburg and Tyumen4. 
2 R, Silantyev, Noveishaya istoriia islamskogo soobshchestva v Rossii (The recent history 
of  the Russian Islamic community), Ichtios, Moscow, 2005, p. 149.
3 World Population Prospect. Vision Population DataBase; D. A.Vishnevskii 
(Ed.), Demograficheskaya modernizatsya Rossii (Russia’s demographic modernisa-
tion), Novoye Izdatel’stvo (New Publishing), Moscow, 2006, pp. 441, 503.
4 “Sotsial’nye riski migratsii” (Social risks of  migration), Part 2 of  the research 
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Migration is becoming more Islamised. Not long ago Uzbeks 
and Tajiks, especially from the older generation, were drinking 
alcohol, eating food prohibited by Sharia Law, and seldom vis-
ited mosques, but in recent years their religious identity has be-
come more pronounced. On Fridays, migrants visit a mosque: 
for them, as a researcher from Saratov Natalia Mukhametshina 
put it, it is “a piece of Motherland, where they, in addition 
to socialising with compatriots and brothers in faith, can relax 
their minds”5. Ethnic migrant mosques are appearing in Russia. 
In 2005 a “Tajik mosque” was opened in Yakutsk, and in 2013 
in Vladivostok (Muhiddin Kabiri, Chairman of the Islamic 
Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, was present at the opening 
ceremony); another “Central Asian” mosque is functioning in 
Tatarstan. The number of Imams from Central Asia in Russian 
mosques is growing. According to various data from 7 to 17% 
of them have Tajik or Uzbek Imams.
Muslim migrants are settling in the territories to the east of 
the Urals and the Russian North. The number of Muslims in 
these regions is 1776 thousand while the total population of this 
part of Russia is 37.6 million6. From 1989 to 2010, in the Urals 
Federal District (UFD) the number of Central Asians grew by 
70%, that of the Azerbaijanis – by 110%, and that of migrants 
from North Caucasus – by 140%. During the same period in 
the Siberian Federal District (SFD) the number of migrants 
from Central Asia grew by 30%, and that of the Azerbaijanis 
project Immigratsia naselenia v Rossii: economika, sotsial’naya sphera, natsionalnaya bez-
opasnost (Population immigration in Russia: the economy, social sphere and na-
tional security), National Strategy Institute, Moscow, 2015, pp. 13-24.
5 N. Mukhametshina, “Musulmanskoye soobshchestvo Rossii pod vliyaniem mi-
gratsionnykh protsessov (na primere Saratovskoi oblasti)” (Russian Muslim com-
munity under the influence of  migration processes: the case study of  the Saratov 
region), Vestnik Rossiiskoi Natsii (Bulletin of  the Russian Nation), Moscow, 2011. 
No. 4-5, p. 230. 
6 See A. Malashenko and A. Starostin, The Rise of  Nontraditional Islam in the Urals, 
Carnegie Moscow Center, September 2015; “Islam na rossiiskom Dalnem 
Vostoke” (Islam in the Russian Far East), Rossia v global’noi politike (Russia in 
global politics), no. 4, 2016.
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– by 60%. In the Far East Federal District (FAFD) the number 
of Central Asian migrants increased by 40%. And it should be 
noted that these figures are too low, as many migrants come 
there illegally.
87% of migrants from Central Asia are male and mostly 
young. Their presence affects the gender balance in the areas 
where they live. Given the common Muslims’ perception that 
“non-Muslim” women are “easy meat”, this situation may lead to 
the same type of conflicts that some German cities experienced 
after a number of asylum-seekers sexually assaulted some wom-
en. Migrants “cluster” on a family or clan basis. The factor of 
religious solidarity is becoming more visible. They form new di-
asporas that extend their influence over profitable spheres of eco-
nomic activity, and monopolize markets, especially farm ones. 
The pressure of migration on the school education system 
is increasing. In Moscow schools there are two or three chil-
dren from migrant families in every class; in some districts their 
number is as high as 30 to 40%. Migrant children are some-
times prone to aggressive behavior, which causes conflicts on 
ethnic and religious grounds7. 
Over the last 2-3 years, some groups of Muslim migrants in 
Russia as well as in Europe embraced radical sentiments 
The Russian Islamic community, as a whole being loyal to 
authorities, is however influenced by the radical trend develop-
ing in the global Muslim Ummah, variously defined as funda-
mentalism, Wahhabism, Islamism or Salafism. In Russia these 
radicals are most often called the Salafis.
The Russian Muslim community’s vulnerability to Salafis 
(Islamists) can be explained by two reasons. The first of them 
is an internal one – the complicated social and economic situ-
ation, government corruption etc. provoke protest sentiments 
among Muslims. The second one is external influence. After the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia was invaded 
7 Politika “zamestchayuchei migratsii” v Rossii: posledstvia i alternativy (The politics of  
substitutive migrations in Russia: consequences and alternatives), The Institute 
of  the National Strategy, Moscow, 2014.
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by radical ideas; foreign missions and international Islamic 
organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood, the al-Haramain 
Foundation, the SAAR Foundation and al-Qaeda started their 
activities in the country. In the second decade of the XXI cen-
tury Russian Muslims came under the influence of the develop-
ments in the Middle East, the Arab Spring, the rapid activation 
of local Islamists, and, finally, the creation of the Islamic State. 
The Russian Islamists’ ideology, like elsewhere in the Muslim 
world, is based on a wish to build up a system of social rela-
tions corresponding to the Islamic tradition and Sharia Law 
with an Islamic state (a Caliphate or an Emirate) as its pref-
erable form. Theoretically it is possible to create such a state, 
but only after the secession of its supposed territory from the 
Russian Federation. That was the claim of the Chechen in-
surgents, whose separatism was suppressed after 2000 when 
Vladimir Putin came to power. Still many Muslims believe in 
the possibility of the Islamic alternative’s “soft implementation” 
through the creation of an “Islamic space” in Russia with de 
facto Sharia laws that can be supposedly compatible with the 
Russian Constitution. 
The process of Islamisation or even Shariasation is in pro-
gress in the North Caucasus, especially in Dagestan, – its big-
gest republic – where hundreds of religious courts are already 
functioning, resolving family/household, land and property 
disputes. Many Dagestanis believe that the rulings of Sharia 
judges are more fair than those by official secular courts.
There is an opinion that such a space has already taken shape 
in Chechnya, where the population is obliged to abide by 
Islamic norms of behavior. President Vladimir Putin is aware 
of this fact, but he lets the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov to 
Islamize the republic in exchange for his absolute loyalty to the 
Federal Center, or rather to Putin personally. (Kadyrov himself 
denies that a total “Islamisation” is taking place in his republic). 
In the Muslim Russia there is a confrontation between tra-
ditional and unorthodox Islam. The traditionalists support 
Islam linked to the local ethnic and cultural tradition retaining 
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rudimentary elements of paganism and allowing deviations 
from the religious dogma. They are sharply criticised by un-
orthodox Salafis, who reject Islam’s ethnic and cultural pecu-
liarities, and call for a return to the “true Islam” of Prophet 
Muhammad’s times. Russian Salafism can be regarded both as 
a dissident trend and a religious political movement. It consists 
of three trends. The first one is represented by young Muslims 
who are seeking answers for moral questions in Islam. They are 
engaged in religious self-education, hold illegal assemblies and 
seminars. Yuldash Yusupov, an ethnologist from Bashkortostan, 
thinks that “Salafism is a religious system for young people”8, 
regarding it as a youth subculture of sorts. 
The second trend of Salafism is characterised by public re-
ligious activity. These Salafis form Jamaats, trying to attract as 
many believers as possible into their ranks. Moreover, they de-
mand from Muslims, and first of all businessmen, to pay Zakat 
– a Muslim tax – to support the Jamaats. They control sever-
al mosques in the North Caucasus and the Volga region. Since 
2009 Salafi mosques were functioning in Dagestan and the big 
cities in Tatarstan. In Kazan the Salafis controlled the Qolsharif 
Cathedral Mosque for some time9. The Salafis advocate manda-
tory elections of the mosques’ Imams (currently they are usually 
appointed by Spiritual Directories loyal to the authorities). In 
2011 Nayil Sakhibzyanov – a Salafi Mukhtasib – tried to create 
a “parallel muftiate (Muslim administrative territorial entity)” in 
the Bashkir city of Almetyevsk. Salafis of the second type, howev-
er, use peaceful methods, avoiding radical forms of confrontation 
with the official clergy, and, of course, with secular authorities.
Only third-type Salafis are prone to extreme methods, in-
cluding terrorist acts. In the North Caucasus the actions of 
8 Stanet li Bashkiria novoi “goryachey tochkoi” postsovetskogo prostranst-
va? (Will Bashkortostan become a new flashpoint of  the post-Soviet Space?), 
Gumilev-center.ru, 24 January 2012.
9 “Arabskaya revolutsia” v Tatarstane: islamskie fundamentalisty v regional’noi 
politike (The “Arab revolution” in Tatarstan: Islamic fundamentalists in regional 
politics).
Russia 2018. Predictable Elections, Uncertain Future80
extremist Salafis have become commonplace. In the rest of 
Muslim Russia, the third trend revealed itself somewhat later. In 
2003-2005 extremists carried out several explosions on the gas 
pipeline at the border between Tatarstan and the Kirov region. 
In 2010 their arms caches were found in the Nurlat district of 
Tatarstan. In 2012, they organised clandestine production of 
explosives and suicide-bomber belts in the Vysokogorsky dis-
trict of the same republic. 
In 2010 the authorities managed to prevent several Salafi 
actions, including in Bashkortostan and the Urals. In 2012 
an appeal by a “Mujahidin Amir” Marat Khalimov calling for 
“active struggle” was posted in the Web. Some experts imme-
diately called Khalimov’s subordinates “forest Mujahidin,”10 
thus putting them on equal footing with the insurgents in the 
Caucasus. In November 2013 a large petrochemical factory 
in Nizhnekamsk was shelled by an improvised rocket of the 
Qassam type used by Hamas in Palestine. In 2012 the Mufti of 
Tatarstan Ildus Faizov was badly wounded by a car bomb; on 
the same day a popular theologist Valiulla Yakupov, who advo-
cated Islamic traditionalism, was assassinated.
Russian Vice Prime Minister Alexander Khloponin, who oc-
cupied the post of Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy in the 
North Caucasian Federal District in 2010-2014, stated: “As far 
as the penetration of radical Islam is concerned, […] the North, 
the Volga region where 40% of Russian Muslims live, and the 
Urals are the sore spots today”11. 
Nobody knows the exact number of Salafis in Russia. M. 
Zinchenko, a political scientist from Pyatigorsk, thinks: “Today 
Neo-Wahhabites12, according to various estimates, constitute 
10 Ekspert: Boyeviki v Tatarstane deystvuiut vmeste a religioznymi radikalami 
na ulitse (Militants in Tatarstan are acting together with religious radicals in the 
streets: expert).
11 A. Khloponin, “Ya za to, chtoby zaprety ostalis” (I think prohibitions should 
remain), RBC, 18 June 2015.
12 Newly minted terms like Neo-Wahhabism or Neo-Funadmentalism and other 
“neos” sometimes look obscure. 
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from 2 to 10% of Russian Muslims”13. In 2005 there were 
2000 Salafis in Dagestan, according to the Republic’s Interior 
Ministry14. The Ansar website gives a much bigger figure: ac-
cording to it, Salafis in Dagestan already constitute from 5 to 
10% of its population15.
Many scholars, Imams, theologists and politicians are reject-
ing Islam’s simplified “dual” classification, thinking that it is 
splitting the Muslim community. The adherents of both direc-
tions continue to compete with each other, but more and more 
often are finding common ground, which serves as a basis for 
Inter-Islamic dialogue. At theological and scientific conferences 
an opinion is voiced that Salafism is a legitimate trend within 
Islam, and only its extreme forms should be resisted. This, for 
instance, is the view of Damir Mukhitdinov, Imam-mukhtasib 
for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region.
Among politicians the dialogue between traditional and un-
orthodox Islam is supported by Yunus-bek Yevkurov, leaders of 
Dagestan and Chechnya. In fact, it is a trialogue, rather than a 
dialogue, as it takes place in the “triangle” – traditional Islam – 
Salafism – the state. This dialogue is a difficult one. It goes on in 
a situation of mutual distrust, and the government is not easing 
its pressure on the Salafis, closing their mosques and confiscat-
ing their religious literature. Still, the parties concerned do not 
intend to terminate their dialogue.
In my opinion, sooner or later the strictly dualistic interpre-
tation of Islam will run its course and will be replaced by a for-
mula postulating Islam’s “unity in diversity”. In all probability, 
13 M. Zinchenko, “Depolitizatsiia islama kak osnova stablizatsii na Severnom 
Kavkaze” (Depoliticising Islam as a basis for stabilisation in the North Caucasus), 
in Mir cherez yazyki, obrazovanie I kul’turu: Rossiia – Kavkaz – Mirovoe soobshchestvo 
(Peace through languages, education and culture: Russia – the Caucasus - the 
global community), Pyatigorsk, 2011, p. 109. 
14 H. Omarova. “Respublika Dagestan. Sistemnyi krisis razrastaetsya?” (The 
Republic of  Dagestan. A systemic crisis aggravating?), 27 February 2013.
15 “Ofitsialny I neofitsialny islam in Dagestan” (The official and unofficial Islam 
in Dagestan), Part 2, Salafism ili neofitsialny islam (Salafism or unofficial Islam), The 
Ansar News and Analytical Channel, Ansar.ru (Yandex).
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we will witness a synthesis of traditional and unorthodox Islam 
with a certain preeminence of the latter. 
The situation in the Middle East – the emergence of the 
Islamic State in 2014 and Russia’s involvement in the Syrian 
civil war – contributes to the radicalisation of Russian Muslims’ 
sentiments. At first, Moscow’s assistance to President Bashar 
al-Assad did not cause any protest among Russian Muslims. 
Moreover, clerics loyal to the Russian government – for instance 
Ravil Gaynutdin, Chairman of the Russia Mufties Council, 
Talgat Tadzhuddin, Head of the Central Muslim Spiritual 
Directorate, Ismail Berdiyev, chairman of the Coordination 
Centre of North Caucasus Muslims, and the Mufti of Tatarstan 
Kamil Samigullin – say that Muslims support Moscow’s official 
line.
However, there have been some exceptions, too. For exam-
ple, Nafigulla Ashirov, Co-chairman of the Mufties Council 
and Chairman of the Muslim Spiritual Directory for the Asian 
part of Russia, thinks that some Muslims are “concerned by 
Russia’s actions in Syria”. A popular website “The Voice of 
Islam” emphasised that statements of each Russian Mufti do 
not represent “the opinion of all Muslims, but only that of 
those who are in spiritual subordination to that Mufti – i.e. as 
a rule a very narrow circle of Imams and public figures…”16. 
Salman of Bulgar, Imam of the Tauba mosque in the city of 
Naberezhnye Chelny, is sure that Muslims are afraid to criticize 
Russia’s foreign policy openly, but still “clench their teeth and 
pray for Muslims in Syria”17. There is an opinion that, in spite 
of a relatively passive reaction of the population, Russian opera-
tion in Syria “provoked a very strong discontent among Muslim 
political activists in the Caucasus”18.
16 “Rossiiskie musulmane o bpombardirovkakh v Sirii” (Russian Muslims on the 
bombings in Syria).
17 “Musulmane Rossii – otnoshenie k interventsii v Sirii” (Russian Muslims – 
their attitude to the intervention in Syria). 
18 N. Silayev, “Vremya chuzhakov” (The time of  aliens), Profile, 9 October 2017, 
p. 19.
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In 2013 two demonstrations in support of Syrian Islamic 
opposition and against Russian policy in that country – each 
of them with several hundred participants – took place in 
Makhachkala, and another – a small one – in Kazan. Their or-
ganizers accused the Kremlin in “waging war against Islam”.  
There is no accurate information on the number of Muslims 
who have a negative attitude toward Russia’s actions in Syria. 
Sometimes it is stated that nearly a third of all Russian Muslims 
are against Moscow’s Syria policy. 
The attitude of Russian Muslims to the Islamic State (ISIS) 
is also controversial. On the one hand, they despise its brutality 
– terrorist attacks and public executions. On the other hand, 
some young people respect the ISIS, sincerely believing that it 
defends Islamic values, struggles for social justice, against alien 
external influences. A widespread tentative indication is that 
ISIS supporters in Russia might be as many as half a million.
The fact that thousands of Russian Muslims are willing to 
fight on the ISIS side is a proof of its popularity. It is difficult to 
estimate their exact number. In May 2015, the director of the 
Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Alexander Bortnikov 
gave a figure of 1700 individuals19. According to the CIS Anti-
terrorist Centre, 5000 Russian citizens fought in the ranks of 
ISIS20. In October 2016 a federal TV channel mentioned a 
figure of 6000. In early 2017 president Putin, referring to the 
information provided by the General Staff of the Armed Forces 
and the FSB, said that about 4000 of Russians (and 5000 peo-
ple from other post-Soviet states) take part in the Syrian war21. 
According to other data, 7000 Russian citizens fight on the ISIS 
side22.
19 http://mir24.tv/news/society/12713622
20 T. Gushchina and T. Morozova, “Ushedshie v IGIL: Mify I realnost” (They left 
for ISIS: Myths and reality), Komsomolskaya Pravda, 27 July 2016.
21 V. Panfilova, “Rossiia mozhet peresmotret besvizovyi regim so stranami SNG” 
(Russia may revise the visa-free regime with CIS countries), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
28 February 2017.
22 D. Sokolov, “Pobeda nad razumom” (The triumph over reason), Vedomosti, 11 
April 2017. 
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Many Muslims call their trips to the Middle East “the 
Hegira”, comparing this act to Prophet Muhammad’s journey 
from Mecca to Medina in the year 622. They also go to the 
“ISIS front” in order to live in the Muslim world, where they 
would not be a minority. 
Recruitment of Mujahedin takes place in various parts of 
Russia. The call for arms is spread via the Internet, whose Russian 
sector features thousands of relevant accounts. Dozens of web-
sites are working for this purpose – the Al-Hayat and al-Furkan 
being the most popular – the well-known Dabiq journal is dis-
tributed. ISIS disseminates its propaganda via social media, for 
instance the very popular Odnoklassniki (Classmates) network. 
Russian was for a long time the third most used language in 
the propaganda sphere (after Arabic and English). According to 
Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Russian Security Council, 
this recruitment network took roots and so far it has been im-
possible to destroy it completely.
A system of interrelated radical and extremist groups has tak-
en shape in Russia – starting at the Pacific coast, it crosses the 
whole Russian territory, Central Asia and South Caucasus. It 
is also linked to the Chinese Xinjiang region, Afghanistan and 
Turkey. One can call this network an “Islamist route”, used by 
thousands of potential jihadists to get to the Middle East.
In 2016-2017, however, the inflow of militants to ISIS start-
ed to dry down. This can be explained by political and mili-
tary setbacks suffered by the ISIS, the loss of faith in its suc-
cess. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, in 2017 (as of 
October) only five Russian Muslims left for the Middle East to 
fight. How does this figure correspond with reality, it is difficult 
to say. Anyway, one has to admit that the very idea of creating 
a state on the basis of Islamic tradition has by no means ex-
hausted itself; terrorist “sleeper cells” still exist in Russia – they 
display no visible activity, but are ready to enter the scene in 
conflict situations, both inside the country and elsewhere in the 
Muslim world.   
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All these factors shape Russian government’s policy toward 
Islam and Muslims, influence the so-called Islam-State relations. 
The government demands unquestionable loyalty from the 
Muslims. However, this is impossible – at least because of the 
fact that Russian Islam is a part of the global one with all its dif-
ferent tendencies, and first of all Islamism. The Kremlin has not 
been able to gain complete control over the Russian Ummah, 
and will hardly succeed in the future.
The authorities are gradually realising this, though official 
propaganda continues to attribute protest sentiments to exter-
nal influence, the intrusion of ideas and radical missionaries 
from the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Pakistan 
etc. External influence does exist of course. But one has to ad-
mit that its seeds fall on the fertile soil of the Muslims’ frustra-
tion and discontent with the social and economic situation.
The authorities have chosen force as their main instrument 
to combat Islamism. “State activities towards political Islam are 
most often reduced to law enforcement and operations of se-
curity agencies; very rarely we see positive steps aimed at the 
incorporation of Islamic values into the political stabilisation 
process…”23. Many Islamic organisations, both extremist ones 
and only suspected in extremist activities, were banned. Among 
them we should name the “Highest Military Council (Mejlisul 
Shura) of the united Mujahidin forces of the Caucasus”, the 
Congress of the peoples of Dagestan and Ichkeria, Al-Qaeda, 
The Muslim Brotherhood, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan,  Jamiyat al-Islah al-Ijtimai, Jamiyat 
Ihja at-Turas al-Islami, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, Nablighi al-Is-
lami etc. (the last two organisations claim that they are against 
terrorism). Many jamaats are accused of terrorism, and quite 
a number of ordinary citizens as well, who are not engaged in 
terrorist activities, but share the ideas of “unorthodox Islam”, 
23 L.R. “Sykiäinen. Rossiiskaya gosudarstvennaya politika v otnoshenii islama: 
iskhodnye printsipy, tseli I napravlenia” (Russian government policy towards 
Islam: guiding principles, aims and directions), Vatanym (My Motherland), 
Moscow, Federal Voluntary Organization, January 2004, pp. 3-4.
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criticize the authorities and help their family members who be-
long to the opposition.
In 1999 Wahhabism was prohibited by law in Dagestan; in 
2001 a similar ban was imposed in Chechnya and Kabardino-
Balkaria. Legislation prohibiting Wahhabism was not passed 
on the federal level, however, because some clerics and experts 
managed to prove that such a law would only aggravate the 
situation in the Muslim regions. Also Wahhabism is a religious 
trend legally existing in many countries of the Muslim world, 
including Saudi Arabia – a state which Russia tries to improve 
relations with (in 2017 Saudi King Salman visited Moscow). 
The authorities’ combat against Islamists is often accompa-
nied by violations of legal norms – this is especially true for 
North Caucasian republics. In Chechnya under unofficial or-
ders of the Republic’s leader Ramzan Kadyrov houses belonging 
to militants’ families are destroyed (burned down), individuals 
arrested as suspected terrorists are subjected to tortures. Human 
rights activists cite a lot of cases when people arrested by secu-
rity forces simply disappeared. 
Prohibition of various religious publications included in the 
federal list of extremist materials is one of the instruments for 
combating extremism. Often these prohibitions are imposed 
groundlessly, without expert evaluation by specialists in reli-
gious studies. For instance, in the early 2000s in Dagestan the 
Quran translated by Valeria Porokhova was removed from sale 
without any explanation; in 2014 the Quran translated into 
Russian by the Azerbaijani scholar Elmir Kuliyev was prohib-
ited (for unknown reasons Kuliyev was accused of Salafism by 
official experts). There were some absurd cases when Islamic 
literature was banned because the books included quotations 
from the Quran, which, in the opinion of “experts” (who had 
nothing to do with religious studies) backed by courts, incite in-
terethnic and religious hatred, as in these quotations “Muslims 
worshipping ‘Allah’ are set against […] other confessions […] 
An advantage of a certain group over other people is postulated 
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on the grounds [. . . of its affiliation with Islam, the Muslims”24.
These prohibitions irritate Muslim clergy and some Muslim 
politicians including the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. 
Ravil Gaynutdin, Chairman of the Russia Mufties Council, has 
repeatedly urged to put an end to the “festivals of district courts” 
that try to qualify as extremist both the classical theological 
literature and contemporary authors. Nafigulla Ahirov staded 
that “secular court should not pass judgments on the problems 
of Islam, and especially its sacred texts”25. In late 2015 the State 
Duma, apprehensive of discontent among Muslims, passed an 
amendment to the existing legislation, prohibiting district and 
municipal courts to hear cases related to extremism. The prop-
osition of the Chechen deputy Shamsail Saraliev to make holy 
scriptures’ texts immune from trials was also supported. 
In spite of this hard line, the government understands that 
the desired results might not be achieved only by pressuring 
Islamic opposition. President Putin’s meeting with the heads 
of the leading Muslim Spiritual Directorates in October 2013 
is a telling event in this connection. The meeting was timed 
to coincide with the 225th anniversary of the Orenburg 
Muhammedan Assembly, created by Catherine the Great in 
1788 as the first government institution to regulate and control 
the life of the Muslim community. 
In his speech before the clergymen, President Putin outlined 
the main challenges facing the Muslim community. The biggest 
one, in his opinion, is the “socialisation of Islam”, meaning “the 
development of the traditional Muslim way of life, thinking 
and views in accordance with contemporary social reality and 
as a counter to radical ideology”26.
24 “Opyat zapheshcheny molby s ayatami Qurana” (Prayers with Quran Ayats 
banned once again).
25 “Soviet muftiev obzhaluet reshenie suda otnositelno knigi ‘Molba k bogu’” 
(The Mufies Council will appeal against the court judgment on the book “Plea 
to God”).
26 Henceforward all quotations from President Putin’s speech are taken from 
Islam Minbare, November 2013, no. 11. 
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The Islamisation of migration has also attracted the Kremlin’s 
attention. The authorities deem it necessary to enlist Russian 
Muslim clergy to work with migrants, to participate in the 
social adaptation of individuals coming to Russia to live and 
work. 
The President made an important statement concerning po-
litical Islam. Criticising religious radicals, he said that the po-
liticisation of religion is “not always a positive process”. Thus, 
Putin indirectly admitted the legitimacy of political Islam, 
and the fact that this trend is not necessarily a negative one. 
These words show that the Kremlin, maybe under the influence 
of the Arab Spring, admits Islam’s political potential. In the 
Syrian conflict Russia collaborates with Lebanese Hezbollah. 
The Kremlin also maintains regular contacts with Palestinian 
Hamas.
As the former Head of Dagestan (in 2013-2017) Ramazan 
Abdulatipov put it, religion is separated from the state by 
Constitution, but the state is not separated from believers27. 
Therefore, Islam is a “political factor,” and various political 
views and actions (including oppositionist ones) can be mani-
fested through it. 
At the same time, the Kremlin is displeased by the lack of uni-
ty between the two largest Muslim religious organisations – the 
Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (CMSD) and the Russia 
Mufties Council (RMS). Moreover, some government officials, 
first of all in Moscow, support the RMS, while others, and the 
Russian Orthodox Church as well, back the CMSD. As far as 
the Coordination Centre in the North Caucasus is concerned, 
this is an amorphous organisation, torn by conflicts between 
republican Muftiates. Dozens of Muslim Spiritual Directories 
function in Russia today, but, apart from the aforementioned 
ones, only the Muftiates of Dagestan and Tatarstan are really re-
spected. In 2016-2017 Imam Albir Krganov – with the support 
of the Russian Orthodox Church – created a Spiritual Assembly 
27 V. Popov, “Islam trebuet bolshego vnimania” (Islam requires more attention), 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 November 2013.
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of Russian Muslims, but the new organisation failed to build 
substantial trust among believers.
On the other hand, an integration trend exists within the 
Muslim clergy. In 2010 the League of Muslim Journalists car-
ried out a survey and found out that 55% of influential Russian 
Muslim clerics support the creation of a unified religious struc-
ture. Additional 20% share this idea with some reservations28. 
Some clergymen even want to restore the Soviet system of con-
trol over religious life. Nazymbek Ilyazov, Head of the muftiate 
in the city of Astrakhan, for instance, thinks that “in the Soviet 
period for the clergy it was much easier to work for the clergy”, 
and “now it is essential to revive the Soviet tradition of govern-
ing the religious sphere of public life […]  Muslim Spiritual 
Directorates should work in the interests of the state […]”29.
However, it is absolutely impossible to create such a system 
– suffice to mention that the Russian Orthodox Church rejects 
this idea, regarding it a threat to its autonomy.
It is difficult to evaluate the secular authorities’ attitude to-
wards Islam and Muslim without taking the position of the 
Russian Orthodox Church into account. Formally, relations 
between Islam and Orthodoxy are perfect. First, Orthodox and 
Muslim clerics alike support government policies, and, second, 
they have conservative views, sharing a negative attitude to 
“Western values”. It is worth noting that the Orthodox Church 
views democracy as a system incompatible with Orthodox val-
ues, while Muslim conservatives cherish the idea of a specific 
“Islamic democracy” and special “human rights in Islam”.   
This proximity of views, though facilitating mutual 
28 “Itogi vserossiiskogo oprosa musulmanskih liderov vpechatlyaiut dazhe 
skeptikov I protivnikov obyedineniia” (The results of  an all-Russian survey of  
Muslim leaders impress even the skeptics and opponents of  unification), Muslim 
Press News Agency, Islam Minbare, no. 3, 2010. 
29 “Umma trebuet arbitra. Interview Vladislava Kondratieva s rukovoditelem 
Astrakhanskogo dukhovnogo upravlenia musulman Nazymbekom Ilyazovym” 
(The Ummah demands an arbiter. Interview with the Head of  the Astrakhan 
Muslim Spiritual Directorate Nazymbek Ilyazov. By Vladislav Kondratiev), 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta – Religions, 15 January 2014.
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understanding, does not translate into mutual sympathy be-
tween the Muslim and Orthodox clerical establishment. High-
ranking Orthodox clerics sometimes speak dismissively of 
Islam. Even Patriarch Kirill in his interviews has repeatedly and 
pointedly mentioned “religious terrorism”.   
A negative attitude by Orthodox clergy to ethnic Russians’ 
conversion into Islam is a very telling fact. Archpriest Vsevolod 
Chaplin – an extremely conservative Orthodox ideologue – 
calls these people traitors, adding: “A war has been declared on 
us – they want us to change our lives completely against our 
will. This should be treated absolutely seriously – it is a global 
clash as serious as the clash with Nazism in 1940s”30. 
Muslims, for their part, also regard their fellow believers’ con-
version into Orthodoxy negatively. For instance, in Tatarstan 
the “Kryashens” – Christianised Tatars – are sometimes subject-
ed to abuse. In St. Petersburg one clergyman gave his blessing 
to Orthodox propaganda among migrants. In Moscow in 2009 
abbot Daniel Sysoyev, engaged in missionary activities among 
Central Asian migrants, was murdered in his church. 
Muslims are especially irritated by confessional, and, by as-
sociation, political ambitions of the Russian Orthodox Church 
that continuously calls Orthodoxy “the religion of the majority” 
and claims a special position in the state and society. Muslims 
object that by Constitution Russia is a secular state, where reli-
gion should be disconnected from politics.
Conclusion
The situation in the Russian Muslim community can be re-
garded as a relatively peaceful one. Like most citizens, Russian 
Muslims are politically passive and loyal to the authorities. 
Rivalry between traditionalists and Salafis does not lead to 
harsh confrontations and murders, as it happened in a relatively 
30 TV Tsentr pro russkikh musuman, “Predatel vsegda opasen I …”  (Center TV 
channel on Russian Muslims: “A traitor is always dangerous…”.
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recent past. The dialogue between the two trends in Islam is 
going on, though in a “dot-and-dash” manner. 
Religious extremism and terrorism is still present, but the 
level of these activities is lower than in the previous years. This 
can be proved by the statistics of armed clashes in the North 
Caucasus: the number of their victims has fallen from 1705 in 
2010 to 287 in 201631. In other parts of Russia – including the 
Muslim Volga region – there were no terrorist attacks at all in 
2014-2015.
Muslim migrants are relatively peaceful – their behavior in 
Russia is markedly different from that of their counterparts in 
Europe. Incidents with their participation are relatively rare. 
The terrorist attack in St. Petersburg, organised in 2017 by mi-
grants from Central Asia is rather an exception. Muslim mi-
grants have become a part of Russian Ummah and are fitting 
into the Russian society, though with considerable difficulty. 
The influence of external factors – the situation in the Middle 
East and the Islamic State in particular – has diminished in 
comparison with the period immediately after the proclama-
tion of the ISIS Caliphate in 2014. Interest in the ISIS is de-
clining. And, as far as Russia’s involvement in the Syrian con-
flict is concerned, most Muslims are indifferent to it. 
Still the situation in the Russian Ummah is evolving by a 
sinusoidal motion. The threat of mounting tensions and even 
conflicts remains a probability. In October 2016 several ter-
rorist attacks took place in the North Caucasus, showing that 
Islamists still have some force left in them. Efforts to eliminate 
the roots of Islamism have not succeeded so far. The econom-
ic crisis is aggravating and living standards deteriorate. This 
leads to a growth of protest sentiments that can be manifested, 
among other things, in a religious, Islamic form.
It is also unclear how Muslims who have returned from the 
Middle East will behave. So far these individuals full of mili-
tant and religious energies are lying low. But Nikolai Patrushev, 
31 http:www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/system/uploads/article_image/image/0013/136 
541/new_2.jpg
Russia 2018. Predictable Elections, Uncertain Future92
head of the Russian Security Council, thinks that “people who 
have received such a combat experience and who remain reli-
giously and politically ‘charged’, after returning to their perma-
nent places of residence […] can pose a rather serious threat to 
their countries’ security”32. 
Apart from Islamist activity, conflicts can be provoked by 
harsh actions of security forces, unmotivated bans on religious 
literature etc. 
All this requires an elaboration of new adequate approaches 
from the Russian government. For such a step consistent shifts 
in the secular authorities’ ideology, practice and even political 
psychology are necessary. 
32 Sovbez RF: Boeviki, “Islamskogo gosudarstva iz stran SNG mogut stat ugro-
zoi natsionalnoi bezopasnosti” (ISIS Militants from CIS countries can pose a 
threat to national security: Russian Security Council), Info Islam.
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5.  Russia’s Quest 
     for Economic Independence
Philip Hanson
In Britain, Brexiteers say they aim to “take back control”. A sim-
ilar sentiment lies behind much of contemporary Russian eco-
nomic policy. The Brexit campaign has specific targets: above 
all, replacing EU regulation with British regulation. Russian 
economic policy has a broader range of aspirations: from im-
port substitution through severe limits on external debt to na-
tional control over IT systems. But the similarities in underly-
ing motivation are strong. Brexiteers and Russian advocates of 
economic sovereignty share a suspicious view of foreigners and 
a readiness to sacrifice or deny the existence of benefits from 
existing patterns of international economic integration.
In the Russian case, a suspicious view of at least some for-
eigners is understandable. Moscow is after all subject to sanc-
tions imposed by the US, the EU and a number of other coun-
tries from 2014. But several of the ‘fortress Russia’ elements in 
Russian economic policy pre-date sanctions. Economic sover-
eignty is a long-standing preoccupation in Russia, even though 
the official Strategy of Economic Security was reformulated 
only in 20171 (O strategii 2017; the previous version dates from 
1996).
The first section of the paper outlines the definition and 
coverage of economic security in Russian policy. Subsequent 
sections are devoted to the main components of the strategy: 
limiting public debt; limiting the economy’s sensitivity to the 
oil price; limiting dependence on foreign technology by import 
1 O strategii ekonomicheskoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 
2030. (On the Economic Security Strategy of  the Russian Federation until 2030).
substitution; raising the domestic economic growth rate. The 
final section contains conclusions about the prospects of faster 
growth – perhaps the most important aim of an economic secu-
rity policy – after the 2018 presidential elections. 
Economic sovereignty and economic security in 
current Russian official thinking
The key idea in Russian policy statements on economic sover-
eignty is that Russia must minimise its vulnerability to outside 
influences. In 2006, Vladislav Surkov, then a Deputy Head of 
the Presidential Administration, introduced his notion of sov-
ereign democracy by saying that Russia wished to cooperate 
with other nations “according to just rules and not to be man-
aged from outside”2 (emphasis added).
These outside influences might come from deliberate actions 
targeted at Russia, such as sanctions, or they might be the result 
of the undirected working of markets. The frequently-expressed 
distaste for Russia becoming a “raw material appendage” (pri-
datok) of the West suggests the latter fear. This distaste is as 
much an expression of wounded pride as of economic anxiety, 
but the fear that primary producers have less control over their 
own fates than advanced and diverse economies seems to play 
a part. 
In July 2015, the Russian Security Council instructed the 
Ministry of Economic Development to draft a new Economic 
Security strategy3. Nearly two years later, after inter-departmen-
tal vetting and amendment, the new doctrine on economic se-
curity appeared4. In it, the definition of economic security is 
2 V. Surkov, “‘Nasha rossiiskaya model’ demokratii nazyvaetsya ‘suveren-
naya demokratiya’” (‘Our Russian Model of  Democracy’ is named ‘Sovereign 
Democracy’), address to United Russia officials, Moscow, 28 June 2006.
3 “Nikolai Patrushev: Nuzhno razrabotat’ strategiyu ekonomicheskoi bezopas-
nosti Rossii” (Nikolai Patrushev: It sis necessary to develop an economic security 
strategy of  Russia), Pravda, 3 July 2015 
4 O strategii ekonomicheskoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 
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given as “the preservation of national sovereignty by defence 
against internal and external [economic] threats”5. The refer-
ence to internal threats is, at first sight, an anomaly. It becomes 
clear later in the document, however, that domestic sources of 
economic weakness are treated as threats to Russia’s econom-
ic security, along with external influences. This is a source of 
potential conflict within the policy-making process: the most 
plausible treatment of domestic economic weakness may re-
quire greater openness to the world economy (v. infra). 
The document lists a number of concerns arising, it is 
claimed, from current circumstances. During the “transition 
from a unipolar to a multipolar world” instability increases: 
international markets fluctuate more; international debt is 
more unstable, and the natural-resource export model is un-
dermined. In self-defence, Russia needs to achieve a “sufficient” 
level of technological independence and therefore lower “criti-
cal” dependence on imported technology. Strategic reserves of 
capacity must be created; the vetting of foreign direct invest-
ment in strategic industries must be strengthened; indicators to 
be monitored include the federal budget balance, both domes-
tic and international debt, and inflation. The language about 
these indicators is vague, but the implication is that the public 
finances should be conservatively managed. 
The economic security strategy is the work of several agen-
cies, and it shows. It expresses concerns about low investment 
and even about property rights in Russia, as domestic sources of 
weakness. But there is no discussion of the opportunity cost of 
economic security measures in the form of potential gains from 
international integration forgone. It is as if gains from interna-
tional trade and investment did not exist, which is weird, given 
Russian official position on regional economic integration and 
the benefits of the Eurasian Ec Union.
2030 (On the Economic Security Strategy of  the Russian Federation until 2030), 
cit.
5 Ibid., p. 4.
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Controlling public debt
The current Russian official preoccupation with fiscal prudence 
may well be at least in part the result of a chastening experience 
in the Yeltsin era. In August 1998, the Russian government 
defaulted on part of its public debt, unilaterally restructuring 
its debt in GKOs (short-term state bonds). The GKOs were 
rouble-denominated but widely purchased by foreign investors 
and held by Russian banks that were themselves indebted to 
Western banks. Returns on the GKOs had touched 100% be-
fore the bubble burst. A Western bail-out launched a month 
earlier had failed to restore confidence in Russian finances6.
The default was followed by a burst of inflation, a seizing-up 
of Russian financial markets and a massive devaluation of the 
rouble. In the event, the rapid decline of the rouble from about 
6 to the US dollar to over 20 helped to start the subsequent 
recovery, but the humiliation and the immediate losses to 
Russian banks and other investors were not forgotten. When 
rising oil prices brought the opportunity to run surpluses in the 
balance-of-payments current account and the federal budget, 
those surpluses were squirreled away in foreign currency re-
serves, the paying-down of foreign debt and the building-up 
of budgetary reserve funds. There was a net outflow of private 
capital, except in 2006 and 2007, as Russian businesspeople 
sought safe havens for their wealth while the policymakers in 
the financial and economic bloc of government pursued ortho-
dox conservative policies of financial prudence. Both the state 
and the private sector were playing it safe. The result, as shown 
in Figure 1, is that Russia, like other oil-exporters, has very 
modest levels of sovereign debt.
6 P. Hanson, “The Russian Economic Crisis and the Future of  Russian Economic 
Reform”, in N.V. Chowdray (Ed.), Global Economic Crises, An Introduction, 
Hyderabad, ICFAI University Press, 2004, pp. 179-183.
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Until early 2015, Russian sovereign debt had an invest-
ment-grade credit rating from all three major credit-rating 
agencies, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. (At the time 
of writing, Russia’s rating is below investment grade so far as 
the first two of these agencies are concerned). There has been 
a long period during which the Russian state could have bor-
rowed abroad on good terms. Indeed, even in 2016, modest 
Eurobond offerings totalling $3 billion were readily taken up, 
despite sanctions and credit ratings.
Fiscal prudence has been pursued for reasons of conserva-
tive financial policy, steered by two Finance Ministers: Aleksei 
Kudrin from 2000 to 2011 and then Anton Siluanov. But there 
is no question that this fiscal conservatism has been supported 
by President Vladimir Putin. If Putin had wanted more bor-
rowing and fiscal stimulus, he would have got it. This budgetary 
caution fits well with the search for economic independence.  
Fig. 1 - Russia and selected countries: 
gross public debt as a share of GDP, 2016 (%)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, April 2017
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Borrowing abroad is a particularly sensitive issue. In autumn 
2017, as the inter-departmental budget battle for 2018 heat-
ed up, the Ministry of Finance was reported as being simply 
unable to provide spending departments with the funds they 
sought over and above the expenditure plan for 2018, because 
the main budgetary reserve fund was almost completely used 
up and domestic financial markets were too small to provide 
the funding requested. The option of borrowing abroad was not 
mentioned7 (Butrin, 2017).
In recent Russian macro-economic policy, the case for aus-
terity rather than stimulus is, in any case, strong: the economy 
lacks the spare capacity for real output to expand without infla-
tion. That does not mean, however, that this conservative policy 
is without its costs. With public expenditure on state pensions 
and the military high and rising – at least through 2015 –, 
state investment in human capital (healthcare and education) 
has been squeezed. These are precisely the expenditure headings 
that former Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, in high-profile 
reform proposals, wants to see growing8. 
Dependence on oil
Countries in which exports of primary products are large rela-
tive to GDP face certain risks. The prices of those exports are 
likely to be volatile. The availability of natural resource rents 
may keep incentives for enterprises lower than in countries 
where those rents are not present and may provide more scope 
for corrupt relations between the state and businesses. 
The existence of these risks does not mean that nations that 
are rich in natural resources are necessarily handicapped in their 
7 D. Butrin, “Den’gi ne pukhnut” (Money doesn’t smell), Kommersant, 8 September 
2017.  
8 T. Lomskaya, “Kudrin predlozhil Putinu zanyat’sya obrazovaniem iI zdor-
ov’em” (Kudrin proposed to Putin to tackle education and healthcare), Vedomosti, 
6 September 2017. 
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economic performance. Norway, a developed country with a high 
“dependence” on oil and gas exports, has strong open-society insti-
tutions and a robust system for managing its hydrocarbon wealth. 
Russia, however, has struggled to cope efficiently with its 
wealth of oil, gas, coal, and metals – particularly oil and gas. 
Before the oil price decline of 2014, oil and gas accounted for 
about two-thirds of Russian exports, and revenue from them 
covered around a half of federal government spending. By heav-
ily taxing oil and gas and, from 2004, channelling a substantial 
part of the revenue into reserve funds, the government succeed-
ed to some extent in insulating the domestic economy from 
oil-price fluctuations; but not completely.
In the boom years, state spending crept up with the oil price, 
and that price was the dominant influence on the rouble/dollar 
exchange rate. Moreover, natural resource rents were used to 
prop up, by both formal and informal transfers, inefficient eco-
nomic activity in other sectors9.
When the oil price fell in late 2014, the pressures on the 
budget and the exchange rate of the rouble were intense. This 
served as a reminder that both fiscal prudence and economic 
security required stronger insulation of the budget and the do-
mestic economy from the oil market. 
First, the federal budget for 2017-19 was planned with a 
conservative oil-price assumption (annual average oil price) of 
$40 per barrel (/b).
Next, there was an attempt to create legislation that would 
lock in a reduction in the budget’s sensitivity to the oil price. On 
5 July 2017, the Duma approved at first reading a rule that oil 
and gas budget revenues accruing from an oil price above $40/b 
must be channelled into the Reserve Fund and not into current 
spending – $40/b being the cut-off point in 2017, rising by an an-
nual 2% in subsequent years as an adjustment to US inflation10. 
9 C.G. Gaddy and B.W. Ickes, “Putin’s rent management system and the future of  
addiction in Russia”, in S. Oxenstierna (Ed.), The Challenges for Russia’s Politicized 
Economic System, Abingdon, Routledge, pp. 11-33.
10 V. Visloguzov, “‘Gosduma vzyalas’ za pravilo” (The Duma has taken a stance), 
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Earlier “budget rules” have been based on a similar objective but 
this is the strongest version adopted thus far. It remains possible 
for the leadership to suspend the rule, with the endorsement of 
the Duma; but with “economic security” at stake, that will not be 
done lightly. The funds thus sterilised should in principle remain 
in the Reserve Fund – largely depleted at the time of writing but 
allowed by the same legislative amendment to the Budget Code 
to be replenished from the National Welfare Fund.
If this rule is respected and the Urals oil price stays main-
ly above $40/b, the budget and the economy at large should 
cease to be hostages to the international oil market. All being 
well, the budgetary reserves would be built up for use in anoth-
er oil-market downturn. The objectives of fiscal prudence and 
economic security would both be served. 
There is, however, a political catch. Strict adherence to the 
budget rule would limit the scope of what Gaddy and Ickes 
describe as Putin’s rent management system. Funds to buy off 
business lobbies and to look after Putin’s cronies would be more 
tightly rationed. The effects on intra-elite tensions could be to 
exacerbate them.
Import substitution
In September 2017, the Russian government submitted to the 
Duma draft legislation that would require all state-controlled 
companies to seek government approval for the purchase of air-
craft, helicopters, and ships from abroad11. On 8 September, 
President Putin told IT specialists in Perm’ to cut down on their 
use of imported hardware and software for security reasons. 
They told him that 90% of the hardware currently employed in 
Kommersant, 6 July 2017.
11 A. Vorob’ev, A. Toporkov and D. Beloglazova, “Goskompaniyam pridetsya 
soglasovyvat’ s pravitel’stvom pokupku samoletov, vertoletov i sudov” (The 
Oil companies wil have to coordinate with the government on the purchase of  
planes, helicopters and boats), Vedomosti, 10 September 2017.
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Russia and 70% of the software was imported – so there was a 
long way to go12. These were simply new steps in the develop-
ment of the Russian state’s import substitution campaign – an-
other element in the search for economic security.
That campaign has its precursors in Russian economic poli-
cy, but the import substitution campaign that can be observed 
today began with three presidential instructions issued in May 
2014, following the West’s first round of asset-freezes and visa 
bans but before the broader financial sanctions that were to 
follow in the summer13.
The government was instructed to assess the possibility of 
“competitive import substitution in industry and agriculture”, 
and to do so in two-and-a-half months; to compile (in just 
one more month) a list of goods and services that could be 
purchased by the state from producers within the Eurasian 
Economic Union; and, in one further month, to work out 
plans for implementing import substitution. 
So far as can be judged from published reports, these instruc-
tions came out of the blue. In April, there had been a discus-
sion led by the President of the problem of supplies of military 
equipment from Ukraine and what to do if they were halted by 
Kiev. That is the nearest reported high-level discussions came to 
focussing on import substitution before May 2014.
Meetings, legislation, and state spending followed. A 
Government Commission on Import Substitution, chaired by 
Prime Minister Medvedev, was established. Subsidised credits 
from the Fund for the Development of Industry have been 
deployed to encourage import-substituting production. The 
Ministry of Industry and Trade has a leading role in the cam-
paign, under the government commission14.
12 “Vstrecha s predstavitelyami informatsionnogo klastera Permskogo kraya” (A 
meeting among the representatives of  the information cluster of  Permskij Kraj); 
8 September 2017.
13 R. Connolly and P. Hanson, Import Substitution and Economic Sovereignty in Russia, 
Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme Research Paper, June, p. 10.
14 For more details and Russian sources, see ibid.
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The scope and scale of the campaign are not easy to deter-
mine. In 2015, there were said to be 570 import-substitution 
investment projects under 19 branch programmes. How many 
of them were (a) real and (b) in existence only because of the 
campaign, is impossible to say. In the same year, the Fund for 
the Development of Industry reportedly allocated a modest 
R20 billion to 59 projects. That suggests activity on a limited 
scale.
The import substitution programme is intended to reduce 
Russia’s dependence on foreign technology by building up do-
mestic production of high-quality equipment and know-how 
in a range of industries, from farm machinery to IT. Domestic 
production appears to include inward foreign direct invest-
ment, leading to production by foreign subsidiaries or joint 
ventures – though this is not stressed.
A programme of this sort carries risks. It entails micro-man-
agement by the state, which can be a source of inefficiency. 
Excluding foreign suppliers from a market reduces the pressure 
of competition, slowing the innovation, quality-improvement, 
and cost-reduction that a producer would otherwise have to 
undertake in order to survive. Even if the exclusion of imports 
is planned at first to be for a limited period, the resulting pro-
tection may create an effective lobby for extending restrictions, 
organised by the firm or firms protected.
It may be possible for a nimble, efficient state agency to man-
age an import-substitution programme of limited scope and 
duration – preferably one that focuses on areas of real compet-
itive potential – without succumbing to these risks. But few 
would describe the Russian state as nimble and efficient. There 
has been no shortage of domestic critics highlighting these risks 
and calling either for a scrapping of the campaign or at least a 
cautious and moderate approach to it. 
One of the more discreet and tactful critics has been the 
Prime Minister, Dmitrii Medvedev. This is, at any rate, the 
gist of an article in the journal Voprosy ekonomiki that bears 
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his name15. Perhaps he did not write it, but it is to be hoped 
that at least he read it, for it contains some sound advice for 
the chairman of the Government Commission on Import 
Substitution (Medvedev himself ): countries that have joined 
the selected group of leading economies have not done so by 
restricting trade; cooperation with the West will at some point 
be resumed; and import-substitution should not become the 
“slogan of the day”.
Others have made the point that protection reduces com-
petition and therefore incentives to efficiency, and that even 
“temporary” protection tends to endure16. 
In the event, cuts to state spending have probably done more 
than the critics to curb expenditure on import substitution pro-
jects. Such expenditure restrictions will have more impact on 
investment funding for these projects than on the bans on state 
procurement, for example, of imported furniture17. The latter 
may incur costs in the form of higher prices for the purchasing 
departments but any such effect is indirect and less easily ob-
served than the cost of an investment programme.
At the same time, changes in the exchange rate of the rou-
ble against the dollar and the euro tended for much of 2014-
16 to favour import-substitution, regardless of the campaign. 
What the campaign and a favourable exchange rate seem to 
have failed to do is to create momentum in Russia’s domestic 
production. 
The import substitution campaign has been primarily about 
industry and IT. There has also been a new protectionism in 
agriculture: the counter-sanctions18. Unlike the import sub-
stitution campaign, the counter-sanctions were officially and 
15 D. Medvedev, “Novaya real’nost’: Rossiya i global’niye vyzovy” (A new reality: 
Russia and global challenges), Voprosy eknomiki, no. 10, 2015, pp. 3-29.
16 See for example, Igor Nikolaev blog on Ekho Moskvy, 13 September 2017, 
“‘Teper’ i bez inostrannoi mebeli” (‘Now’ and without foreign fornitures).
17 Ibid.
18 R. Connolly and P. Hanson (2016), pp. 17-18; A. Kostyrev, “Plody zapresh-
cheniya” (The forbidden fruit), Kommersant, 7 August 2017.
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explicitly a response to Western sanctions. Introduced in the 
summer of 2014 and periodically renewed, they are an embargo 
on the import of most food items from those countries that had 
imposed sanctions on Russia. 
There are some leakages around the embargo, including 
the invention of Belarusian prawns, but the counter-sanctions 
unquestionably provide some protection for Russian farming. 
Have they stimulated growth in farm output? It is the case that 
value added in agriculture, fishing, and forestry grew at 3.3% 
a year in 2014-16 while Russia’s overall GDP was falling19. But 
that comparison probably gives too favourable a view of the ef-
fect of counter-sanctions. The farm sector also benefitted from 
the weaker rouble and good weather conditions, and had not 
been doing badly before 2014. Still, the counter-sanctions very 
likely helped.
This particular policy raises a number of issues. First, com-
plaints about higher food prices and lower quality resulting from 
the counter-sanctions are said to be common. The embargo is 
estimated to have added R4,400 a year (€65) to average food 
bills20. Second, the stimulus to production may be limited in its 
impact by uncertainty about the duration of the embargo. This 
is suggested by the contrast between falling beef-herd numbers 
and rising numbers of pigs on Russian farms: the former re-
quire longer-term investment planning than the latter. Third, 
the protected sector, as usual, seeks to prolong the protection. 
The Minister of Agriculture, Aleksandr Tkachev, has said he 
would like to see the counter-sanctions lasting for ten years21. 
Protectionist policies in general – both the import substitu-
tion campaign and the counter-sanctions – build up lobbies 
for their perpetuation. Now that antagonism between Moscow 
and Washington is entrenched, there may be a long period in 
which international political pressure for dismantling these 
protectionist measures is lacking. Therefore, the lobbies may 
19 Rosstat, hiip://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/vvp/vvp-god/tab11.htm
20 A. Kostyrev (2017).
21 Ibid.
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have their way without having to try too hard. Most econo-
mists see net benefits accruing to most countries from freer 
trade and investment, and will treat this as bad news for the 
Russian economy.
Economic security, as defined in the 2017 strategy, might be 
held to justify the cost of this protectionism. But a main aim set 
out in the strategy is to reduce Russia’s dependence on imports 
of advanced technology by developing a broad range of interna-
tionally-competitive high-tech production in Russia, and that 
may be particularly hard to achieve. It is one thing to put up 
with an absence of Camembert and stylish furniture, and make 
do with home-made substitutes. It is quite another to make do 
with a lack of advanced gas turbines or computers. Catching up 
in high technology without either close links with the world’s 
leading companies or the stimulus of competition is, to put it 
mildly, challenging. 
Faster growth
In the 2017 strategy there is a list of indicators of Russia’s na-
tional economic security22. They include measures of sustain-
ability of the public finances, such as the ratio of public debt 
to GDP and the size of the budget deficit – topics already dis-
cussed above – but the list also contains GDP per capita at 
purchasing power parity and Russia’s share of global output: in 
other words, the country’s levels of productivity and prosperity 
and its economic weight in the world. The experience of eco-
nomic ‘stagnation’ since about 2012 is a source of deep concern 
for the Russian leadership. It brings with it fears of popular 
discontent and a loss of international influence. 
Russia’s changing share of world output since 2010 is shown in 
Chart 2 alongside the equivalent shares of China and the United 
States. The projections through 2020 are those of the IMF.
22 O strategii ekonomicheskoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 
2030, cit., p. 17.
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Russia has an economy that is much smaller than those of China 
or America and much less productive than that of America. But 
for the leadership’s sense of geopolitical progress, so far as that 
can be judged, the real challenge is that Russia has ceased, at 
any rate for the time being, to “catch up” – to have a growing 
economic weight in the world. 
Nor does this seem likely to change in the near future. The 
IMF’s view of Russian prospects is shared by the majority of in-
dependent forecasters. In the August 2017 poll of twenty-four 
forecasters by the Development Centre of Moscow’s Higher 
School of Economics the median forecast was for 1.4% GDP 
growth in 2017, edging up to 1.8% in 202323.
23 hiips://dcenter.hse.ru/prog2/
Fig. 2 - Shares of global output at purchasing power parity, 
United States, China and Russia 2010-2016 estimated 
and 2017-20 projected (%)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, April 2017
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The reasons for this are, in short, the following. The inputs 
of both capital and labour into production have been stagnat-
ing, and at least in the case of labour will continue to do so, for 
demographic reasons. Investment in human capital, upgrading 
health, skills, and knowledge, is widely perceived also to be lan-
guishing. The output might still be made to grow faster if the 
introduction and diffusion of new products and processes and 
investment in both human and physical capital were to accel-
erate. But the private sector is deterred from innovation and 
investment by its vulnerability to asset-grabbing by, typically, 
a collusive combination of corrupt officials and business rivals 
with better access to political favours. In other words, their 
property rights cannot reliably be defended24.
This is a systemic problem, and the loss of dynamism in 
the economy since 2012 may perhaps be associated with a 
worsening of an already-poor ecosystem for private business. 
Anders Aslund suggests that the period from 2012 on has been 
characterised by a combination of crony and state capitalism 
– the state’s share of the economy growing while the private 
sector is increasingly dominated by a small group of associates 
of President Putin25. At all events, uncertainty appears to have 
increased for most of the Russian businesses, though not for 
friends of Putin. The state, even if it were in principle capable of 
injecting vitality into the economy, has been limited by its own 
adherence to financial orthodoxy.
One response to “stagnation” has been a search for a new 
economic strategy that could lead to faster growth. The official 
objective is a sustained growth rate faster than the global av-
erage, so that Russia might increase its share of global output 
by 2020. It is not yet clear whether the new strategy is to be 
unveiled as part of Putin’s presidential campaign or only after 
the presidential election. It may well be that the more alluring 
24 For an extended description and discussion of  this problem, see P. Hanson, 
Reiderstvo: Asset-Grabbing in Russia, Chatham House paper, 2014.
25 A. Aslund, Russia’s Crony Capitalism: Stagnant but Stable, CASE Seminar 
Proceedings no. 148, 2017.
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parts of the programme will be on show during the election 
campaign and the less alluring bits afterwards. A rise in the 
retirement age would be an example of the latter.
The search for a new strategy has been conducted as a com-
petition between contending drafts, the main ones being three. 
There is the government’s own version, drafted by the Ministry 
of Economic Development (MED). Then there are the drafts 
proposed by two civil organisations – the Stolypin Club (SC), 
led by the presidential ombudsman for business, Boris Titov, 
and the Centre for Strategic Research (CSR) led by former fi-
nance minister Aleksei Kudrin – with quite different visions 
of the way ahead. The CSR has had by far the most media 
attention but has kept the details of its proposed plan secret. 
However, Kudrin and the CSR have put out so much material 
that their preferences are clear. What is not clear is how many 
of their declared preferences are incorporated in their proposals 
to President Putin.
The MED “target” scenario includes a very moderate loos-
ening of fiscal austerity compared with present policy, and the 
ritual advocacy of an improved environment for business. An 
earlier version sought curbs on real wage growth to boost cor-
porate profits and thus investment but that seems to have faded 
from view.
The centrepiece of the SC plan is fiscal and monetary stim-
ulus. The government deficit should be kept at 3% of GDP 
– modest enough by Western standards but shocking to the 
Russian Ministry of Finance – funded by foreign loans and a 
monetary emission of R1.5 trillion. The debt of small and me-
dium enterprises should be restructured. And there is the usual 
call for an improved business climate – for which Titov has 
campaigned for years26.
Orthodox critics of the SC proposals argue that they might 
briefly boost output but that in the medium and longer term 
26 A. Prokopenko, “Stolypinskii klub napisal al’ternativu kontseptsii Kudrina” 
(The Stolypin club wrote an alternative to Kudrin’s concept), Vedomosti, 1 March 
2017.
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their main consequence would be inflation. Unemployment 
is low and so, according to Rosstat, is spare capacity, so the 
critics have a point. In any case, the whole direction of fiscal 
and monetary policy, backed by Putin, is one of caution. Yes, 
the leaders want faster growth, in part for security reasons, but 
they also fear debt and inflation, also for security reasons. They 
would have to be convinced that there was no alternative route 
to faster growth before they would even consider following the 
advice contained in the SC plan.
The CSR proposals, insofar as they can be inferred from CSR 
reports and Kudrin’s articles, are for continued fiscal restraint 
plus liberal reform.  They include some increase in the share 
of state spending allocated to health-care and education, off-
set by a drop in the shares allocated to “unproductive” uses; a 
step-by-step rise in the pension age; substantial privatisation; 
reform of state administration; and measures to improve the 
business climate including reforms to make the courts more 
independent27.
The “unproductive” expenditure headings that Kudrin ear-
marks for relative reduction include defence and the category 
“security and law enforcement”. The former share should, in 
Kudrin’s budget manoeuvre, edge down over seven years (2017-
24) from 3.1 to 2.8% of GDP; the latter from 2.3 to 1.8%. If, 
boosted by reforms, the economy were to grow at an average 
rate of 3% a year, these diminished shares would still allow de-
fence spending to increase marginally in absolute terms.  But 
they would shave a little off security and law enforcement. If 
ever a proposal was designed to annoy the siloviki – the security 
bosses – this is it. It labels their life’s work ‘unproductive’ and 
offers to reduce the resources made available to them by the 
state. Is this really part of the CSR proposal to Putin, which has 
not been made public, or is it merely a sideshow designed to 
please the liberal intelligentsia?
27 Centre for Strategic Research (CSR) presentation on reform, hiip://csr.ru/
wp-content/2017/01/GF4.pdf; T. Lomskaya (2017).
Russia’s Quest for Economic Independence 111
If the CSR proposal to Putin includes a downsizing of the se-
curity establishment, privatisation of leading banks and energy 
companies, and the establishment of an independent judiciary 
– all aims that Kudrin and CSR have publicly espoused – it 
would amount to a complete re-fashioning of Russia’s political 
economy. Putin and his close associates may indeed be con-
cerned about Russia’s slow growth, but are they so concerned 
that they would risk that sort of change?
Conclusion. Conflicting aims 
and political obstacles
There are two underlying problems that impede Russia’s search 
for economic invulnerability. One is that the conditions for eco-
nomic security as officially defined are not mutually compati-
ble. The other is that one of those conditions – faster growth 
– may be at odds with the interests of the political elite.
Conflicting aims. Dennison’s First Law is as follows. The 
simultaneous pursuit of diametrically opposed objectives sometimes 
leads to difficulties (Stanley Dennison, liberal Cambridge econo-
mist). Governments of all kinds in all places are apt to run into 
difficulties of this sort. Policies pursued in contemporary Russia 
in the name of economic security have been no exception.
Russia approaches the 2018 presidential elections with an ar-
ray of policies designed to maintain, among other purposes, the 
nation’s economic security: fiscal and monetary conservatism, 
the sterilisation of the inflow of petro-dollars, import-substi-
tution, and the boosting of growth. But the objectives these 
measures are meant to serve are not all amenable to the same 
treatment.
The biggest conflict is between faster growth and protection-
ism. There may be occasions when protecting a particular line 
of production stimulates innovation and growth in the industry 
that is protected, so that it becomes internationally compet-
itive. And there are some lines of production where security 
in the broad sense makes it desirable at least for some states 
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to cultivate an independent national capability: fighter aircraft, 
for example. But protectionism reduces competitive pressure 
on the protected producers and less competition generally 
means less incentive to cut costs and to innovate. And if that 
loss of competitive pressure is the main result of a policy such as 
Russia’s import-substitution, then the policy’s net effect is slow-
er growth and faster inflation. But growth and price stability are 
themselves objectives of the search for economic security. 
Import substitution is particularly problematic in an era 
when IT permeates all economic activity. Russian companies 
have done well in a number of areas while subject to inter-
national competition: anti-virus software and social networks, 
for example. But in payments systems, e-commerce, and com-
puter hardware and software more generally28 the country is a 
very long way from technological independence and is having 
difficulty trying to achieve it. Perhaps the attempt to establish 
home-made alternatives to the likes of Google and American 
Express is a costly impediment to domestic prosperity. The rest 
of the world, if it ever tried, has long since given up. And do-
mestic prosperity, after all, is one of the implicit objectives of 
“economic security”.
The problem of elite interests. Finally, there is the problem 
of the political acceptability of the different growth proposals. 
This matters. In the long run, the issue of growth is the most 
important item on the economic security agenda.
Some of the measures proposed in one or more of the com-
peting draft strategies stand a chance of implementation – at 
least in part. There will probably be more effort put into the 
digitalisation and other streamlining of public administration, 
for example. It would not be too difficult to imagine the pen-
sion age being raised – in small steps and after the election. On 
the perennial subject of the “business environment” there is al-
ready an attempt to make the system of control and inspection 
by regulatory agencies less pervasive than it currently is. And 
if in the medium term the oil price remains well above $40/b, 
28 Kremlin (2017).
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more room might be found for an expansion of public funding 
of healthcare and education – without an offsetting contraction 
in spending on security and law-enforcement.
One proposal runs up against the very notion of econom-
ic security: the Stolypin Club’s stimulus plan. It sets off alarm 
bells: it carries a risk of higher debt and faster inflation. Does 
the stimulus look capable of generating enough growth to sup-
port additions to budget revenue that would restore the public 
finances to a healthy condition? No. But even if it did, it would 
go against the grain of Putin’s implied policy preferences.
The most problematic recommendation of all is the one that 
is common to all the draft strategies: that the environment for 
business should be improved. This is probably the most im-
portant recommendation of all. What would be required to 
reduce the uncertainty experienced by private companies be-
cause of the threat of asset-grabbing and unpredictable bribery 
demands? (If the “bribe tax” is predictable, it can be planned 
for, and ceases to be a source of uncertainty). What is needed 
is almost certainly more than the minor adjustments planned 
for the control and inspection system. Kudrin and the CSR 
have called for the establishment of an independent judiciary. 
Whether that is in their proposal to Putin is unknown, but they 
have at any rate raised the issue, as have others before them. 
There have also been proposals to take a number of economic 
offences out of the criminal code and deal with them under 
civil law. These two measures, and particularly the first one, 
would drastically reduce the ability of officials to force targeted 
businesspeople to surrender all or part of their businesses.
The absence of a rule of law adequately protecting property 
rights is widely understood in Russia to be a fundamental im-
pediment to investment and innovation. Members of the po-
litical elite, or at least the technocrats and pragmatists among 
them, understand this as well as anyone. The trouble is that this 
move towards an open-access society would impinge on their 
own elite interests, for three reasons.
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First, lower-level officials are used to “feeding” off those they 
supervise and regulate. This is part of a set of arrangements to 
keep them loyal to the system. Indeed, it is part of the system.
Second, this system keeps those lower-level officials in a state 
of suspended punishment, because bribery and asset-grabbing 
are illegal and these illegalities can always be used against them 
by the higher authorities. That underpins obedience. Finally, 
the members of the political elite themselves would be vulnera-
ble to a proper enforcement of the law.
For these reasons, the establishment of a rule of law remains 
a distant prospect. If the protection of property rights is a nec-
essary condition for Russia’s escape from “stagnation”, the pres-
ent system is likely to endure, and sluggish growth with it. In 
the long run, that would be damaging to Russia’s economic 
security.
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6.  Russia and the West: 
      A Possible Thaw in Relations?
Giancarlo Aragona
An essay on Russia and the West must first examine whether, 
in the post-Cold War era, the definition of the West as a block 
of cohesive countries facing Russia is still valid. The answer can 
only be a qualified yes.
The geopolitical reality in the Euro-Atlantic area has changed 
drastically since the early Nineties. In parallel, the Euro-
American relationship has undergone transformations. As a 
consequence, also the notion of West vis à vis Moscow cannot 
be immune from an evolutionary process.
The election of Donald Trump to the White House has add-
ed a further element of uncertainty to the way western solidari-
ty is interpreted by the country which has always functioned as 
the undisputed leader of the block.
During the Cold War, the US, through NATO1 and other 
channels, set the tone of the relations with Moscow. The allies, 
facing the massive Soviet threat, paid maximum attention to 
safeguarding their cohesion and to acting in unison towards the 
USSR. The existence of some room for manoeuvre, especially 
in trade and industrial areas, should not be overestimated. Italy 
was a case in point. It never departed from its strong commit-
ment to loyal participation in sharing the burdens of the com-
mon defence, but pragmatically entertained active industrial 
and commercial relations with Moscow.
1 The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949 by twelve founding 
members, and entered into force on 24 August 1949. The Warsaw pact, officially 
Treaty of  Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, was signed on 14 May 
1955 by the Soviet Union and seven Soviet satellite states of  Central and Eastern 
Europe.
Soviet leaders were keen to consider the White House their 
counterpart in the then bipolar world. They felt comfortable in 
this situation. It substantiated the USSR claim of superpower 
status and guaranteed a high degree of stability and predicta-
bility, which were and remain constant objectives of Russian 
foreign policy. This never discouraged Moscow from taking ad-
vantage of opportunities to weaken Western cohesion and drive 
wedges in the Euro-American link, also by exploiting the pres-
ence of strong communist parties in certain European members 
of NATO2. These attempts by and large always failed.
The demise of Soviet communism and the end of the Warsaw 
Pact3, together with evolutions in the global balance of power, 
changed the way Western solidarity was intended and enact-
ed. However, despite the transformative impact on the world 
dynamics of the end of the Cold War, we can safely say that 
Transatlantic cohesion, and NATO’s relevance under the guid-
ance of the US, have been safeguarded.
Is the Trump presidency going to change this consolidated 
scenario? How will it impact on the very notion of “West”, and 
on its relations with Russia? How will the election to the White 
House of a President whose interpretation of American inter-
ests and approach to the exercise of power differs substantially 
from the doctrine and practice of all post-war administrations?
It is legitimate to debate how much remains of the shared 
values and solidarity regarding common security which, at the 
time, deterred the Soviet Union and successfully confronted 
its system of domination in central and Eastern Europe, and 
beyond.
2 Two examples being the Parti communiste français and the Partito Comunista 
Italiano, West European communist parties were similar to their counterparts 
in the Soviet bloc, as they were subordinated to Moscow and connected both 
ideologically and doctrinally to the Soviet model of  socialism.
3  The Warsaw Pact, officially Treaty of  Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance, was signed on 14 May 1955 by the Soviet Union and seven Soviet 
satellite states of  Central and Eastern Europe.
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As yet, there is no definitive evidence that this administration 
accepts that the meaning of “West” goes beyond a vaguely de-
fined commonality of the values of democracy, rule of law, and 
free market economy to comprise crucial practical dimensions.
It is worth remembering the President’s initial scathing com-
ments about NATO, comments which he later amended when 
attending his first alliance summit in Taormina. The iteration 
of the “America first” principle by Trump, together with his and 
his electoral base’s isolationist instincts, are additional reasons 
for concern. It might, therefore, become increasingly compli-
cated to maintain the unity and cohesion of the Western camp, 
especially since it is still unclear how this administration in-
tends to exercise the leadership of the Euro-American commu-
nity. This is due to altering Moscow’s perceptions and strategies.
We have entered a phase of great fluidity, concerning both 
the dynamics within the West and between the West and 
Russia. To this day, as during the Cold War era, Russia still 
considers the United States as the decisive global player against 
which to measure its weight in the world, and the Western al-
lies as Washington’s complement of power in Europe and be-
yond. This explains why the determining feature of the Western 
Russian relationship remains the quality of the interaction and 
dialogue between Moscow and Washington. It might seem an 
understatement to say that this relationship has become in-
creasingly tense and difficult. As Secretary of State Rex Tillerson 
stated at the end of his last visit to Moscow, relations between 
Washington and Moscow are at an unprecedented low.
This paper argues that, in the short-medium term a relaxation 
of tensions is unlikely between Washington and Moscow and, 
as a consequence, between Russia and the group of countries 
defined as the West. To predict future scenarios, and answer the 
question whether and under what circumstances a thaw would 
be possible, it is necessary to examine how we have reached the 
present state of affairs.
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Optimism at the birth of post-Soviet Russia
Events in the following decades have shown that, in reality, re-
lations between the West and Moscow have oscillated between 
phases of apparent understanding and cooperation and periods 
of mistrust and tension. In the early nineties, many in Russia 
sincerely hoped that, with Western support, the country, whose 
Tsarist and Soviet ballast added to its enormous geographical, 
religious, and ethnic complexities and differences, would in 
time become a modern and well-functioning democracy and 
market economy, accepted as an equal by the West.
Although with different views and degrees of conviction, in 
the United States and Europe there was widespread expectation 
that Russia could develop into a mature democracy, comfort-
able in the international community in spite of its diminished 
power and influence, and, most importantly, a genuine partner 
of the West4. In hindsight, this hope underestimated the frus-
tration of Russian elites and large sections of public opinion for 
the loss of power, if not of formal status, following the end of 
the Soviet Union and of the Warsaw Pact, vis à vis the consol-
idation of Western (and American in particular) dominance. 
This mood fuelled a feeling of profound disappointment with 
the way the economy had been hurriedly transformed from col-
lectivism into wild capitalism, where corruption and opaque 
connections dictated the results, to the benefit of the few and 
the detriment of most of the population.
The serious financial and economic crisis of the late nine-
ties concluded a phase in the still young history of post-Sovi-
et Russia and opened new perspectives in which foreign and 
domestic policy interplayed, sometimes perversely, in shaping 
4 As stated by the political economist Francis Fukuyama “The End of  History”, 
The National Interest, Summer 1989: “What we may be witnessing is not just the 
end of  the Cold War, or the passing of  a particular period of  post-war history, 
but the end of  history as such: that is, the end point of  mankind’s ideological 
evolution and the universalisation of  Western liberal democracy as the final form 
of  human government”.  
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the country’s future course. Western-Russian frictions reflected 
clashes of interests but also revealed different readings of the 
end of the Soviet Union. The West (correctly, from its point 
of view) saw the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of 
the Soviet empire as the triumph of its values and system of 
government. Russians, understandably from their perspective, 
interpreted these events, at best, as processes to which they had 
contributed in order to move towards economic and political 
freedom. And they expected to be adequately rewarded. At 
worst, they resented what many saw as a national humiliation, 
which, in time, fuelled a deeply ingrained nationalism.
Russia in front of NATO and UE enlargement 
The decisions to enlarge NATO and the European Union, por-
trayed by their members as a way to extend stability, freedom, 
and economic growth to a larger circle of countries on the con-
tinent, were perceived by Russians as a rollback of their influ-
ence and an infringement of what they considered their areas of 
primary interest. These feelings were accentuated when coun-
tries once part of the Soviet empire, such as the Baltic States, 
became involved in the enlargement processes5.
Suspicions and resentment in Moscow were compounded by 
signals that the US and its allies, stretching the perimeter of the 
responsibility to protect and bring stability to far away coun-
tries or regions in crisis, were determined to claim the right 
of military intervention without UN endorsement whenever a 
consensus in the security council proved impossible.
The modalities of NATO intervention in the Jugoslav crisis 
caused profound resentment in Russia, especially the support 
to Kosovo’s secession from Serbia. Moscow’s suspicions grew in 
the following decade when neoconservatives around President 
Bush began to theorize unilateralism in international affairs and 
the export of democracy.
5 By April 1999, NATO had already welcomed the three Baltic States into its 
ranks, while the countries entered the European Community on 1 May 2004.
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Facing these trends in US foreign policy, which European 
allies followed with varying degrees of conviction, Moscow 
attempted to counter by hardening its obstructionist attitude 
in the UN Security Council, where it could exercise the right 
of veto, and by strongly condemning any action which side-
lined the United Nations. This behaviour was interpreted and 
denounced by the United States and other western leaders as 
confirmation that the Kremlin was not accepting the new rules 
which, at least in their view, should have presided over the man-
agement of the post-Cold War international order.
Many, in the United States and Europe, argued that it was 
the uncooperative attitude of Russia which sometimes made it 
necessary to circumvent the United Nations in order to avoid 
the paralysis of the international community in situations of 
imminent humanitarian catastrophes, genocides, etc.
The concept of effective multilateralism began to take shape 
in American and European foreign policy circles as an attempt 
to reconcile the preservation of multilateral frameworks with 
the ability by coalitions of countries to take prompt action in 
the event of a crisis. With their cumbersome procedures and, 
above all, the need to enlist the consent of the veto powers, 
Russia and China, for any decision, the United Nations were 
the obvious target of this innovative approach. In Russia, the 
combination of economic chaos and national loss of direction 
ignited a process of progressive centralisation of power, in what 
came to be later theorised as managed democracy. The gap in 
values with the West, somehow swept under the carpet in the 
years of euphoria, began to emerge. As it became gradually 
more evident, the Russian establishment, with the exception of 
marginal liberal and westernised circles, started to take pride in 
the return to old Russian values, rediscovering inter alia the re-
ligious roots of the motherland, in contrast to a decadent West.
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The system of government perfected in the long Putin years6 
epitomizes this evolution. Significant consequences followed 
both in terms of domestic and foreign policy. These negative 
factors in Russian-Western relations did not preclude periods 
of solidarity, for instance after the Twin Towers attack in New 
York, or of rapprochement, as at the NATO-Russia Summit in 
Pratica di Mare7. Paradoxically, though, these apparently pos-
itive moments paved the way for subsequent frustration and 
negative developments. Moscow felt that its show of solidarity 
and signals of goodwill to the United States and its European 
allies did not elicit the expected rewards. The euphoria follow-
ing the Pratica di Mare Summit rapidly evaporated as Russia 
felt that NATO was not adopting the changes in its procedures, 
postures, and programmes warranted by the spirit, if not the 
letter, of the summit results.
On the western side, especially in Washington, London, and 
Eastern European capitals, convictions took hold that Moscow 
was aiming at weakening NATO or trying to morph it into a 
security organisation, an OSCE maybe with more teeth – in 
any case, no more the pillar of Western defence and solidarity, 
under American leadership.
A new phase of tension started when NATO’s Bucharest 
Summit in 20088 announced that Ukraine and Georgia could 
in time join the alliance. The ensuing Russian military interven-
tion in Georgia in support of the separatist moves of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia caused strong condemnation in Western cap-
itals. With a parallelism which must have sounded suspicious 
to Moscow, the European Union in 2009 launched the Eastern 
6 Leader of  United Russia: 7 May 2008 - 26 May 2012; Chairman of  the Council 
of  Ministers of  the Union State: 7 May 2008 - 18 July 2012; 34th and 38th Prime 
Minister of  Russia: 16 August 1999 - 7 May 2000 and 8 May 2008 - 7 May 2012; 
2nd and 4th President of  Russia: 7 May 2000 - 7 May 2008 and 7 May 2012 
- today.
7 NATO - Russia Council, Rome Summit 2002. 
8 Official Texts, Bucharest Summit Declaration, NATO, last updated, 8 May 
2014.
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European partnership9 and, as a follow-up, in 2013 it started 
association negotiations with Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and 
Armenia.
Russia, firmly under President Putin nationalistic and 
semi-authoritarian leadership, saw its fears confirmed that the 
West was encroaching upon what was part of the Tsarist and 
Soviet empires and what still saw as its traditional and rightful 
sphere of interest and influence. These steps have progressive-
ly heightened Russia-Western tensions whose most immediate 
causes are well known: the annexation of Crimea by Russia and 
its destabilising activities in Eastern Ukraine, the divergences of 
approach over Syria and more generally over a future Middle 
East settlement, Moscow’s interference in the electoral and po-
litical processes of the US and European countries.
All these factors have brought relations between Moscow and 
the United States to the level eloquently described by Secretary 
of State Tillerson. The same applies to the relations with EU 
countries, although among the latter group views and sensitiv-
ities concerning Russia differ, even significantly. Against this 
background, in the short-medium term, a thaw between Russia 
and the West is highly unlikely.
Several things would need to take place in order to make it 
happen, even without taking into account the complications 
represented by the Trump presidency and the implacable scru-
tiny to which any of its moves concerning Russia is submitted. 
It is a fair assessment that the White House is to all practical 
effects paralyzed where Moscow is concerned.
This might sound paradoxical since the President is suspect-
ed of being over favourably disposed towards the Kremlin, and 
for opaque reasons, while evidence is mounting of the latter’s 
meddling in the US presidential elections in order to damage 
Hillary Clinton.
The turn of events in Washington, where Congress and a 
special counsel are looking into this matter, leading to the 
9 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement 
Negotiations, Eastern Partnership What is it?. 
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indictment of people dangerously close to Trump, has creat-
ed a situation whereby any policy initiative aimed at engaging 
Moscow in dialogue would raise the worst suspicions and be la-
belled as a sell-out of the US and allies security. This presidency 
is still very young, its shortcomings in the foreign policy sector 
(and not only concerning Russia), are not being repaired, and 
the polarisation of the American political debate is not abating. 
Barring the impeachment of the President, a perspective pursued 
by his opponents but complicated to achieve, the Trump factor 
in constraining a thaw with Russia seems therefore destined to 
stay with the US for some time. Besides, it is an open question 
whether President Putin, with Russian presidential elections 
approaching and the Trump presidency under siege, would be 
interested in changing Moscow’s attitude towards Washington, 
and the West in general, or in making compromises.
In any case, the premature termination of the current presi-
dential mandate would produce a trauma in the orderly func-
tioning of the government in Washington. The return to nor-
mal would not be immediate, and the foreign policy views of 
Vice President Mike Pence are not clear. In the meantime, the 
American international role would be diminished.
The Ukrainian crisis
Despite this unpromising background, it is useful to highlight 
what in principle would be needed, from both sides, to move 
towards a thaw between the West and Russia. The most urgent 
requirement, particularly from a European perspective, is pro-
gress on the Ukrainian crisis, with the implementation of the 
Minsk agreements by all sides. In this respect, the main respon-
sibilities fall on Russia, because of its encouragement and sup-
port to the secessionist movement in South-eastern Ukraine, 
as well as of its annexation of Crimea. In Moscow, the events 
in Ukraine are read, and genuinely believed by many in the 
population, in terms radically different from the way they are 
perceived by Kiev, the United States, and the European Union.
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Fundamentally, the Kremlin’s version represents what hap-
pened in Ukraine as the result of manoeuvres by Washington’s 
and its more anti-Russian allies aimed at installing a subservient 
regime in Kiev, severing Moscow’s deep-rooted links to Ukraine 
with blood and family connections going back for centuries, and 
putting in jeopardy the Russian naval base in the Crimean city 
of Sebastopol. Hence, the reaction of the people of Southern 
Ukraine and the population of Crimea, where pro-Russian sen-
timents are dominant, which Moscow could not ignore. This 
reading of the events is self-serving and distorts reality.
The way in which the then European Commission man-
aged the negotiations of the association agreement is open to 
serious criticism. Brussels underestimated the deep divisions 
and emotions in Ukraine over relations with Russia, as well as 
Moscow’s deep apprehension about the geopolitical and strate-
gic positioning of a country so meaningful to Russian identity 
and once vital component of the Tsarist and Soviet empires. 
However, Moscow’s intervention can in no way be represented 
as a necessitated response to those events.
Russia must accept that history cannot be reversed and that, 
in respect to Ukraine, as to other countries which have emerged 
from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it has no right nor 
possibility to constrain their sovereign choices. This acknowl-
edgement would not cancel long-standing family and cultural 
links or imply the infringement of Russian interests. It would 
demand the building of fruitful relations on a different basis 
from the past.
The end of Russia’s interference in Ukraine and unequivocal 
respect for the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, as well 
as autonomy in determining its domestic and foreign affairs, 
are essential prerequisites to starting a process of detente. It is 
worth noting that the latter term was used during the Cold War 
but has re-emerged in discussions of current Russian-Western 
relations.
It may sound cynical, but decisive pressure on the secession-
ists to implement their part of the Minsk agreements, so that 
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the Southern-Eastern regions can revert to Kiev’s control, might 
also help the Kremlin to divert the international community’s 
immediate attention from the issue of Crimea.
To underline Moscow’s evident responsibilities and call upon 
Russia to act, does not underestimate that the Ukrainian gov-
ernment, given the deep divisions and the prevailing emotions 
in the country, is facing difficulties in playing its part in the 
implementation process. However, even a government with a 
more solid support base would meet enormous obstacles in en-
acting and obtaining domestic acceptance of such significant 
changes in the constitutional structure of the country while 
facing heavy military, economic, and political pressure from a 
dominant neighbour.
A cooperative approach by Moscow would gradually relax 
the apprehensions of those sections of the Ukrainian popula-
tion more hostile to Russia, and facilitate Kiev’s task in selling 
the agreement domestically, thus nearing the end of a protract-
ed and highly destabilising conflict in the heart of Europe.
The electoral results in France and, partly, Germany, have 
run against Russian hopes. In France, the election to the Élysée 
of Emmanuel Macron has frustrated Moscow’s explicit support 
for the populist and anti-European campaign of Marine Le 
Pen. Not surprisingly, the French President has taken a very 
firm stance regarding Russia.
In Germany, where Russian behaviour has been more cau-
tious, the results, although they have weakened Chancellor 
Angela Merkel and complicated her efforts to form a new gov-
ernment, anticipate continuity in foreign policy by the next 
government.
Confronted with this situation, the Kremlin would be bet-
ter advised to make some adjustments to its handling of the 
Ukrainian dossier. The proposal, floated by President Putin, to 
deploy a peace keeping force in Ukraine, though impractica-
ble in its original form (it would crystallize the separation of 
the secessionist regions), might offer the opportunity to test his 
willingness to work towards a solution. If, however, Vladimir 
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Putin, as expected, stands for re-election, he is likely to run 
an electoral campaign where nationalism and Russian excep-
tionalism will weigh significantly. Therefore, we cannot expect 
compromises soon nor can we know when and if Moscow will 
begin to exert serious pressure on the secessionists to facilitate a 
settlement coherent with the Minsk agreements.
Russia and Middle East
Syria is proving to be another area of friction between Russia, 
the US, and European powers.
With regard to the Arab awakenings, Moscow’s historical 
diffidence concerning popular protest and equally established 
reflex to suspect adversarial forces of denting Russian interests 
were in evidence.
Amid the Middle Eastern turmoil, Moscow did not conceal 
its anxiety and suspicion of any change in the status quo, fearing 
instability above all else and exposing itself to the accusation 
of insensitivity towards democratic progress and the violations 
of human rights. Russia’s diplomacy has tactically adapted to 
circumstances as the uprisings in the Arab countries unfolded, 
sceptical of the evolving events.
When France and the UK, with American consent, interpret-
ed the UN Security Council resolution, approved by Moscow, 
to intervene in Libya and eliminate Ghaddafi, the Kremlin’s 
worst fears were confirmed. This moment represented another 
watershed in shaping its attitude towards Western motivations, 
and not only in the Middle East.
It is plausible that initially, Russia’s intervention in Syria was 
in reaction to two concerns. First, the prospect that a post-As-
sad settlement would be organised and dominated by the US 
and its allies, paving the way for the further consolidation of 
American influence in the region. Second, intertwined with the 
previous one, the fear that the collapse of the Alawite regime 
would carry the loss of its important foothold in the Middle 
East and of its only naval base in the Mediterranean.
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In fact, according to rumours echoed in the international 
press, within the Obama administration and maybe in some 
European capitals, the idea was being nurtured that the rebel-
lion against Assad in Syria offered the opportunity to simultane-
ously eliminate a tyrannical regime in Damascus, close to Iran, 
and the historical Russian presence in the country, thus dimin-
ishing its projection in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. 
Such a plan, had it ever existed, would have been overambi-
tious and misguided: the fight against Isis in Syria, an American 
and Western priority, needed, in the light of the realities on 
the ground, the concourse of the factions aligned with Assad, 
helped and supplied by Iran and Russia.
Russian (and Iranian) support for the regime has changed 
the course of the Syrian crisis and statements by Western lead-
ers that, in order to pacify the country, Assad must go, sound 
now perfunctory or projected into an undefined future. At the 
moment, Putin has a strong hand in the Syrian game. Russia’s 
position on the ground is more solid now than it was at the be-
ginning of the war. A settlement in Syria is nowhere near and, 
should it materialize, it is likely to carry the imprint of Russia, 
Iran, and Turkey rather than of the United States and other 
Western powers. Moscow will encourage a solution only when 
and if a political process, independently of Assad’s destiny, will 
guarantee continued Russian influence in the country and the 
region.
It is worth noting that signals of the consolidation of Russian 
regional status and influence are already emerging. King Salman 
of Saudi Arabia’s state visit to Moscow at the beginning of 
October was not only a significant diplomatic gesture. The two 
parties also announced agreements in the field of military-in-
dustrial cooperation.
However, while Moscow at the moment seems to have the 
upper hand, its actions have produced consequences which will 
not be easy to manage in the longer term, and not necessarily in 
the Russian interest. As becomes more evident by the day, they 
have facilitated Iranian penetration in Syria and beyond, and 
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raised the alarm of the Sunni Arab powers. It is doubtful that 
Russian and Iranian fundamental objectives and interests will 
continue to coincide, also taking into account that Israel will 
not sit idle while Teheran and the Hezbollah consolidate their 
positions in its proximity. The Israeli dimension in Russian-
Middle Eastern policy should not be underestimated. Moscow 
will have to reckon with Tel Aviv’s views and possible reactions.
Moscow has prevented an immediate damage to its interests 
by intervening in Syria, but it has started a very complicated 
and uncertain military and diplomatic venture with a number 
of contradictory variables.
Furthermore, the war in Syria is only one of the problems in 
the Middle East, the entire area being an arc of crisis. Libya, a 
country where Italian interests are exposed and vulnerable, rep-
resents another difficult open issue. There too Russian moves 
raise concerns in so far as they do not appear coherent with the 
national reconciliation efforts led by the United Nations.
The Middle East contains innumerable contradictions and 
to reconcile them into a compatible framework would prove 
arduous for anyone. The crisis of the international global order 
is epitomised by events in that region. The multiple conflicts 
of interest and the juxtaposition of competition among global 
and regional powers, together with delicate religious fault lines, 
make the Middle East an area where, for an indefinite time, 
Russia and the West are likely to find themselves on different 
sides. Russia stated readiness to cooperate with Washington 
and the Western powers in the fight against the Islamic state is 
marred by ambiguities and mental reservations.
The situation is not made any easier by the fact that so far, 
the Trump administration, beyond its declared commitment 
to fight Isis and to energize the pursuit of a solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has not manifested a comprehensive 
approach to the Middle East. Instead, it conveys the impression 
of oscillating between confusion about its strategy and disen-
gagement from the decisive role which the United States have 
traditionally played in shaping the equilibria in the region. A 
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diminished contribution by America to Middle Eastern dynam-
ics would create a vacuum susceptible to increasing instability.
Moscow’s adversarial posture concerning the US and its dis-
regard for the human rights violations10 by Assad, its recurrent 
use of the veto in the security council to protect the Syrian 
regime (most recently to obstruct the extension of the activity 
of the commission investigating the use of chemical weapons), 
have expanded the distance with the West, which goes beyond 
conflicting aims to touch upon values and general visions. 
But, as important as Ukraine, Syria, and the Middle East are, 
in order to improve Russian-Western relations progress hangs 
on issues of a wider nature.
Cooperation despite different visions 
Since Putin’s advent to power and subsequent transformation 
of the political landscape in Russia, Moscow’s approach to the 
way the international order should be organised, especially in 
the Euro-Atlantic region, became progressively more divergent 
from the Western vision. Realpolitik methods stretched to the 
extreme, and a perverse combination of managed democracy 
at home and assertiveness abroad seemed to become the deter-
mining factors in the Kremlin’s diplomacy.
International liberalism and promotion of democracy and 
human rights were, albeit with nuances, the declared guiding 
references for the West. From these divergent philosophies, 
against a growing gap in understanding the respective moves, 
concrete consequences in policies ensued. Putin’s Russia, in 
Western eyes, seems engaged in attempts to recuperate an out-
dated concept of foreign policy, based on spheres of influence 
and zero-sum games, thus trying to reverse the results of the end 
of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
From the Russian perspective, fuelled by the Kremlin na-
tionalistic propaganda, the US and Europe are engaged in an 
10 Syria. Events of  2016, World Report 2017, Human Rights Watch, 2017. 
Russia and the West: A Possible Thaw in Relations? 131
unrelenting effort to deny Moscow its role of great power and 
its right to protect its interests in Europe and beyond. The 
Russian expectation that the US and its European allies recog-
nize Moscow’s claim to a sphere of influence in its near abroad 
(however defined) and probably in wider areas has become the 
core disagreement. In the Kremlin interpretation, spheres of in-
fluence carry heavy practical consequences and imply the right 
to interfere in the sovereign choices, including in the foreign 
policy and economic fields of a country.
Can such an acknowledgment from the West be forthcom-
ing? It cannot be excluded that President Trump, given his 
transactional approach to foreign policy, might have proven 
sympathetic to this expectation, at least up to a certain point 
and in so far as not in direct contrast to US interests.
However, given the turmoil and deep polarisation surround-
ing his tenure of office, he lacks the political capital and author-
ity to make acceptable to the mainstream establishment and 
public opinion a dramatic departure from what have become 
founding principles of the US foreign policy. A departure made 
more traumatic because it would concern a country accused 
of having worked for his election and would substantiate the 
accusations that the President is indifferent to the interests of 
allied countries exposed to Russian claims of a right of scrutiny 
and intervention in their affairs.
During Yeltsin’s presidency (July 1991 - December 1999) and 
also in the initial phase of Putin’s tenure of power, many experts 
were inclined to consider Moscow’s foreign policy as essentially 
reactive and aimed at containing further erosions of Russian 
power. As time went by, the Kremlin seems to have concluded 
that to put Russia on an equal footing with the United States, 
and launch signals to China, it must act more aggressively on 
the international stage, adopting destabilising tactics whenever 
deemed useful.
Therefore, we should not expect significant progress in the 
relationship between Washington and Moscow: rather, in the 
short term, if anything, an increase in recriminations and 
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accusations is more likely as the investigation on Russian inter-
ferences in the presidential election goes ahead.
All these factors combined lead to the conclusion that we are 
faced with conflicting narratives of the post-Cold War era and 
divergent philosophies of international relations.
A real thaw between the West and Russia can only happen 
when and if the gap in the narratives of the post-Cold War 
period begins to narrow, the principle of equal sovereignty and 
rule of law is accepted and respected, and Russia does not feel 
marginalised: conditions which are clearly not within reach in 
the immediate future. For now, we can realistically expect only 
limited cooperation on urgent matters like nuclear safety and 
proliferation, arms control, or some acute aspects of region-
al crises. The fight against Isis, as we have seen, represents in 
principle a priority area for cooperation. However, being close-
ly connected with wider geopolitical factors, concerted efforts 
meet with considerable obstacles.
It is an indisputable fact that, in shaping the Russian-Western 
relationship, the weight of the European Union appears rel-
atively marginal. Only some member countries of the Union 
play a significant role in this respect. It is worth asking why the 
EU as a group cannot make their impact adequately felt.
Divisions along different lines fracture Europe in formulat-
ing its Russian policy. The first, and most obvious, is between 
the old members and those from Eastern and Central Europe. 
The latter look at Moscow with profound diffidence, if not hos-
tility. They have suffered greatly under Soviet domination, and 
their struggle against the overwhelming eastern neighbour in 
some instances goes back to Tsarist times. Western EU mem-
bers do not have such historical ballast and grievances, or at 
least not of a comparable nature. It is a difference which also 
exists in NATO, where the paramount US influence until now 
has been able to facilitate and maintain common positions.
In the Union, despite all the talk and, in some instances, 
fear of German dominance, a similar leadership cannot be ex-
ercised. This is particularly true in the field of the Common 
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Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The consensus rule, which 
is unavoidable when vital national interests are at stake, leads to 
the formulation of policy platforms normally representing min-
imum common denominators among the members’ positions. 
The room for manoeuvre of the high representative is heavi-
ly constrained. In this situation, the EU appears split between 
some members’ excessive apprehension (and overreaction) in 
the face of any Russian move and underestimation of the risks 
in some of Moscow’s initiatives, by others.
Equally, among the old EU members, differences towards 
Russia exist and are not easy to reconcile. The United Kingdom, 
the recipient of considerable Russian investment in particular 
in the field of real estate, has nevertheless traditionally promot-
ed, both in NATO and the EU, a policy of firmness towards 
Moscow in all matters of security and international affairs. The 
Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries follow a similar 
pattern. The crucial German position has always been nuanced. 
In addition to economic cooperation, Berlin must endeavour 
to entertain an overall relationship with Russia which is coop-
erative to the maximum possible extent. In this, Moscow has a 
specular interest since stability in Europe depends in large part 
on Russian-German constructive dialogue.
At the same time, Berlin cannot neglect the attitudes and ex-
pectations of its partners to the East, situated as they are in the 
uncomfortable space between Germany and Russia. It is an un-
easy balancing act which the crisis in Ukraine has further com-
plicated, causing growing unease in the personal rapport between 
President Putin and Chancellor Merkel. The German electoral 
results are not likely to alter these fundamental data. France un-
der President Macron has hardened its position vis à vis Moscow. 
The southern countries seem to sponsor a softer line towards 
Russia, although with limited impact on overall EU policies. 
These constraints and the leading American role in orienting 
the Western course towards Moscow, generate in turn marginal 
Russian interest in considering the Union a credible interlocu-
tor in geopolitical or strategic matters.
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In the eyes of Russia, the EU shadows US and NATO’s 
policies.
Hence Russia’s preference to deal with individual EU coun-
tries, either because of their particular relevance or because they 
are deemed amenable to Moscow’s aspirations. Moscow should 
realize that this game in the long-term is not in its interest and 
prevents full cooperation with a vital partner.
It is a worrisome situation, particularly when uncertainty 
reigns concerning the diplomacy of the United States. It also 
makes the search for a thaw in Western-Russian relations more 
problematic.
In order for the EU to strengthen its profile and make a more 
significant contribution to the formulation of the Atlantic strat-
egy towards Russia, it must agree on a united and balanced poli-
cy platform. This means, on the one hand, upholding European 
values and being responsive to the understandable concerns of 
the eastern partners about Russian moves and intentions. On 
the other hand, the 28, soon 27 with Brexit, should also exer-
cise the supreme virtue of diplomacy, i.e. realism, and acknowl-
edge that in certain areas, in its near abroad and beyond, Russia 
has played a historical role and still has interests which cannot 
be disregarded.
So far, this balanced approach has proven elusive, and it is a 
meagre consolation that also NATO faces similar issues.
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In 2017, the critical state of the relations between Russia and 
the EU was confirmed. At the end of June, the EU decided to 
renew its economic sanctions on Russia for another six months, 
while Moscow kept its counter-sanctions on many imports from 
Europe. In an attempt to isolate the country internationally, 
the West did not reinstate Russia’s G8 membership. Moscow’s 
military intervention in Syria supporting Bashar al-Assad did 
not make things better: as in the case of the Ukrainian crisis, 
different narratives regarding both the specificities of the Syrian 
crisis and, ultimately, the founding principles of global govern-
ance, emerged.
2018 does not look any more promising. The continuity 
in Putin’s rule is likely and so is the persistence of the many 
points of frictions between Moscow and Brussels, chiefly over 
Ukraine. Yet, while the deadlock in the relations seems a plau-
sible scenario, it does not need to be the only one. Against all 
odds, Russia and the EU can resume dialogue on several issues, 
including the most difficult ones, provided that both put aside 
the wait-and-see approach that dominated in 2017, and engage 
in an active dialogue on the crucial issues that would allow re-
storing relations. 
The growing drift in values between Russia 
and the EU is here to stay; the EU should learn 
how to deal with it
Over the last few years, the security and political divergenc-
es between Russia and the EU have been growing in terms of 
values, too. In 2013, Putin asserted in his annual state of the 
nation a morally conservatives world-view in opposition to the 
West’s liberal one, exposing Russia’s willingness to fight against 
what it considers to be the West’s normative imperialism. Since 
then, Russian officials made numerous references to a “post-
West” world order, in which each country’s sovereignty should 
be preserved not only from military and political interference 
but also from what is perceived as the imposition of Western 
values.
Is this a top-down conservatism that the Kremlin is merely 
trying to advance domestically and exploit internationally as a 
way to fight the West? It does not seem so. Despite the nuanced 
image of Russia’s conservatism offered by Ferrari in his chap-
ter, it is undeniable that conservative views are more and more 
widespread within Russian society and beyond. Not only do 
Eastern Partnership countries, new EU members from Central 
and Eastern Europe and segments of old EU members’ societies 
share conservative views, but they also increasingly see the EU 
as imposing liberal values threatening the very essence of their 
populations. While divisive factors such as the so-called “mi-
gration crisis” contributed to consolidate and amplify the fears 
of these countries, Russia appears as a relatively stable model 
for the defence of traditional values. For the EU, which has 
based both its integration and foreign policies on the defence of 
liberal democratic values, this is a problematic issue not only in 
terms of Putin’s possible political gains, but also in light of the 
erosion of the popular consensus to the European project. The 
EU cannot and should not step back from the defence of liberal 
democratic values, so enrooted in its very nature. However, it 
should strive to mediate between the most progressive and most 
conservative streams within its own societies, while looking for 
new languages that are not perceived as patronising by non-EU 
societies, including the Russian one.
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The EU should pursue a resilient Russia policy
Resilience is the catchword for the new EU Foreign policy. 
Highly mentioned in many official documents, such as the 
2016 “EU global strategy”, resilience is a principle defining the 
EU’s ability to deal with an increasingly changing and more 
complex global environment in a flexible manner. With a tai-
lored approach and a pronounced focus on local specificities, 
resilient strategies in EU foreign policy seem to mark the end of 
the inward-looking and “one-size-fits-all” approaches that local 
partners have often accused the EU of. 
The EU has long acknowledged – at least formally – the need 
to adopt a tailored approach in its relations with Russia; now, 
it needs to make it truly resilient. In our view, this does not 
only entail measures to strengthen the EU’s ability to respond 
to possible Russia-related threats, in particular regarding energy 
security, hybrid warfare and strategic communication; it also 
requires a more active search for a thaw in the relations with 
Russia. The last official attempts by Brussels and Moscow to 
improve the strained state of relations date back to 2016. 2018 
should be the time when both the EU and Russia demonstrate 
more creativity and audacity, starting from a genuine attempt 
to understand each other’s point of view and interests. The 
growing lack of trust between Russia and the EU may provoke 
a sort of “frozen conflict” that both should try to avoid, in light 
of the high political and economic costs entailed. As Giancarlo 
Aragona puts it, the EU “must agree on a united and balanced 
policy platform” acknowledging Russia’s historical role and in-
terests in certain areas. Russia, in turn, needs to make conces-
sions especially on Ukraine, where it should guarantee the full 
implementation of the Minsk peace agreements on the Donbass.
Do not take Russia’s implosion for granted
In the past year, the EU has shown the ability to adjust and re-
sist to destabilising factors. Does Russia have state and societal 
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resilience, too? Several chapters in this report tackle the huge 
political, social and economic challenges facing Russia. Sakwa 
and Vitale highlight the political pitfalls of the Russian system, 
still overly reliant on Putin and with little space for a true and 
independent political opposition. Hanson maintains that it is 
also due to these political shortcomings that the Russian econ-
omy fails to implement the required measures to improve GDP 
growth. The Western sanctions overlapped with a situation of 
falling global oil prices, contributing to magnify Russia’s exist-
ing problems and pointing at dramatic scenarios where an im-
plosion of Russia’s institutions and economy seemed imminent. 
Despite all these challenges, though, Moscow has demon-
strated considerable political, economic, and social stability. 
For instance, Malashenko gives a (perhaps, over-)optimistic 
view of how Russia manages and guarantees the peaceful co-ex-
istence of Muslim minorities in Russia, be it migrants from 
the Caucasus and Central Asia or Russian citizens of Muslim 
origins. Russia is proving that not only it can keep muddling 
through the turmoil without collapsing, but it can also intensi-
fy its international presence to assert its foreign policy interests. 
Some very recent economic trends, such as the rise of global oil 
prices (exceeding the price of $70 per barrel in January 2018) 
may contribute to renew Russia’s confidence and push doomed 
scenarios away. Western sanctions fostered stagnation but, so far, 
they have failed to put Russian economy on its knees. Russia’s 
future, especially economy-wise, continues to look gloomy, but 
the EU should carefully keep tracking the evolution of recent 
trends such as the rise in global oil prices carefully and avoid 
taking Russia’s implosion for granted. Not to mention the fact 
that an imploded, hence destabilised Russia (both economically 
and politically) would not be a desirable scenario.
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Critical review of all the possible instruments 
in dealing with Russia (including sanctions)
Consistency in upholding European principles must be pre-
served, but this does not mean that an automatic and perpet-
ual roll-over of sanctions is inescapable. The effectiveness of 
the sanctions is questionable. Not only did Russia maintain its 
position towards Ukraine but, over the last few years, it has 
also increasingly drifted away from the EU and the West at 
large both at the political and economic level. This constitutes 
a problem both for the West and for Russia. Pursuing a dia-
logue with Russia, whatever path it will take after the elections, 
is still in the EU’s best interest. Perhaps, the flexible and dia-
logue-prone approach of Italy could inspire the general EU ap-
proach towards Moscow and show a way out from this impasse 
we are currently in. 
Against a general backdrop of confrontation, Russia and the 
EU can and should still work on areas where they have shared 
interests. “Selective engagement with Russia on foreign-poli-
cy issues” indeed one of the EU’s Russia policy “Five guiding 
principles” that were agreed at the EU Foreign Affairs Council 
in March 2016 and that remain the main framework for the 
EU’s policy towards Russia. One of the recent and fundamental 
issues where Moscow and Brussels could cooperate on is the 
full implementation of the Nuclear Deal with Iran, currently 
threatened by Trump’s hostile approach. Hopefully, the defence 
of the Deal could offer a possible EU-Russia cooperation path, 
possibly reviving the optimism that the current state of the re-
lations lacks and badly needs. As redundant as it may seem, 
overcoming differences and the mutual lack of trust is the first, 
difficult step to restart a necessary cooperation.
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